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SUMMARY
In the North Atlantic market, with carriers supplying far 
more seats than required by the passengers, a situation 
of over-capacity has been created. This made many intern­
ational airlines to compete vigorously among themselves 
to get good share of the market by attracting the maximum 
number of passengers to fill as many of the empty seats as 
possible in a desperate move to receive new revenues; but . 
that resulted in a deterioration in their financial results 
due to low yields and higher costs.
The major aim of the work is to examine the state of 
competition occuring between international airlines, with 
many carriers coming to the market bringing or introducing 
innovative low fares, and to ascertain whether this compe­
tition has had any role in causing the over-capacity in the 
supply of seats and the overall influence on the industry.
The work suggests formulating a remedial action of co-ordination 
between all those parties associated with the industry to 
reach a better multilateral understanding build on the 
optimal balance to serve the interests of all for the best 
of the whole air transport industry.
The performance of the airlines and their financial stability 
need some form of regulation in off setting the results of 
deregulation and to refrain from extreme system of either 
way as the unilateral action by one party to impose its own 
views and practices can prove very difficult for others.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
1.1. AIMS :
The main objectives of this study can be outlined in the 
following points;
A- To look into one of the most important sectors of the 
international air transport market that of the North 
Atlantic.
B- To investigate the state of competition occuring between 
the international carriers and the unhealthy state of 
air transport where many airlines are suffering severe 
financial setbacks especially in the end of seventies 
and up to this date.
C- To examine and analyse this market by studying all the 
areas affecting the operation of the participating air 
carriers and to ascertain whether competition had any 
significant role in causing the overcapacity and the 
overall influence of this competition on the industry,
D- To formulate a remedial action which takes into consid­
eration the different objectives of airlines.
1.2. HYPOTHESIS :
Because the interests of the public and private sectors 
sometimes conflict, there is no one system of airline 
operation which is applicable to all carriers in the North 
Atlantic market and this need for an optimal balance which 
influences the degree of competition between airlines.
This is so due to the fact that some carriers are privately 
owned and the others are partially or wholly controlled by
—10-
governments and that international airlines tend to belong 
to two main streams of thinking one aiming to achieve 
financial profitability and the other to operate as a 
public service and to benefit the economy.
1.3. METHODOLOGY ;
The work has been progressed by focusing on the theoretical 
side of the subject, the collection, collection and analysis 
of the relevant data and last the extraction of the findings, 
conclusions and recommendations.
The theoretical work is based on giving the reader a complete 
picture to what the air transport industry, especially that 
of the North Atlantic, is all about by looking at those areas 
that constitute and play the major role in determining its 
shape of existence and its continuity.
The collection of data concerning the operating traffic results 
for the period 1970-1980 were drawn mainly from the Interna­
tional Air Transport Association (lATA)’s publications, being 
the most reliable and official source of information in the 
industry. Institut du Transport Aerien (ITA) an international 
association that is concerned with all aspects of air transport, 
and data published by Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) which 
relate to the economic regulation and promotion of commercial 
air transportation within as well as to and from the US,
The c a b ’s main publications include Air Carrier Traffic 
Statistics and Air Carrier Financial Statistics. The financial 
data is one source of data by which it enables CAB more
— .11— I
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accurate assessment of the economic performance of airlines 
and in understanding the market environment in which carriers 
are operating and competing in.
The main journals and trade magazines that were used in the 
desk research beside the major literatures were:
- Journal of Transport Economics and Policy.
- Journal of Air Law and Commerce.
- The Aeronautical Journal.
- ITA Study and Bulletins.
- Aviation Week and Space Technology.
- Flight magazine.
- Tourism International Air-Letter.
- Air transport world.
- International Tourism Quarterly.
- Interavia.
- ICAO publications.
A ten years period, 1970-1980, was chosen for investigation 
and analysis in this study as the airlines in the last quarter 
of the seventies have experienced some financial difficulties 
contrary to the early years of the period when the industry 
was experiencing a considerable growth in passenger traffic 
and airlines were achieving sound financial results making 
it very lucrative for new international carriers to join the 
market.
Also in this period the controversial deregulation approach 
was introduced in the market following the American Deregul­
ation Act of 1978.
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From the initial reading a draft material was prepared on 
each suggested chapter, then came the stage of collecting 
the data that concerned the chosen period in which they 
were tabulated to serve the study. From the analysis of 
these different tables together with the suggested material 
of the chapters, the writer was able to reach certain findings,
conclusions and recommendations which focused and built to
reflect the following ;
- The effect of competition.
- The economic difficulties facing the industry.
- The issue of fares.
- The costs factor.
- The political significance of the industry,
1.4. BACKGROUND TO THE MARKET :
The North Atlantic market, connecting North America and Canada 
with Europe, Middle East and North Africa, which represents 
approximately one third of the w o rld’s international passenger 
traffic, is such an interesting market that has attracted 
over forty scheduled international airlines beside many charter 
air carriers. With this number of competing carriers, the 
market is having a supply of aircraft’s seats much more than 
required by the passenger demand and so a situation of extra
capacity is created. Also it is necessary to mention that
some airlines tend to depart the market as they go bankrupt 
while others come in because they see a potential for profit, 
therefore we have seen significant entry and exit of carriers. 
The international air transport industry is going through
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severe financial crisis leading in some cases to the withdrawl 
and ceasing of operation and Laker Airways is only one example 
of this.
The general reasons behind this international confusion and 
complexity can be attributed to the followings which are inter­
related with each other ;
1- The existence of large number of airlines.
2- Fluctuating and unstable growth of demand.
3- Intense competition within the scheduled airlines and 
between the scheduled and charter carriers leading to the 
availability of extra capacity.
4- The general world economic recession.
The introduction of deregulation and the emergence of many 
non-scheduled carriers offering low cost fares to the public 
forced the scheduled airlines with no choice but to compete 
vigorously to retain their share of the market by introducing 
their own low promotional fares attracting passengers to fill 
as many empty seats as possible in desperate move to get new 
revenues. This lead to a deterioration in the financial 
situation with less and less profits due to low yields and 
at the same time higher cost factors.
With the jury's still out, where airlines still face bankruptcy 
or the threats of bankruptcy taking place, can air carriers 
survive deregulation, as it exists today, is the biggest 
concern facing the industry, and there is that question whether 
governments should have more say in the airlines’ affairs and 
to have some potential regulation.
Facing such a situation, the industry still lacks an important
14-
ingredient in formulating it& remedial action that would suit 
all the participating parties for the benefit and the survival 
of efficient industry.
1.5. LITERATURE REVIEW :
As the study is looking into such an important issue that has 
a big role in effecting and shaping the results of air transport 
industry on such vital and large market that of the North 
Atlantic, the writer has built his review of the main literature 
on this subject on the following areas which most of the 
discussion in the chapters to follow will focus on,
1- The role of the International Air Transport Association 
in fixing rates and the criticism to this activity mainly
by the Civil Aeronautics Board of the United States of America,
2- The issue whether competition and freedom of skies is 
serving for the benefit of the industry or is it playing part 
in the deterioration of the financial position of airlines.
3- How crucial is the issue of extra capacity in discussing 
the above.
On the role of lATA, Richard Chuang and J. Brancker were two 
main sources who focused in detail on the activity of the 
Association.
Chuang in his book ” A case study of a Quasi-Government 
Organisation " which is a revised version of his doctoral 
thesis submitted in 1970 referred to lATA as Quasi-government 
organisation and explored on the following issues:
A- Delegation of functions to a non governmental organisation 
on the basis of many bilateral air service agreements and 
not on the multilateral convention system.
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B- The scope of lATA traffic conferences’ activities and the 
politics of government reservations.
C- The nature of lATA resolutions.
D- The impact of a nation’s economic philosphy on lATA and 
the relationship between aviation policy and the overall 
foreign policy.
Chuang referred to the existence of an inverse relationship 
between the degree of effective government control over its 
carriers and the frequency of government disapproval and of 
government reservations to lATA resolutions and that countries 
tend to have a negative or unfavourable attitude toward lATA 
when they support and approve the free enterprise economic 
policy .
At the same time Chuang refers to the criticism toward lATA 
by CAB in focusing on two issues one, where fares are high 
and second, the secrecy and the closed meetings of lATA.
J« Brancker, in his work ” lATA and what it does ” published 
in 1977 aimed to show that many activities of the Association 
achieve its objectives that of benefiting a regular and economic 
world air transport system by providing a high standard of 
air transport and making air services available to many people.
The work concentrated mainly on the lATA machinery and conferences 
and how the consumer benefit out of the facilities provided. 
Brancker justifies the role of lATA fare fixing and that fares’ 
agreements are subject to government approval and that the 
actual cost of operation and market conditions are taken into 
consideration when building these fares.
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The International Air Transport Association in a survey 
conducted by itself " lATA agreeing fares and rates ” , 
describes its conference machinery showing the way fare and 
rate agreements are reached and it explains the reasons behind 
the implementation of these procedures.
The Association made many interesting conclusions :
1- No single state or airline can enforce its philosphy on 
international level,
2- The provision of excess capacity has contributed to the 
financial difficulties of airlines’ operations beside that 
of inflation and rising costs.
3- There is a greater understanding among governments for the 
need of an international and uniform policy for achieving 
a coordinated and economical civil air transport.
Mahlon Straszheim and Stephen Wheatcroft have been two main 
authors who contributed to the subject of criticism of lAT A ’s 
role.
Straszheim in his book ” The international airline industry” 
in 1969 refers to the Association fare setting process as a 
value of service pricing system due to the political influence 
and consideration that these play at time of establishing 
fares and advocates the introduction of rational pricing. 
Straszheim believe that governments tend to give their approval 
to lATA’s rates not because they meet the interest of the 
traveller and the airline but because the objective of most 
of these governments’ is the interest of their airlines, so
17-
he recommends the need for more government interference 
and supervision of lATA rates setting but at the same time 
aiming and asking for price competition.
Straszheim in his paper ” The determination of airlines 
fares and load factors " believes that the ability of lATA 
to maintain prices well above competition levels for the 
more efficient carriers leaves the travelling public's interest 
for lower fares unrepresented,
Straszheim then focused on two main issues;
- Profits are excessive in some airline markets,
- Load factors are too low in some other markets.
He then argues the theoretical solution for the trade-off 
between scheduled frequency, fares and capacity, and goes to 
analyse the travel patterns and profit prospects,
Wheatcroft on the other hand has always been an lATA supporter 
to its fare setting role in being a compromise to achieve the
benefit for both the private and the public.
Wheatcroft in his book " Air Transport Policy " published in 
1964 has given considerable attention to the importance of 
lATA's role in stablizing the market even that he does agree 
that some lATA fares tend to be build on higher rates due to 
lack of competition than: those fares structured without the 
existence of its role fare fixing.
Wheatcroft have also examined the reasons for regulating air 
transport in which he identified the following ;
1- The characteristic of the industry of being a Quasi public
utility .
2- Free for all could harm the safety of operations.
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3- Its importance for national prestige and defence activities.
4- Due to its national economic characteristics only few 
airlines can operate and that product differentiation is limited. 
Wheatcroft believes that due to the oligopolistic character
of the available carriers it would be difficult to have a 
perfect competitive market and so unregulated competition is 
unlikely to achieve the type of air transport development that 
governments seek and that the scheduled international carriers 
would be satisfied with.
Wheatcroft then advocates the control of entry and tariffs 
as an essential framework for the industry but does not believe 
that market forces should be relied upon exclusively to control 
the development of the airline industry.
Wheatcroft in a paper " The changing economics of international 
air transport ", presented to the Economics and Finance Council 
of Air Transport Association of America in USA in 1981, looked 
at those changes that happened in the international scene, 
their implications and then referred to the actions needed by 
airlines to overcome the problems facing the industry.
In this paper Wheatcroft reaffirms his believe in the necessity 
of some economic regulation in the international air service 
operations.
He stressed the fact that lATA's Conferences should be maintained 
when agreeing on fares and rates and at the same time he saw 
that some changes are needed in its machinery to enable it 
have a more workable system.
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M . Straszheim in his paper "Airline Demand functions in the 
North Atlantic " examined the demand functions and the price 
and the income elasticity for the different classes of services 
in the North Atlantic. He then affirmed that prices play an 
important role in the development of traffic.
While in his work " The international airline industry " ,
conducted in 1965 in which the data used were for the years 
1962 and 1964, Straszheim examined the economic efficiency 
in evaluating the industry performance and considered the 
structural changes in the regulatory environment and recommended 
policies toward improving the performance of the industry.
He also looked at the characteristics of demand and focused 
on the North Atlantic as one market of case study when 
discussing the price elasticity within the First class and 
Economy class services.
A major work on the issue of price elasticity was conducted 
in 1978 by Wheatcroft " Price elasticity revisted " which 
examined the many studies made by different researchers on 
the North Atlantic.
Jesse Friedman prepared his report for British Airways and 
Pan American " A new air transport policy for the North Atlantic ; 
Saving an endangered system " on the nature of the economic 
problems facing the world airlines particularly on the North 
Atlantic market and gave his solutions to these problems.
He emphasized on the importance of blending control and 
competition and the need of accommodating the interests of 
the scheduled and non-scheduled airlines and the public.
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Friedman advocated the reduction or elimination of flight 
frequencies provided by scheduled operations, the prevention 
of excess capacity by the non-scheduled operations and also 
the elimination of barriers to the mixing of both scheduled 
and non-scheduled passengers on the same flights.
Friedman favours the need for the intergovernmental machinery 
concerning capacity problems to be on multilateral basis.
On the subject of efficient pricing, Friedman calls for the 
scheduled carriers to respond to consumer demand and to 
competitive charter operations by offering discount promotional 
fares at any margin above the incremental cost, but due to 
the requirements of healthy competition, this will require 
fares to be not lower than that necessary to meet the charter 
competition at the equilibrium.
Friedman goes on to suggest the need that rates for both 
charter and scheduled services have to be controlled.
As excess regulation is politically out of question, Friedman 
concluded his work that the only choice is between effective 
or ineffective regulation and so the crucial fact is that 
capacity control is the key to remedy the situation on the 
North Atlantic.
Professor Rigas Doganis, in his article ” Air transport - 
A case study in international regulation ” , besides looking 
into the economic consequences resulting out of the type of 
regulation available in the international air transport arena, 
examined the arguments for and against regulation.
He went on to show that there are political constraints which
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make it difficult to justify freedom of competition and i
recommends a revision in the bilateral air service agreements. j
Doganis in his study " Current trends in the international |
I
regulation of air transport " reviewed the existing trends j
!
for both deregulation and protectionism and then foresaw the j
I
following developments: first, charter services to be included !
Iin the bilateral air agreements where their capacity together I
with that of the scheduled operations will be more controlled :
I
and second to bring the tariff of the non-scheduled services I
within the control of these agreements. I
ii
1I
Nawal Taneja in his book " US international aviation policy ", {
published in 1980, examined the importance of lATA's multilateral j 
system in the existing international bilateral regulatory system, 
the pros and cons of deregulation and the consequences of the 
US international aviation policy. He also reviewed and analysed 
the North Atlantic operations for the period 1968-1978 and 
assessed the results.
Taneja challenged the criticism and allegations against lATA 
of being anticonsumer and anticompetitive organisation and 
in contrary believes in the effectiveness of its machinery 
for the benefit of the consumer and find no alternative system 
to work much effectively in the public interest.
Taneja does not appeal to the free market approach in the 
pricing structure and advocates the importance of having the 
international fares controlled by governments.
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Richard Smithies in his article " The changing demand for 
air transport " summarises the international framework behind 
the changing mix of scheduled and charter service on the North 
Atlantic.
Smithies believes that the travellers' needs have changed from 
that of the 1940s and 1950s which made the North Atlantic a 
mass market in which both scheduled and charter air services 
are gearing their activities to meet this demand in a compl­
ementary shape. So he goes to suggest that regulations and 
legislations concerning the air policies should consider this 
change in demand. He has referred to the following as part 
of the problem existing on the North Atlantic:
- The excess of scheduled services.
- The complicated and unprofitable fare structure.
- The existence of different regulations governing the charter 
carriers.
Mutti and Murai in their paper " Airline travel on the North 
Atlantic " focused on the relationship between the passenger 
demand on the North Atlantic and the market shares.
They referred to price levels and exchange rates as two 
important issues when considering demand on the market.
Cooper and Maynard in their paper " The price of air travel " 
suggest that there are no convincing evidence that open market 
and freedom of air will harm the passengers. They go on to 
recommend, as a reform action, the introduction of regulated 
competition together with the injection of subsidies by 
governments to safeguard the continuity of their airlines.
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Two books published in early 1960s have given the basic 
theoretical understanding to the subject of competition 
and regulation in air transportation,
S. Richmond in 1961 in his work " Regulation and competition 
in air transportation " looked on the justification of the 
importance of regulatory air transport and viewed that 
" unregulated competitive market forces may have adverse 
consequences for the public at large " .
While R . Caves in " Air transport and its regulation ” in 1962 
shed the light on the advantages of free competition on the 
US domestic air industry and looked into the policies of 
Civil Aeronautics Board.
Caves relates both the airline's market conduct and performance 
to the regulatory pattern and to the economic elements of 
market structure.
William Q'connor in 1971 in his book " Economic reeulation 
of the world's airlines " concentrated on the economic 
regulation that of the right of carriers to establish service 
to another country, the control of the frequency of flights 
and capacity of aircraft and the fares to be charged.
O'connor advocates the idea of having a multilateral system 
instead of the bilateral. He then looks into the national and 
international aviation interests and suggests that the best 
system is that which will promote lower fares, centralize 
and simlify economic regulation and that seeks the welfare 
and advancement of the less developed countries and the 
lessening of international political tensions.
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O'connor believes regulated competition is the most desirable 
system from the standpoint of world public interest and the 
inevitable and the prevalent system from the political 
standpoint in the foreseeable future.
One of the genuine and detailed works in air transport 
conducted in the United Kingdom is the " British Air Transport 
in the seventies " prepared by the Committee of Inquiry into 
the civil air transport chaired by Professor Sir Ronald Edwards 
and presented to the parliament in May 1969.
The aim of this committee, as put by the report, was 
" To inquire into the economic and financial situation and 
prospects of the British civil air transport industry and into 
the methods of regulating competition and of licensing currently 
employed, and to propose with due attention to other forms 
of transport in this country what changes may be desirable 
to enable the industry to make its full contribution to the 
development of the economy and to the service and safety of 
the travelling public " .
The report recommended : •
1- The establishment of Civil Aviation Authority under which 
the economic, technological and operational aspects of
regulation be brought, I
2- The encouragement in the creation of a second force airline, j
3- To have a better organised public sector carriers concerned |
with British scheduled air services and also to involve j
in charter and inclusive tours. I
iI
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The report favoured the protection of scheduled services 
due to their public service characteristic and which, because 
of its operation at low load factors, will be facing a severe 
competition from their non scheduled rivals.
Beside the above three areas that we mentioned, one has to 
look to one other special subject that of data published by 
lATA on the different data of the traffic movement being the 
main source of data.
lATA's Industry Research Division publishes continued data on;
- Passenger numbers ( scheduled, non-scheduled, lATA and non 
lATA ).
- Percentage of growth on previous years.
- Percentage share of the market.
- Seasonality.
- Load factors.
- Passengers carried by airlines.
- Seating capacity offered.
- Fare types.
The main publications on the North Atlantic are;
1- 1978 North Atlantic traffic Report;
The report in its three sections covered three major issues;
A) Review of the North Atlantic passenger traffic capacity 
and load factor trends for the period 1968-1977.
B) Analysis of the North Atlantic passenger traffic and
capacity by quarter and by direction for the period 
1972-1977.
C) Analysis of the North Atlantic passenger traffic by carrier
and country for the period 1972-1977.
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The main findings of this report were;
1- Seating capacity during the period 1972-1977 recorded a 
slower development than traffic and both capacity and traffic 
recorded marked differences in growth rates by quarter.
2- The introduction of non-IATA scheduled Laker Skytrain |
service at the end of 1977. !
!
3- Both lATA non-scheduled and total charter traffic grew |
faster than lATA scheduled and the total scheduled traffic |
for the period 1968-1977. I
4- lATA non-scheduled traffic grew at 13.8% per year slower |
than the traffic growth of the non-IATA non-scheduled of 15.8%. j
I5- First class capacity for lATA scheduled services in the. ' j
period 1968-1977 experienced a growth at an average rate of 
3.1% per year while traffic grew at a faster rate of 5.9%.
The Economy class capacity grew at the rate of 8 .6% per year 
while traffic growth rate recorded a 7.9% per year.
2- North Atlantic Passenger Traffic Report 1975-1980;
This report monitored the following issues :
- The US deregulation.
- The worldwide economic recession.
- The promotion of low excursion fares.
- The introduction of new scheduled services.
The report recorded data on airlines’s results on individual 
and group basis and on region basis, traffic, capacity and 
load factors.
3- Analysis of the US international air travel statistics with 
particular emphasis on the US-Europe markets ;
This report published in February 1979 where the figures were 
based on data collected by the US immigration and Naturalization
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service also comprised detailed statistics by US gateways 
for the different top fifteen European countries, covered 
the years 1977 and 1978 and made the following findings:
A- The new low fares introduced in 1977 on US-Europe had 
only a small impact on the scheduled and charter traffic.
B- The UK-US market had a growth rate greater than those of 
other US-European city pairs.
C- Non-scheduled performance declined in contrast to the 
scheduled traffic.
D- Non-US airlines reported better traffic share than that 
of the American carriers.
4- World air transport statistics :
These are annual reports published to cover performance of 
lATA member carriers. One of the sections that the report 
deal with and give special attention is the North Atlantic 
that gives detailed data on the previous years activity on 
monthly basis.
Starting May 1976 the reports included traffic carried by 
Concorde as part of the First class figures.
Also starting from 1978 Miami was included in the North 
Atlantic figures while before it was considered part of the 
Mid Atlantic operations.
There is one important remark that has to be made with regard 
the figures published by IATA, where during looking into the 
figures issued in the Review of the North Atlantic Passenger 
Traffic Capacity and Load Factors trends referred in (1), we 
found the average annual growth for the years 1973-1975 in 
most of the tables to be different than those calculated by us
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Take for example table 1 appearing on page 9 of the 
Development of total North Atlantic Passenger Traffic: 
the three lATA growth rates for scheduled, charter and 
total traffic for 1973-1975 were -6,3%, 16.4% and -6.4% 
respectively, while in our calculation using the same 
traffic figures of the same table gave a growth rates 
of -6.0%, -6.0% and -6.0%. The same can be said about the 
other tables appearing in the same report.
When contacting lATA- Industry Research Division to explain 
this difference in growth rates figures, it was understood 
that lATA growth rates were calculated on original traffic 
figures but at time of printing the report new traffic 
figures were recorded and printed instead of the original 
ones while keeping the growth rates figures without alteration.
Finally, the research will allow the writer first to develop 
a wider conception of the problems associated with the 
international air transport industry and principally that 
concerning the North Atlantic market and second to find 
relationships in the literature with the study's hypothesis 
upon which the research work is build on.
CHAPTER TWO 
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN AIR SERVICE AGREEMENTS
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CHAPETR TWO
2. THE ANGLO-AMERICAN AIR SERVICE AGREEMENTS 
2.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND :
At the end of second world war, in which had the effect of 
establishing the United States as the world leader in the 
civil aircraft manufacturing and airline industry with most 
of Europe had been laid waste, one of the reconstruction 
programmes was to restablish a proper world airline system.
This was primarily due to the fear of most countries that 
the USA due to its monopoly position would offer unlimited 
capacity and exert its powerful air transport strength to 
acquire world dominance in determining the future of the 
international air transportation system.
During these years, the USA developed an extensive network 
of international airline operations, with their carriers having 
special economic and technical advantages over foreign carriers 
and possessing equipment and experience far surpassing that 
of their strongest competitors with a dominant position on 
the most important of the international routes, the North 
Atlantic.
After having preliminary conversations bilaterally between 
the various nations of the world and the USA, the US government 
then agreed to host an international conference to establish 
a post war civil air structure, and to make arrangements to 
allow international airlines to develop commercial air 
transportation services through the conclusion of multilateral 
agreements.
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2.2. CHICAGO CONFERENCE ;
This conference was held in Chicago on 1 November 1944, 
in which the representatives of 54 countries attended 
( table 2 ,1 ) with the aim to consider some form of multi­
national agreement, and where it was proposed that an 
international regulatory body should be established.
Different oppinions and interests existed between the 
strategies of the United Kingdom and the United States 
delegations. The British fearing a US monopoly stressed 
the need for regulation in routes, rates and frequencies 
and favouring an international body to organise control and 
order in the air; while the US proposed complete freedom 
in the air with equal opportunity in an open sky for all 
nations on international routes, where it presumed market 
forces will determine frequencies and fares.
The conference laid down 5 traffic catagories to be considered 
for international air transport, and formulated the five 
international freedom rights of civil air transport;
" 1) The privilege to fly across its territory without landing;
2) The privilege to land for non-traffic purposes;
3) The privilege to put down passengers, mail, and cargo 
taken on in the territory of the state whose nationality 
the aircraft possesses;
4) The privilege to take on passengers, mail or cargo 
destined for the territory of the state whose nationality 
the aircraft possesses;
5) The privilege to take on passengers, mail and cargo 
destined for the territory of any other contracting state 
and the privilege to put down passengers, mail and cargo 
coming from any such territory. " (1 )
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Table (2.1)
Participants at the ICAO Conference 
Chicago 1944
Afghanistan
Australia
Belgium
Bolivia
Brazil
Canada
Chile
China
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cuba
Czechoslovakia
Denmark
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Ethiopia
France
Greece
Guatemala
Haiti
Honduras
Iceland
India
Iran
Iraq
Ireland (Eire)
Lebanon
Liberia
Luxemburg
Mexico
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Norway
Panama
Paraquay
Peru
Philippine Commonwealth
Poland
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Syria
Thailand
Turkey
Union of South Africa
United Kingdom
United States
Urguay
Venezuela
Yugoslavia
Source: Thornton,R. ( 1 9 7 0 ) International Airline Politics', PP. 21.
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The major concern and debate in the conference was on the 
acceptance of the fifth freedom right,proposing transport 
between two other countries, with the British leading most 
of the European nations in oppositing it. The other four 
freedom rights were acceptable to most nations with the 
first two rights accepted by the majority.
The first two rights, called the transit agreements, were 
thus agreed upon, while the establishment of the last three 
rights, called the transport agreements, being left for 
discussion on a bilateral basis as the attempts at a multi­
lateral agreement had proved unsuccessful.
The fifth freedom right remain the only issue not solved and 
thus became " a stumbling block which finally resulted in the 
failure of the draft ". (2 )
As the Chicago Conference failed to solve the issues of 
multilateral economic regulation, this left governments and 
their airlines to face a situation of unregulated international 
air transport, with differences remaining on international 
air policy between the Europeans, led by the United Kingdom, 
at one pole pressing for regulation, and the United States 
at the other pole asking for freedom of capacity, fare levels 
and carriage of fifth freedom traffic.
Bilateral negotiations thus became the only means by which 
commercial freedoms could be obtained.
Out of the Chicago Conference, the following articles should 
be noticed :
Article 1 retained and restated the 1919 Paris Convention in 
which ” the contracting states recognise that every state has
-3 4-
complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above 
its territory " (3), and it is this that gives the conference 
the importance it still holds in the industry even in our 
present days. It follows from the principle of airspace 
sovereignty that every state is entitled to regulate the 
entry of foreign aircraft into its territory and that persons 
within its territory are subject to its laws.
Article 6 indicates that the convention is concerned only 
with scheduled air services, this being the only type of 
service that would be made available to the public, no forecast 
was anticipated for the existence of charter services, and 
the article states that " no scheduled international air 
service may be operated over or into the territory of a 
contracting state without its previous consent " . (4)
While article 77 states ’’ aircraft have the nationality of 
the state in which they are registered " except in case of 
aircraft operated by international operating agencies where 
joint operating organisations were permitted, and that no 
aircraft could be validly registered in more than one state. (5 ) 
Following the Chicago Conference, air carriers from 31 countries 
agreed in Havana in 1945 to establish the International Air 
Transport Association. Its membership open to airlines 
operating scheduled air services, with main function to 
regulate international air transport concerning both rates 
and service conditions, and it was generally accepted that 
control of international fares was in the public interest, 
and also for the benefit of the airlines in protecting the 
industry from price-cutting warfare.
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2.3. BERMUDA AIR SERVICE AGREEMENT 1 :
In 1946,at the invitation of the United Kingdom government,
U.K. and U.S.A. representatives met in Bermuda to negotiate 
all the disputed issues between the two countries following 
the failure of the multilateral approach.
At this stage the interests of the two nations differed 
considerably and the US carriers possessed far more equipment 
and experience in the international aviation scene than their 
competitors including the United Kingdom. At this meeting the 
two sides arrived at a compromise whereby each nation granted 
to the air carriers of the other the rights to operate through 
their own airspace and to land for non traffic purpose.
The two nations also gave other the right of entry and departure 
to embark and disembark traffic in the territory of other, 
but this was to be valid only for airports named, and routes 
generally indicated, with the restrictions that the government 
should approve rates and nominate adequate capacity.
The dominant features of the agreement was that airlines were 
left free to operate services at the frequency and capacity 
they considered justified and the parties remained free to 
designate more than one airline on any particular route, where 
fair and equal opportunities were given for carriers of the 
two countries to operate any route between their territories 
and to provide air transport facilities to match public needs. 
The agreement introduced a system of controlled competition 
with airlines having a " fair and equal opporunity " to 
operate services with the primary objective of the contracting 
parties to provide capacity " adequate to the traffic demands 
between the country of which such airline is a national and 
the countries of ultimate destination of the traffic (6 )
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By the agreement, following the failure of the countries •
ipresent at the Chicago Convention to find a practical way 1Îin solving the issues of fares control, fares and rates |
were to be set by the airlines of the two countries through |
I
the machinery of the International Air Transport Association |
with the two governments having the final say as they have 
the power to reject any fare they disapprove before coming 
into force.
One important fact to be noted is that capacity and frequency 
principles agreed upon in Bermuda differed from what the UK 
had previously advocated at Chicago Convention of predeter­
mination of capacity needed to meet the traffic demand, while 
the new agreement associated with principles of ex-post 
facto review provided that services especially primary traffic 
that of third and fourth traffic of one party do not affect 
the services of the other party.
The agreement served as model and pattern that proved of 
lasting significance to all air transport agreements 
subsequently to be concluded between the two countries, and 
even between other countries in the years to come, where many 
of the bilateral air agreements reached at the present time 
are either based on the Bermuda agreement provisions or are 
very similar in character
2.4. BERMUDA AIR SERVICE AGREEMENT II :
In early seventies, with the emergence of excess capacity 
leading to a serious waste of resources resulted in higher 
passenger fares and damage to airlines, the United Kingdom
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asked for both capacity control by governments and a 
reduction of fifth freedom rights of United States’ carriers 
beyond London, while the United States remained in favour 
of Bermuda I principles and sought a better share of the 
m a r k e t .
In June 1976, The British expressed their discontent with 
the Bermuda I agreement and the UK government gave one year 
notice to cease service unless a new agreement was reached.
The UK objective behind this renegotiation of the Bermuda I 
agreement as put by the UK chief negotiator W.Shovelton 
focussed on the following;
” - to improve balance of the agreement, particulary by
opening up new gateways for our own airlines in the States
- to set up a form of capacity rationlization across the 
North Atlantic which would help to save the waste of 
resources and fuel occasioned by the over-provision of 
seats on these routes and so help to maintain fares or, 
if possible, lower them.
- to reduce and make more equal the fifth freedom opportu­
nities available to each side.
- to get a sizable share of services into Gatwick as well 
as Heathrow.
- to improve the tariffs clauses.
- to secure a clearer, more comprehensive and up-to-date 
agreement, ” (7 )
Also one has to refer to the imbalance in earnings between 
the airlines of both countries that existed at that time as 
a result of the first Bermuda agreement, where the British
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carriers had an earning of 127 millions compared to jé 183 
millions for the American carriers for services on the North 
Atlantic as per the figures released in 1976 by the United 
Kingdom Department of Trade (table 2,2).
In 1977 the governments of both United Kingdom and United 
States concluded the Second Bermuda air service agreement, 
which came into force on 23 July 1977 to replace the 31 years 
old Bermuda I agreement.
This new agreement provided a new and, complicated mechanism 
for certain routes especially the major transatlantic ones.
A feature of the agreement was that twice a year each country’s 
carrier would file its proposed scheduled services with the 
government of the other country, allowing, in the case of 
objection by one of the parties, for consultation to agree 
on frequencies. In other words the airlines were allowed to 
decide the capacity and the number of scheduled flights they 
wished to operate but the foreign government has to approve 
them before operation as has the right to challenge the 
submitted capacity and frequency, but neither government has 
the right of veto over capacity.
Another feature of the agreement was that a two year period 
was given to an airline entering certain permitted routes 
with no capacity or frequency controls allowing it to compete 
with the already existing airlines.
As the United States used to insist that bilateral agreements 
permit multiple designation without limitations on the number 
of airlines on any route, the second Bermuda agreement was
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Table (2.2)
EARNINGS ON ROUTES BETWEEN UK & USA
ROUTE (both ways) ANNUAL EARNING (^millions) 
USAUK
127North Atlantic (UK-USA)
Hong Kong to/ from USA No service
Bermuda & other dependent 
territories to/ from USA 3
Fifth freedom beyond USA No service
Fifth freedom beyond UK —
Fifth freedom beyond Hong Kong —
183
51
20
17
22
Total Earnings 130 293
Source : Doganis, R . (1977), ’ Current trends in the
international regulation of air transport ’, 
ITA Bulletin. No. 41. PP. 961.
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a departure from the idea of designating an airline to a 
specific route.
The only routes where the number of airlines was limited 
were the transatlantic services, where para 2 of article 3 
of the agreement designated only one airline on each route 
except for two specified routes that of New York-London and 
Los Angeles-London. While other transatlantic routes would 
be served by one carrier from each country, a second airline 
may be added if the total traffic of both countries reaches 
more than 600,000 passengers one way per year for two years 
running, or if one airline's traffic on a route exceeds 
450,000 passengers one way in a year for two consecutive years. 
On the subject of the fifth freedom, the American gave up 
this right on 22 cities from Britain to Belgium and Austria 
in three years time and to Holland, Sweden and Norway in five 
years, none of which was served at that time, but the US gained 
unlimited rights beyond London into Europe ( for details of 
these routes refer to Appendix II ).
As a result of this agreement, the number of gateways available 
to airlines from each country were increased, where British 
Airways, Laker, British Caledonian, Delta, Northwest, TWA, 
Braniff and Pan American were having new opportunities of 
service, where four new cities in Britain being served by US 
airlines and British carriers having four new cities in the 
United States.
The airlines of both parties were given a fair and equal 
opportunity to compete with each other with tariffs to be set 
at a rate giving adequate return based on " the costs of
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providing such service assuming reasonable load factors " (8 ) 
and required that tariff filings be submitted well in advance 
before coming into effect.
This agreement in summary achieved a certain amount of 
liberalization, but remained in general somewhat more restrictive 
than the old Bermuda agreement, and ultimately led to the 
availability of lower fares on the North Atlantic and more 
substantial change in how frequency and capacity were to be 
regulated on services between the two countries ( Appendix III 
refers to Article 11 of the agreement on the subject of " Fair 
Competion " ).
Even that Bermuda II agreement was considered by the Americans 
to be restricitiv e , particularly with the barriers to fifth 
freedom and capacity clause, it was considered the best reward 
for those advocating low fares and as Nawal Taneja phrased 
it " since Bermuda two agreement was responsible for bringing 
Laker in the market in the first place, much of the credit 
for lower fares should go to Bermuda II " . (.9)
Finally one must remember that with the anti trust laws in 
America, the US bilateral air agreements concluded with other 
countries in the years to follow Bermuda II tended to be more 
liberal, table 2.3. refers to these new agreements signed by 
the US with few European countries.
2.5. BERMUDA AGREEMENT II REVISIONS :
In accordance with article 18 of Bermuda II agreement, the 
first revision came into force on 1 April 1978 to replace 
article 14 of the original agreement. This revised agreement
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was concluded separately and focused on the issues of charter 
services; it was agreed that the country’s rules will be 
applicable with the control over the price of charter flights 
rested with the country in which the flights originates.
This revision provided for each country to designate an 
unlimited number of charter carriers with fair and equal 
opportunity prevailing when competing between themselves.
The second revision came when in Washington in March 1980
the negotiators of both countries agreed to revise the original
agreement; this resulted in the British claiming to have
successfully negotiated controlled liberalization in the
face of strong US pressure to remove almost all controls
from the North Atlantic.
The new revisions gave reasonable satisfaction to both 
countries even though not all of their demands were accepted 
by the other side.
The new changes created 12 new US gateways from London and 
allowed both countries to nominate six new US gateways each 
in the 1980-1985 period. The amendments allowed the country 
which nominates a new US point to protect its own airline for 
three years without any competition from the other country’s 
carriers.
Also in addition to the existing cities, New York and Los- 
Angeles, two new US gateways, Boston and Miami, were allowed 
a dual designation by each country that could be served by 
two carriers from each country on flights from or to London.
The US also agreed to use Gatwick airport for all new US- 
London services.
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No agreement was reached on charter flights and the United 
States was denied fifth freedom rights for services through 
United Kingdom to Europe and the far east except for Glasgow, 
Prestwick and Oslo, and the United Kingdom was not permitted 
fifth freedom (cabotage) rights within USA on some direct 
flights from or to London.
By the revision in agreement both countries agreed that the 
mutual policy of promoting low fares could be continued while 
at the same time allowing for the virtual deregulation of UK- 
USA air cargo by the year 1985.
Finally it is imortant to note that with the new Bermuda 
agreement and its revisions on routes between United Kingdom 
and United States there is, beside frequency of services, a 
high degree of product and pricing freedom.
2.6. INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANISATION (ICAO) :
The great achievement of the Chicago Conference was the 
establishment of the International Civil Aviation Organisation, 
which was later to become a specialized agency affiliated to 
the United Nations.
One of the most important functions of ICAO, formally estab­
lished on 4 April 1947, is the preparation and the periodical 
revision of international standards and recommending practices 
relating to civil aviation. It does much to standardise 
aeronautical regulations throughout the world.
Article 44 of the Chicago Conference sets the objectives of 
the Organisation as follows:
1- to ensure the safe and orderly growth of international 
è i v i l  â v i â t i ô n  - thireughout the  we r l d .
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2 - to encourage the arts of aircraft design and operation 
for peaceful purposes.
3- to encourage the development of airways, airports and air 
navigation facilities for international civil aviation.
4- to meet the needs of the peoples of the world for safe, 
regular, efficient and economical air transport.
5- to prevent economic waste caused by unreasonable competition.
6 - to ensure that the rights of contracting states are fully 
respected and that every contracting state has a fair 
opportunity to operate international airlines.
7- to avoid discrimination between contracting states.
8 - to pomote safety of flight in international air navigation.
9- to promote generally the development of all aspects of 
international civil aeronautics. (1 0 )
The Organisation has an Assembly, which is its sovereign 
body meeting every three years, while the Council is the 
governing body having judicial powers whereby it excercises 
a role of mandatory arbitration in disputes between member 
states which among other things adopts the annexes to the 
convention and have an Air Navigation Commission; an Air 
Transport Committee; and a legal committee.
Each state member of the Organisation has only one vote 
even if it has more than one scheduled service carrier, and 
here the USA serves as a good example.
In 1947 there were 26 ICAO member states while 148 states, 
excluding the USSR and China, now are members of it and 
adhere to the Chicago Conference.
-46-
The Organisation has always shown its preference for multi- 
laterism and support for the machinery of lATA,
In its Second Special Air Transport Conference, which took 
place in Montreal, the Organisation recommended that the 
worldwide multilateral machinery of the lATA traffic 
conferences be adopted as the first choice when establishing 
international fares.
To conclude this chapter, it is necessary to mention that 
in the US where less protective measures were taken by the 
CAB, liberalisation of air transport regulation began in 1977. 
Through its market power and via bilaterlism, the United States 
attempts to achieve an international aviation free market. 
Turning away from protective approach, the US international 
aviation policy moved toward less restrictive and competitive 
environment. With the application of deregulation, airline 
management decisions on such matters as route entry and 
pricing were no more determined by the CAB where discounts 
up to 50% were allowed and even later airlines were given 
complete pricing freedom.
Deregulation place maximum reliance on the competitive forces 
of the airline market place and allows new and existing carriers 
to rapidly enter new markets beside, sanctioning secondary 
airports to the major ones.
Finally, under the US deregulation policy, the US Administration 
has been trading new routes and gateways to foreign airlines 
in exchange for lower fares and a more competitive situation.
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CHAPTER THREE :
3. THE INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION
3.1. INTRODUCTION :
In April 1945 after the Chicago Convention, 31 international 
carriers, whose countries were members of the International 
Civil Aviation Organisation, met in Havana and established 
the International Air Transport Association (lATA) and later 
in September 1945 the Association was incorporated by an Act 
of the Canadian Parliament. (1)
The Association had originally been formed in August 1919 in 
the Hague by airlines of six European countries; Holland,
United Kingdom, West Germany, Sweden, Denmark and Norway 
under the name of the International Air Traffic Association 
with the objective of making air transport more convenient 
to the public together with the view of co-operating for 
mutual advantage to prepare and organise international air 
traffic, but at that time had nothing to do with fixing fares 
and rates. (2 )
The new lATA was formed for controlling competition by 
regulating fares and tariffs of the international air transport 
activities, ensuring similarity of service standards, and 
having world wide machinery in promoting co-operation between 
the airlines in legal, traffic, financial and commercial fields. 
It was only when bilateral agreements became the norm, after 
signing Bermuda I agreement by the United Kingdom and United 
States in 1946, that the lATA machinery was given its role 
of fare fixing.
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In the last decade the Association has been under lot of 
pressure from the new comers to the industry i.e. the non­
scheduled operators who are making their way into the mass 
air service market, but has been successful in its attempts 
to control the development of these non-scheduled services 
by influencing governments' legislation, which have led to 
the classification of just four types of charter services, 
these being the Single Entity Charters, Affinity Group Charters, 
a separate fare carriers either to establish their own charter 
services outside the lATA machinery, or to implement special 
promotional fares to meet this competition from the charter 
carriers.
The lATA's member airlines have had a big share in carrying 
passengers, with the North Atlantic market being a good 
example where total number of passengers carried by lATA 
carriers for both scheduled and non-scheduled services in 
1970 was 8 million reaching 15.4 million passengers in 1979 
with the figures for 1980 being lower than those of 1979 mainly 
because Pan Am was classified as a non-IATA carrier due to 
the Show Cause Order of 1978 introduced in USA; chapter nine 
refers in detail to this subject.
3.2. lATA MEMBERSHIP ;
The Association has a voluntary membership open only to 
airlines operating scheduled commercial services with two 
types of membership available: either as Active member or 
Associate member with the former applicable to airlines, 
whose country of registration is a member of ICAO, operating
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international scheduled services with full membership's 
authorities and rights, while the latter type is open to 
domestic airlines operating scheduled services.
One important difference between the two types is that the 
Active members have voting rights in traffic conferences 
and other meetings of the Association while the Associate 
member has no right to vote'.
Of the 110 Association's members in 1981, shown in table 3.1 
there are two British carriers; British Airways and British 
Caledonian, and six American carriers; Braniff, Eastern, TWA, 
American, United and Pan American ( National was merged with 
Pan Am) operating scheduled services on the North Atlantic 
between United Kingdom and United States.
Non-scheduled passengers are also carried by Pan Am, TWA and 
British Airways but at much lower rate.
One of the founders of lATA, Pan American resigned in March 
1979 from its membership after the introduction of the Show 
Cause Order in 1978, mentioned earlier, where Pan Am was not 
prepared in participating in the rate and fare fixing activities 
of the Association conferences, but the carrier rejoined lATA 
on 1 April 1981.
Membership of any airline can be terminated by the Association 
when the airline breaches any article or fails to comply with 
the Association’s procedures, or when the country's membership 
to which the airline belongs is terminated from ICAO.
-52-
Table (3.1) 
lATA MEMBERSHIP AS AT 1 APRIL 1981
ACTIVE MEMBERS (93)
Aer Lingus
Aerollneas Argentinas
AEROMEXICO
AVIANCA
Air Afrique
Air Algeria
Air CAnada
Air France
Air Gabon
Air Guinee
Air India
Air Malawi
Air Mali
Air Malta
Air Mauritius
Air New Zealand
Air Niugini
Air Pacific *
Air Tanzania Corp.
Air UK *
Air Zaire
ALIA
Alitalia
American Airlines * 
Angola Airlines 
ARABIA *
Ariana Afghan Airlines 
Austrian Airlines 
AVIANCA
Braniff International 
British Airways 
British Caledonian 
Cameroon Airlines 
CSA
MEXICANA 
CP Air
Cruzeiro do Sul S.A. 
Cubana
Cyprus Airways 
Deutsche Lufthansa 
Eastern Air Lines * 
Ecuatoriana 
Egyptair 
El Al
Ethiopian Airlines 
Finnair
Flying Tiger **
P.N. Garuda Indonesian
Ghana Airways
IBERIA
Icelandair
Indian Airlines
Iran Air
Iraqi Airways
Source;
Japan Air Lines Co.
JAT
KENYA Airways 
KLM
Kuwait Airways 
LAM
LADECO *
LAN-CHILE 
LAB *
Libyan Arab Airlines 
LOT
Middle East Airlines 
Nigeria Airways 
Olympic Airways
Pakistan International Airlines 
Pan American #
Philippine Airlines 
LACASA *
PLUNA *
Qantas Airways
Royal Swazi National Airways * 
SABENA
Saudi Arabian Airlines 
SAS
SOLAIR *
South African Airway 
Sudan Airways 
SWISSAIR
Syrian Arab Airlines 
TMA **
Trans World Airlines 
BWIA International *
Tunis Air 
Turkish Airlines 
UTA
United Airlines *
VARIG
VIASA
Zambia Airways 
ASSOCIATE MEMBERS (17)
Airways
Air Liberia 
VASP
Trans Brasil 
TALAIR pty. Ltd,
Kendell Airlines 
Douglas Airways pty.Ltd.
AEROCOR 
Ansett 
Quebecair 
Namib Air 
IPEC Aviation 
Mount Cook 
Trans Australia 
Masling Commuter Services Pty, Ltd. 
Commercial Airways (Pty.) Ltd.
Eastern Provincial Airways 
East-West Airlines
* elected not to participate in Tariff Cord 
** Cargo Tariff Coordination. 
lATA Publication
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3.3. lATA MACHINERY :
The Annual General Meeting (AGM) is the central decision 
making body and the overall authority of the Association 
in running its activities and formulating its structure 
that takes place in the late summer of each year.
According to Article VIII of the Association, the AGM has :
the functions of electing the president and members of the ■
Executive Committee who control and supervise the affairs 
of the Association, pass the accounts of the previous year •
and approve the next yea r ’s budget. :
The Director General, together with the Secretary and the !
Treasurer who are elected by the Executive Committee, perform !
and exercise the daily activities of the Association. iI
The Executive Committee, which has 21 members elected by the j
AGM from the Active members, appoints five standing committees- j
to which it delegates the power to help perform its duties !
iand functions. j
I
These committees are the Traffic Committee, which has close |
relationship with the traffic conferences, the legal, medical, j
*financial and technical committees, with membership in these 
committees open only to Active members. (3)
3.3.1. lATA TRAFFIC CONFERENCES ;
In December 1945 at the first Annual General Meeting, the 
Association adopted the resolutions of ” Provisions for the 
Regulation and Conduct of the Traffic Conference ” whereby 
the conference machinery was to be based on nine regions 
covering most areas of the world, but because it was difficult
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to establish fares for all the areas at the same time, a 
new arrangement of area divisions was reached that has 
been maintained up to our present day.
These new area divisions, called Traffic Conference Areas 
are as follows;
1) Traffic Conference Area I (TCI); which deals with the 
western Hemisphere consisting mainly of North and South 
America and nearby islands.
2) Traffic Conference Area 2 (TC2); which involves Europe, 
the Middle East, and Africa.
3) Traffic Conference Area 3 (TC3); which deals with all the 
remaining parts of Asia, Australia, New Zealand and the 
Pacific Islands.
Beside these main conference areas there are few joint areas 
which deal with international traffic between two or more 
of these main areas;
- Joint Traffic Conference, dealing between area 1 and 2(JT12)
- Joint Traffic Conference, dealing between area 2 and 3(JT23)
- Joint Traffic Conference, dealing between area 3 and 1(JT31)
- Joint Traffic Conference that deals with routes all around
the world (JT123).
Then these seven area traffic conferences are divided into 
54 sub-areas to meet local market conditions in these small 
areas; these sub-areas which are sometimes called negotiating 
areas are as follows;
- Within TCI ; 1) USA/Canada/Mexico
2) North America-Caribbean
3) North America/Caribbean-Central/South 
America and within America.
- Within TC2
- Within TC3
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1) Within Europe.
2) Europe-Middle East.
3) Europe/Middle East-Africa.
A) Within Middle East.
5) Within Africa.
1) Indian Sub Continent.
2) South East Asia.
3) South West Pacific.
4) Japan and Korea.
The traffic conference is the forum in which the industry's 
pricing decisions are made. The meetings of these traffic 
conferences usually take place annually in September-October 
for passenger traffic and in April-May for cargo traffic. 
Membership of the traffic conferences is compulsory for all 
Active members of the Association who operate international 
scheduled flights within a particular area or areas, but if 
a carrier operates international services in more than one 
area then it is allowed to participate in the traffic 
conferences of these other areas but only as a non-voting 
member, while has the right to one vote in its own area. 
Members are to adhere to the resolutions which must be agreed 
unanimously, and which are subject to their governments' 
approval. It is this unanimity factor which gives the right 
of veto to an individual member and so the interest of each 
carrier is thus safeguarded and no one is left outvoted.
Beside catering and maintaining international tariff framework 
the traffic conference develops documents and control air 
transport tickets, Airway Bills and unified reservation and 
handling procedures, with the aim of establishing quick
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interline bookings and connections. The conferences also 
play a large role in connecting the domestic and international 
routes between different countries.
At the 1978 Annual General Meeting of the Association in 
Geneva, it was decided to implement a plan which had been 
developed by a specially formed task force, which allowed 
members of the Trade Association the option of participating 
in tariff coordination. The Trade Association attracts and 
appeals to the entire international air transport community. 
Following this, the Civil Aeronautics Board in USA decided 
in October 1979 to grant approval for its international 
carriers to participate as trade members.
The Trade Association is involved with the daily operations 
of an integrated world air transport network concerning 
technical, legal, industrial research, traffic services, 
governmental affairs and policy coordination,agency, financial 
and public information. While the Tariff Coordination of lATA 
deals with fares, rates and levels of commission on agency 
sales.
3.4. lATA AND THE CAB ;
It was only at the Bermuda Conference that the US government 
changed its position from that of free fare fixing to that 
of allowing fares to be agreed and set internationally.
The US government had to accept and approve the machinery 
of lATA mainly because it found that this was the best way 
in which international fares would be kept under its indirect 
control; while the CAB had authority only over US domestic
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fares as any control over international air fares was excluded 
from its power according to the civil Aeronautic Act of 1938. 
The US government reluctantly accepted the UK proposal of 
indirect control of rates by lATA; there had been some division 
within the CAB itself on this issue and no alternative 
machinery of rate control was available to the CAB.
So while accepting lAT A ’s authority the CAB insisted on 
allowing itself room to retreat from this international 
machinery whenever alternative means might be found.
The c a b ’s approval of lATA's machinery had to be renewed
annually until 1955 when it gave lATA its permanent approval, 
but the CAB once again showed its reluctance when in June 
1978 passed its Show Cause Order against the Traffic 
Conferences of lATA, in which the CAB announced that it would 
henceforth withhold approval from these traffic conferences 
and their related agreements as they were deemed not to be 
in the public interest.
With this warning the CAB announced that it would withdraw 
immunity, required under the Anti Trust Laws, from any US
carrier that might object to this order and insist on
participating in the Traffic Conference.
Then in September 1979 the CAB changed this position and 
decided to limit its warning to cover only tariff coordination 
on US-Europe operations.
The CAB in April 1980 published a new document in which agreed 
to approve the Traffic Conference system and continued to 
exempt the conferences from Anti Trust legislation for a 
period of two years on these conditions ;
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1- That its own representatives were to attend, as observers, 
those conferences in which United States was involved.
2- The CAB prohibited participation by US airlines in the 
meetings of the Traffic Conferences that deal with traffic 
between Europe and USA.
As for lAT A ’s position vis-a-vis these new developments, it 
continued to disapprove the C A B 's arguments and justifications, 
especially its discrimination against the North Atlantic 
routes and the two years period to which CAB approval was 
subject to.
One of the possible reasons for the hostile position taken 
by the CAB toward ÎATA is to its lack of power to fix the 
fares of its international carriers especially as it disapproved 
the fares reached by lATA, even though the Bermuda I agreement 
in its Annex 2 gives a set of alternatives as substitute 
procedures to be used when there is disagreement to lATA's 
machinery. These procedures were designed for the event that 
the lATA's conference is unable to agree on a rate or, no 
lATA machinery is applicable or, if approval for lATA's 
decisions is either withdrawn by one party or not renewed.
The granting by many governments to lATA the power to fix 
fares did not give any guarantee that these governments 
accept or would continue to accept the rate agreement with 
the Miami and Chandler meetings being two well known occasions 
when American government did not accept the fares agreed by 
lATA.
MIAMI MEETING : Following the lATA meeting at Miami in 1955, 
where a 10% increase on First class fares was agreed instead
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of the original proposed luxury surcharge to be effective 
from October 1956, the US government sought a reduction in 
Tourist fares and did not accept the agreed increase on 
First class fares; this led to the holding of a special 
conference to solve the problem, which at last resulted in 
a compromise by accepting the fares agreed at Miami to be 
effective but only valid up to the end of March 1958, while 
a reduction of 20% in Tourist fares was allowed.
CHANDLER MEETING; At the Chandler meeting in 1962 the lATA 
traffic conference decided to adjust the round trip discount 
from 10% to 5% on the North Atlantic services. This decision 
was rejected by the CAB and later by the Canadian Air Transport 
Board as well. The CAB asked US carriers not to implement this 
proposed fare increase but to continue charging the old fare.
The European position clearly opposed the Americans and latgr 
the United Kingdom threatened to take action against US carriers 
by not granting them landing rights and to impose penalties, 
it even went so far as to threaten to detain aircraft if 
necessary. In the end after several unsuccessful discussions, 
and to avoid this critical international embarassment, the 
US government reluctantly had to ask the CAB to 'accept the 
proposed increases and to allow as a compromise a 5 % discount 
to be implemented for about one year up to 31 March 1964 and 
to arrange a further conference to take place in the fall of 
1963 to review the entire fare structure commencing 1 April 
1964. (4)
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3.5. IATA*S CRITICS :
As each airline has its own policies, it is difficult for the 
Association to agree on a single policy that will suit them 
all without making some parties dissatisfied in one way or 
another. It is for this reason that lATA has come under much 
criticism.
One accusation against lATA has been that it eliminates 
competition between airlines because of its role in fixing 
tariffs, but lATA has never really fixed fares, it only 
recommends fares to governments to be implemented by airlines. 
The American Civil Aeronautics Board has been one of lATA's 
harshest and most intransigent critics. Secor Brown, C A B ’s 
chairman, addressing the Royal Aeronautical Society, described 
the Association as being ” the vice of market containment 
rather market development ". (5 )
The CAB bases its accusation on the ground that rates are set 
at the high cost level of uneconomical or inefficient airlines. 
In response to this, one may look at lAT A ’s figures (figure 3.1) 
where the average Economy fare for the period 1970-1980 has 
been increasing at a lower rate than that of the consumer 
prices calculated on the OCED weighted composite index for 
USA, Canada and Western Europe.
On this subject, Nawal Taneja has in fact shown that for the 
years 1968-1978 the average Normal fare increased by less 
than 40% compared to an increase in consumer price index of 
over 1 0 0 %. (6 )
Other arguments have been taking place concerning lATA's 
function as a carter organisation in which fares are set for
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F1
NORTH ATLANTIC FARES COMPARED TO THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX 
1970  -  1980
INDEX 1970 «  100
240
220
200
180
160
CONSUMER PRICE140
AVERAGE ECONOMY FARE120
100
YEAR 1970 74
Note, An OECD weighted composite price index for the U S .  Canada and Westerr
SiCte'ùf'i
Source : IATA 25, 1980. PP. 26.
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the airlines’ benefit.
Rigas Doganis has charged the Association with being a 
suppliers' cartel, with the aim to maximise its members' 
profits by fixing fares around the cost levels of its least 
efficient members by that protecting unsatisfactory performers 
and giving the greatest possible return to those doing well.
On the other hand most carriers usually bargain for a fare 
based on their demand and cost curves. It appears furthermore 
that most governments concerned have insufficient information 
on which to question their airlines and lATA on these agreed 
fares, and are thus put into the position of having to approve 
lATA's fares automatically, (7)
On the secrecy aspect of the lATA conferences, Cooper & Maynard 
charge the Association with being a producers' cartel whose 
members meet secretly behind locked doors deciding fares in 
a unanimous way which all must agree; they then ask " what 
remains of competition " after all that ? . (8 )
D. Corbett blames the unanimity rule of lATA because it gives 
the small and weak carriers the power to veto the largey and 
more efficient airlines' efforts to reduce fares. (9 ) 
lATA however has never been short of advocates, Swissair's 
president Dr. Walter Berechtold, in a speech delivered in 
1962, rebuffed the critics and asserted that even the efficient 
carriers could have done much better and achieved better 
financial results than were doing currently; he noted that 
lATA set the fares around the costs of the inefficient carriers 
but felt the whole industry benefitted from that and then the 
situation spoke for itself. (10)
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The International Organisation of Consumers Unions, representing 
consumers' interests, in its paper presented to the United 
Nations in June 1970, criticised lATA for being " a mechanism 
for the elimination of competition in air fares " while 
suggesting that the system of fixing fares should be " more 
responsive to the consumer interest ", (1 1 )
In contrast, Mahlon Straszheim (12) suggested that to accuse 
lATA of being a private cartel is not a valid criticism; he 
blamed governments for inadequately supervising their rate 
making operations.
These remarks were made in reply to the CAB chairman's speech, 
given to the International Club in Washington following Athens 
Meetings of lATA in 1965, in which the chairman cricised the 
Association of lacking persuasive power, for being ineffective, 
and for allowing prolonged fighting among its members,
Straszheim did however at the same time defend the CAB's role, 
as being a representative of government, charged with protect­
ing public interest in the USA while airlines are private; 
he felt that this led inevitably to a conflict of interests; 
but airlines of other countries and their aviation authorities 
tend to have similar interests and objectives as they are 
usually both government controlled.
In reply to these allegations and other accusations of lATA's 
ineffectiveness, the Association’s previous Director General 
Sir William Hildred (13) defended its machinery in his speech 
at the 12th Annual General Meeting in Edinburgh in 1956,
Hildred drew a complete picture that left the critics with 
nothing on which to base their campaign to replace lATA with
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some other system that would be more acceptable and workable 
for all parties, while at the same time giving the public 
what they wanted.
Sir Hildred puts the following points in defence of lATA :- 
" Whereas a cartel is designed for the benefit of a few, 
lATA has not limited its membership;
Whereas a cartel stifles competition, lATA members engage in 
a wide variety of competition, between themselves, with other 
scheduled operators who are not members of lATA, with non 
scheduled operators and surface carriers;
Whereas a cartel divides the market, lATA has nothing to say 
about the market, routes are designated by governments;
Whereas a cartel controls production, lATA can say nothing 
about frequencies or capacities or the type of aircraft to 
be used ;
Whereas a cartel fixes prices, lATA can only make recommendations 
in respect of international fares and rates;
Whereas a cartel operates behind closed doors, lATA operates 
openly, its recommendations are formal and written and must 
be approved by governments. "
The ICAO assembly in its support for lATA against the CAB Show 
Cause Order recommended;
" 1- When establishing international fares and rates, the 
worldwide multilateral machinery of lATA should be adopted 
as a first choice and carriers should not be discouraged 
from participation,
2- The entire international aviation community should
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participate in the examination of any system for the 
multilateral establishment of international tariffs,
3- Any unilateral action by governments which may have a 
negative effect on carriers' efforts toward reaching 
agreements should be avoided,
4- That international tariffs should be established 
multilaterally and done so regionally, the worldwide 
system should be considered, " (14)
Stephen Wheatcroft, advocates the importance of TATA machinery 
and argues that it is " a reasonable compromise between the 
interests of the travelling public and the economic health 
of airlines " and stresses that the lATA system does not allow 
prices to be fixed on a monopolist approach as its agreements 
do not restrict capacity, and its decisions are reached through 
a unanimity rule, (15)
The Edwards Report, issued in 1969 in the United Kingdom, 
reinforced the position of lATA, and felt that no workable 
alternative to the regulation of international fares and rates 
through the traffic conferences of lATA had yet been devised,(16)
In conclusion, with the heterogeneous type of market in which 
airlines are operating in, one can say that no one system would 
seem acceptable to all, and until more effective procedures 
or systems have been introduced or suggested to replace lATA, 
the international air community must adhere to it and enforce 
its regulations for the good of all its members.
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CHAPTER FOUR
4. THE CIVIL AVIATION REGULATORY BODIES IN UK AND USA
4.1. INTRODUCTION TO CIVIL AIR TRANSPORT :
The civil air transport system makes a vital and irreplac- 
able contribution to the development of a country's economy 
because of its importance in such areas as employment, 
balance of payments, foreign trade, communication network 
and tourism.
The importance of air transport industry for each country 
could be derived from the objectives it sets out to achieve. 
In setting the objectives of air transport, the following 
issues and factors play a big role;
- Making profit.
- Achieving the public'c interest in satisfying hir travel 
requirements whether it is business or leisure,
- National prestige of the country.
- Economic issues e.g. tourism and foreign currency exchange.
- Political and defence policies.
- To develop and enhance the aircraft industry for those 
countries which are involved in such industry.
Much of the development of air transport will depend on the 
selling criteria of air travel and the amount of promotion 
contributing to it. There are many factors that will involve 
or affect the promotion or the growth of air travel; these 
being economical e.g. the GNP of the country, the personal 
disposable income and the currency exchange rates, political, 
fuel prices, air fares and the quality of service.
For various reasons it is supposed that civil air transport 
should have certain economic regulatory features where it 
serves the interests of the public.
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These regulations should be effective and applicable to the 
interests of both the operators of air services and the 
public using them.
Wheatcroft has explicitly considered the reasons behind the 
importance of regulating air transport where beside the safety 
measures that would be effected due to the lack of government 
control, he refers to the industry as a quasi-public utlity 
serving the objectives of national policy for defence purposes 
and of being a symbol of national prestige.
Wheatcroft has also referred to the economic characteristics 
of the industry,in advocating the importance of regulation, 
such as the limited effect of economies of scale, the lack 
of product differentiation and the oligopolistic nature of 
supply . (1 )
On international routes and markets such as the North Atlantic 
with many airlines of different countries operating, it would 
seem more essential to emphasis on these factors and would 
be surprising to imagine how these countries would accept 
their air transport industry be liberalized of any regulation. 
Also to apply one country's regulatory machinery at international 
level needs certain principles and measures different than 
those when applied in its domestic operations. Here it is 
important to stress such factors as the sovereignty of each 
country over its air space, as emphasized in article 1 of the 
Chicago Conference in 1944 (2), and the acceptance by most 
countries of their international obligations e.g. in approving 
lATA's price fixing machinery, and in the existence of many 
formal civil bilateral agreements between countries.
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With this in mind it would not be surprising to see each 
country building its regulatory system with much consideration 
to its own national interests first and the international 
interests second.
Therefore each country's political system and economic 
philosphy will play big role and would have great effect 
when formulating its regulatory machinery. So we cannot 
expect the basic principles to be considered in formulating 
a regulatory system in United States to be the same as those 
of the USSR, and if this is an extreme example, one may still 
observe the many different regulatory systems of the European 
countries .
The main issues to be dealt with in any regulatory system are: 
Control of entry and exit, rates and tariffs and the competition 
involved .
The organisation to whom responsibility is given for implem­
enting this machinery is another important issue. Some countries 
believe it is better to have the regulatory body within one 
of the government departments, while others feel more feasible 
and acceptable to have it outside the government but working 
closely with it.
Lord Boyd-Carpenter, CAA's chairman, delivering the thirty 
second Brancker Memorial Lecture on 3 February 1975, drew 
attention to this fact and ennumerated the advantages and 
disadvantages of both systems; he felt that a regulatory body 
too closely associated with a government department would be 
unduly influenced by its ministry's politics. He suggested
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a scheme where the regulatory body is placed " at least one 
remove from the world of politics and government " (3) in 
order to leave the body more free to enforce its principles 
away from the influence of politicians.
Lord Boyd-Carpenter concluded that the CAA of the United 
Kingdom and the CAB of the United States are the most reasonable 
of regulatory systems, but suggested certain changes to be 
necessary in the machinery and the organisation of these 
two bodies.
To give a picture of the regulatory machinery existing in 
the UK and the US, one should examine the background history 
and the creation of both CAA and CAB together with the many 
legal changes that have since taken place affecting the 
industry of both countries.
4,2 CIVIL AVIATION IN UNITED KINGDOM :
4.2.1. BACKGROUND :
A study of the background of British civil aviation must start 
with a look at the establishment of the Air Transport Licensing 
Authority in 1938 which aimed at, as the Edwards Report put 
it, " rationalising UK domestic air services following the 
Report of the Maybury Committee in 1937 referred with concern 
to the kaleidoscopic and financially unstable conditions of 
these operations ". (4)
Following nationalisation of the air corporations which took 
place after the second world war, in which three public 
corporations were set up, the Civil Aviation Act of 1946 came 
into force in which granted exclusive rights to the British 
nationalised air corporations to fly scheduled air services,
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leaving the private airlines the authority to operate only 
charter air services.
Three years later, under the Air Corporations Act of 1949,
the Air Transport Advisory Council was created in order to
give advice to the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation
concerning the services which require permission to operate
and on the many agreements already and subsequently concluded.(5)
In 1960 the Civil Aviation Licensing Act came into force 
and did away with the statutory monopoly of the nationalised 
corporations, and the Air Transport Licensing Board ( ATLB ) 
was formed to regulate a new licensing system in which both 
the nationalised and the private carriers were given equal 
opportunity to operate international and domestic services.
At this time it was necessary for all commercial flights to 
have an air service licence to allow them to operate.
The ATLB had to look at the following matters as part of 
its duties:
1- The competence and fitness of the carrier to operate a 
proposed service.
2- To consult with regional advisory committees in considering 
such applications.
3- To consult with the Board of Trade about relations with 
other countries.
4- The general regulation of airline tariffs, and for prices 
and incomes policy. (6 )
There has since been much criticism of the ATLB machinery; 
the Edwards Report issued in 1969 examined these criticisms
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very explicitly and focused mainly on two issues;
First, the appeal procedure and regulations allowed against 
the A T L B *s decisions, where the Report recommended appeals 
to be taken to a judicial body not to the Minister, while 
the 1960 Act had given any party the right to appeal only 
to the Minister against the B o a r d ’s decision.
Second, there had been no clear statements of policy, and 
the Edwards Report recommended that statements of policy be 
formulated by the government and published as a statutory 
instrument containing guidelines to follow. (7)
Stephen Wheatcroft, in his lecture given on 27 November 1963 
before the Air Law Group of the Royal Aeronautical Society, 
referred to the role of the ATLB and criticized the general 
regulatory system of the Act of 1960; He emphasized the 
following issues:
1- Policy making, where he raised the question of " who makes 
policy and how is it promulagted ", and suggested that policy 
making should be left to the Minister. He criticized the 
appeal procedure as being only a rehearing of the original 
case, and thought it would have been more acceptable for the 
Minister to be given the authority to make policy.
2- On control of entry, capacity and tariffs, Wheatcroft called 
for a regulatory procedure to achieve unified control over
the whole industry. He criticized the then regulatory system 
and then showed the division of control over three types of 
route: International, Domestic and Cabotage (table 4.1).
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Table (4.1)
DIVERSITY OF AUTHORITY IN BRITISH AIR TRANSPORTATION REGULATION
CONTROL OF ENTRY AND 
CAPACITY
CONTROL OF TARIFFS
INTERNATIONAL
1- ATLB licensing subject 
to appeal to Minister.
2- Ministry negotiation 
of traffic rights 
under bilateral 
agreements.
Ministry control as 
agreed in bilateral 
agreements normally 
by approval of lATA 
Traffic Conference 
Agreements,
COLONIAL
CABOTAGE
1- ATLB licensing subject 
to appeal to Minister.
2- Licence required from 
Colonial Licensing 
Authority (except 
specified Corporation 
routes).
1- General-Ministry 
approval after 
consultation with 
Colonial Authorities.
2- Specified cases- 
ATLB approval subject 
to normal appeal 
procedure.
DOMESTIC ATLB licensing subject 
to appeal to Minister.
ATLB approval subject 
to appeal to Minister,
Source; Wheatcroft, S, (1964), ’ Licensing British Air Transport
Journal of the Royal Aeronautical Society. Vol. 68,No.639. 
PP. 175.
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3- On Inclusive Tour Charters, he analysed the situation in 
which an airline involved with a tour operation had to apply 
to the ATLB for a licence if it is a British carrier, and if 
the Board rejected its application the tour operator would 
search for a non-British airline to operate the same service 
without the need for such a licence. In this situation it 
would be difficult for the Board to refuse British applicants 
as by the end it would be effecting the position of the 
scheduled service operators. So Wheatcroft suggested instead 
that the tour operator himself should apply for the licence 
and specify the airline, whether British or Foreign, that 
would operate the route. (8 )
The ATLB according to the Act is " to further the development 
of British civil aviation " but no positive guidance was 
given for the Board to follow on policy matters.
As an independent licensing board it was responsible for 
regulating competition but had no responsibility for technical 
safety matters as these were the responsibility of the Air 
Registration Board and the Director of aviation safety.
The Board had been given power to consider the financial 
resources, equipment, organisation and staffing of an applicant 
when granting a licence,
4.2.2. EDWARDS REPORT ;
In July 1967 a committee chaired by Sir Ronald Edwards was 
appointed by the Board of Trade to look into the methods of 
regulating competition, the licensing procedures employed and 
the economical and financial position of the British civil 
air transport industry.
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The Committee was to recommend any required changes in the 
industry that would serve the development of the economy, 
the safety of flights and the travellers’ requirements.
The Report was also to clarify the aims of civil aviation 
regulation generally.
The Edwards Report was subsequently regarded as a foundation 
of all civil aviation regulation policy in the United Kingdom; 
the 1971 Civil Aviation Act and the Civil Aviation Authority 
were in fact created upon the report’s recommendation.
The report forwarded a multi-airline policy and to secure or 
achieve adequate level of service and airline efficiency it 
recommended the provision of a competitive environment and 
that a ’’ second force airline ’’ was needed to compete with 
the state air corporations. (9)
This second airline should come from the merger of the two 
main private air carriers British United Airways and Caledonian 
Airways.
Another important recommendation was the creation of British 
Airways Board to manage the public interests in the two state 
air corporations of BOAC and BEA.
4.2.3. CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY (CAA) :
Air transport in most countries is regulated and protected 
by their governments and this responsibility in the United 
Kingdom has been delegated to a professional and a non 
governmental organisation,the CAA, which acts as the government’s 
expert adviser and has been the authorised representative of 
the UK government in most international aviation matters.
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The Civil Aviation Authority, created on the recommendation 
of the Edwards Report, was formally brought into being on 
22 December 1971 following the passage of Civil Aviation 
Act of 1971 . It assumed full responsibilities on 1 April 
1972 both as a public service and as a regulatory body.
Sir Ronald Edwards, in his speech presented in 1975 to the 
Air Law Group of the Royal Aeronautical Society, noted that 
the principle reason for recommending the creation of the 
CAA was that safety and financial strength were closely 
interlinked and should therefore be supervised by one body 
with special statutory authority.
This authority, although not a governmental department, has 
overall responsibility for such matters as safety, navigational 
services, airport planning, air travel organisers licensing, 
ownership and management of aerodrome, protection of consumer 
interests and price control.
The Authority refers to its responsibilities to be related with ;
" 1- National air traffic services, air traffic control and 
telecommunications jointly with Ministry of Defence.
2- The economic regulation of the civil aviation industry, 
including air transport licensing and approval of air 
fares, and the licensing of air travel organisers.
3- Air safety, both airworthiness and operational safety, 
including the licensing of flight crew, aircraft engineers 
and aerodromes, and the certification of UK airlines
and aircraft.
4- Advice to the government on domestic and international 
civil aviation matters.
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5- Consumer interests; private aviation requirements, economic 
and scientific research; the collection and publication
of statistical and economic data; and consultancy and 
training for overseas administrations.
6 - The ownership and operation of the CAA aerodromes in the 
Scottish Highlands and Islands. ” (10)
Three important functions of the CAA should be mentioned:
A- The Authority aims to see that demand is satisfied by 
the provision of services at the lowest possible rate but 
also with an economic return to efficient carriers.
B- In its approval of fares the Authority tries, beside 
considering many other factors, to relate the proposed air 
fares to costs.
C- It tries to balance the conflicting interests in civil 
air transport of the airline industry, air passengers and 
the nation as a whole. (1 1 )
Figure 4.1 refers to the Authority’s organisation chart, 
showing its departments: Economic, Safety, Finance and 
Planning, National Air Traffic and Personnel Services.
It was the Civil Aviation Act of 1971, which set out the 
broad objectives of government policy for the civil air 
transport industry, that provided for the establishment of 
the Authority. The Act gave the CAA the duty of ensuring 
British airlines provide air transport services to satisfy 
all substantial categories of public demand (section 1-a).
Then the Policy Guidance of 1972 declared that as ’’ civil 
air transport exists by serving the public, the Authority
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should inform itself of the public's needs and take full 
account of them ", (12)
Section 22-5-b of the 1971 Act gave the Authority power to 
fix domestic fares; but the fares detailed in paragraph 22 
of the 1972 Policy Guidance should be set at levels which 
allowed a sufficient return to efficient operators, and at 
levels relating to costs. (13)
The Authority was also given, according to section 21 of 
the Act, the power to issue air licences, and it prohibited 
any aircraft from carrying passengers or cargo without 
having obtained an air licence.
The CAA, according to sections 36 and 61 of Act 1971 and as 
restated in para 26 of the Policy Guidance of 1972, is 
required frequently to publish statistics and information 
about the industry and to undertake research and development 
in such matters as air safety, traffic control, navigation 
services and air transport economics, (14)
It was in 1972 that the Secretary of State for Trade delegated 
to the CAA the power to approve international fares which 
have been previously agreed by the airlines at lATA meetings. 
But the consent to operate services into the UK by airlines 
was withheld from the CAA and reserved for consideration by 
the Department of Trade.
This division in responsibility between the CAA and the 
Department of Trade was criticised by the Authority itself, 
and Lord Boyd-Carpenter, in the 23rd Brancker memorial speech 
in 1975, emphasised on this point and made the remark that 
the " line of demarcation of functions is drawn in the wrong 
place ". (15)
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R.Colegate, in a lecture given on 4 November 1980 to the 
Air Law Group of the Royal Aeronautical Society, sees the 
two main elements behind the CAA's policies as :
" - To limit and in the long term, to reduce the discrim­
inatory elements in airline fares.
- To contain and reduce again progressively over a period, 
the extent to which one segment of demand is systematic­
ally overcharged in order to enable another to be under 
charged so as to take advantage of elasticity differen­
tials. " (16)
Policy Guidance of 1972 laid down the air transport objectives:
1- To ensure that British airlines provide air transport 
services which satisfy all substantial categories of public 
demand, at the lowest charges consistent with a high standard 
of safety in operating the services, while providing an 
economic return to the efficient operators.
2- To ensure that at least one major British carrier, not
being controlled by the British Airways Board, has opportunities 
to participate in providing charter and other terms of air 
transport services that satisfy the public.
3- To encourage the civil air transport industry to increase 
the contributions which it makes towards a favourable balance 
of payments for the UK, and towards the prosperity of the 
national economy.
4- To further the reasonable interests of users of air 
transport services. (17)
Certain modifications in the British air transport were 
decided following a new policy statement published on
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February 1976; these changes may be summarised as follows:
1- Not to allow competition between British carriers, and 
therefore not to have more than one British airline operating 
the same long haul routes, except services to and from 
London where Heathrow and Gatwick airports were considered
to form one destination.
2- A restructuring of the networks whereby both British 
Caledonian and British Airways routes and services should 
become complementary rather than competitive. The new 
modified route structures arranged for BCAL to extend its 
services in South America by taking Colombia, Venezuela 
and Peru from BA; also services to Singapore and Central 
Africa were also transfered to BCAL from BA, while East 
Africa and the Seychelles remained with BA.
As for North America routes, Houston and Atlanta remained 
part of BCAL's network, and it was going to be the sole 
British carrier designated to operate this route when it 
became available.
3- Emphasis was placed on the role of British Airways as 
the main provider of international scheduled services, 
while British Caledonian was seen as the major private 
carrier.
4- The proposed Skytrain service to be offered by Laker 
Airways on the London-New York route would be cancelled. (18)
Finally, the Authority has always been directly concerned 
with the negotiation of arrangements made with international 
and European regulatory bodies and organisations such as
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the International Civil Aviation Organisation, the European 
Civil Aviation Conference and the International Air Transport 
Association.
The CAA has played a major role in the implementation of 
the Advanced Booking Charter (ABC) and the Advance Purchase 
Excursions (APEX) type of fares in the early seventies on 
the North Atlantic routes.
We can say of the CAA that it has been committed to a 
policy of reduced control and supervision of the airlines' 
commercial activities, thus leaving them open to compete 
more effectively.
4.2.4. THE CIVIL AVIATION ACT OF 1980 ;
The first major issue dealt in this new Act was that the 
power of the Secretary of State for Trade to give Policy 
Guidance to the CAA, in respect of how to perform its 
functions, was abolished, instead the CAA was required to 
formulate and publish a statement of the policies that it 
intended to adopt in the field of air transport licensing, 
after consultation with industry and the users of air services 
The abolishing of governmental guidance has strengthened 
the CAA and gave it more of non-political continuity to the 
development of its regulatory policies. Under the new Act, 
however, the air carriers retained their right of appeal to 
the Secretary of State against the CAA's decisions.
The Act also proposed that certain environmental factors 
should be considered by the CAA, both when performing its 
air transport licensing functions and in excercise of its 
functions regarding aerodrome licensing.
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These environmental factors were to include noise, vibration, 
atmospheric pollution or any other cause attributable to 
the use of aircraft for the purpose of civil aviation.
On international matters, the 1980 Act added to section 
23 of 1971 Act a new paragraph stating that the CAA was 
to " perform its air transport licensing functions in the 
manner it considers is best calculated to ensure that 
British airlines compete as effectively as possible with 
other airlines in providing air transport services on 
international routes, and in performing those functions 
the Authority shall also have regard ".
The 1980 Act also proposed that in granting any air licence
on existing air transport services provided by British carriers,
the CAA should consider the effect of authorising any new 
services under their new licence; and they were also to 
consider the benefits that might arise out of having two 
or more airlines providing similar services.
4.3. CIVIL AVIATION IN UNITED STATES :
4.3.1. THE 1938 ACT AND THE CREATION OF CAB ;
In United States public utility regulation began with the 
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, where the Congress recodified 
the economic regulation of commercial aviation completely 
with a system of federal licensing, rate regulation, subsidy 
and regulation of mergers and acquisitions.
Under this Act, the federal economic regulatory responsibilty 
was vested in the Civil Aeronautics Board and that each air 
carrier requires a " Certificate of public Convenience and
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Necessity " (19) issued by the Board before operating a 
particular commercial air route.
These certificates were to be granted only when carriers 
were found financially fit to operate a safe service 
meeting public demand. However certain certificates called 
" grandfathers " were issued automatically to those carriers 
who had operated services during the three months proceeding 
the Act's coming into force on 22 August 1938 unless the 
service rendered during this period had been considered 
inadequate or inefficient.
The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 did a great deal to stabilise 
the air transport industry, and required the CAB to consider 
first, the promotion of adequate, economical and efficient 
service by air carriers at reasonable charges without unjust 
discriminations, undue preferences or advantages or unfair 
or destructive competitive practices; and second, to encourage 
competition to the extent that it might be necessary to ensure 
the sound development of an air transportation system properly 
adapted to the needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of 
the.United States, the postal service and of national defence. 
In 1940 the Safety Board was abolished and its functions 
transferred to the CAB, together with responsibility for 
regulating the economic aspects of air carrier operations, 
issuance of civil air regulations and other safety rules, and 
investigating aircraft accidents.
The organisation of the CAB was then divided into four 
functional groups: Economics Bureau, Safety Bureau, General 
Council and a Secretariat.
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The CAB functions as an advisor to the State Department 
on international aviation affairs, such as bilateral air 
negotiations, and in representing the United States in 
different international air transport meetings such as 
the First Bermuda Agreement of 1946 which was signed 
between the UK and the USA mentioned in chapter two,
Bermuda I agreement in its para (b) of Annex II pointed 
out that the CAB acts as an approving body for the traffic 
conference rate agreements reached through lATA's machinery 
being subject to the approval of the CAB. (20)
The CAB could only refuse, or alter the rates for inter­
national routes submitted by the air carriers if they 
were found to be unjustly discriminatory.
According to the Act of 1938, which was later confirmed 
in the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, the CAB did not have 
the overall authority to set rates on international routes 
as it had on the domestic ones.
Indirect authority or power to approve rates was however 
given to the CAB over the US international carriers if 
they went into agreements among themselves or with foreign 
carriers.
Under the 1938 Act the CAB is equipped with the following 
powers :
1- Entry power; to grant or deny a " Certificate of Public 
Conference and necessity " which an airline needs to fly 
interstate.
2- Rate power; the authority to suspend or set air fares.
3- Anti-trust power; to approve or disapprove agreements 
among airlines.
-88-
4- Power to authorise mergers.
5- Power to administer a subsidy.
6- Power to enforce its own regulations.
7- Power to regulate certain matters of airline service.
The 1938 Act is the most important piece of legislation 
in United States’ aviation history, setting out national 
policy for developing and promoting the airlines.
Richard Caves refers to this Act as the " basic statute 
governing public control of civil aviation in USA ". (21) 
Finally, one has to say that, the US airline regulation 
has been governed by the 1938 Act with entry and fares 
under its control with the provision of frequency, capacity 
and on board services being the only factors for competition.
4.3.2. THE FEDERAL AVIATION ACT OF 1958 :
This new Act recodified the general economic regulatory 
authority of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, and it 
established the Federal Aviation Administration to regulate 
safety and provide for safe and efficient use of air space 
by civil and military aircraft.
According to the Declaration Policy in the Federal Aviation 
Act, the CAB is concerned in the following functions:
1- The encouragement and development of an air transportation 
system properly adapted to the present and future needs
of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United States, 
of the postal service and of national defence,
2-. The encouragement of competition to the extent necessary 
to ensure the sound development of air transportation.
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3- The regulation of air transportation in such a manner 
as to recognise and preserve its inherent advantages, 
ensure its highest degree of safety, foster its sound 
economic condition, improve the relations and coordinate 
transportation between the carriers.
4- The promotion of an adequate, economical and efficient 
service by air carriers at reasonable charges, without 
unjust discrimination, undue preference, or unfair and 
destructive competitive practices.
5- The promotion of safety in air commerce.
6- The promotion, encouragement and development of civil 
areonautics,
The CAB can be said is responsible for seeing that rates 
are just, reasonable, and non disciminatory ; it has the 
power to investigate rates and to establish them if it 
sees the rates filed by the carrier as being unlawful.
Mahlon Straszheim notes that the CAB has power to prevent 
discriminatory rates and to approve or disapprove rates 
proposed either by US or by foreign carriers, but that 
it has no power to set rates. (22)
It is due to the C A B ’s lack of authority to set rates 
that the US carriers face difficulty to bargain within lATA; 
the Chandler dispute referred in chapter three is the 
prime example on this.
In addition, the CAB has no punitive power concerning the 
fares charged by carriers operating international services, 
as these fares are set internationally through lATA
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machinery, as agreed between the US government and other 
nations in the bilateral agreements.
The CAB approval for these international fares will 
mean granting to the carriers the immunity from the Anti 
trust law; while its disapproval of them removes this 
immunity.
According to the C A B ’s chairman, in a speech presented 
on March 1967 to the US House of Representatives, the 
CAB economic regulatory activities are concerned with:
1- Awards of operating authority.
2- Regulation of rates and fares,
3- Regulation of agreements and interlocking relationships, 
among air carriers, and between air carriers and other 
aeronautical enterprises,
4- Support of air services through subsidy payments,
5- Regulation of the air carriers' accounting ,
6- Enforcement of applicable laws and regulations.
The CAB, through its Economic Bureau, tries to maintain 
a competitive climate by protecting the industry from 
a monopolistic situation.
The international rate orders of the CAB have to pass 
through the White House, and the US President is empowered 
by the Federal Aviation Act to disapprove any such order 
when he feels that disapproval is required for reasons 
of national defence or because of US foreign policy.
If the President does not act to disapprove an order 
within 10 days, the order is then issued by the CAB;
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while for routes’ certificates, the President must sign 
the certificates and thus he share with the CAB the 
responsibility for the wisdom of the decision.
The CAB in 1951 questioned the statutory position of the 
non-scheduled airlines, on whether there was a need for 
large irregular carriers offering services in addition 
to those performed by public carriers holding a certificate. 
While it was being determined that there was a need for 
such services, the CAB granted those carriers temporary 
certificates; but because of objection and appeal by the 
scheduled operators, the CAB requested Congress to redefine 
the role of the supplemental carriers and to clarify its 
powers of certification.
Therefore, in July 1962, section 401 of the Federal 
Aviation Act of 1958 was amended to authorise the CAB to 
grant certificates of public convenience and necessity 
to the supplementals on a geographical basis; and the 
CAB was given the power to determine which carriers might 
operate scheduled interstate services and on which routes 
they might operate.
Opponents of the 1958 Act claimed that CAB control over 
entry and exit would reduce the economic pressure to 
keep costs down, and that it would safeguard carriers 
operating ineffiently while blocking the way for efficient 
ones, and that it would enable carriers to establish an 
inefficient route structure, with inefficient utilisation 
of aircraft, and in the end produce higher air travel 
costs .
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4.3.3. THE AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT OF 1978 :
Deregulation of air transport in United States took a 
long process where in July 1975 the CAB stated its 
intention to liberalise entry and exit issues in 
commercial aviation and to give freedom to carriers 
to set their own fare levels.
The Aviation Act of 1975 later allowed a wider operation 
of competitive forces within the airlines.
After lengthy discussions by all the parties concerned, 
the US Senate and the House of Representatives approved 
a new regulatory reform bill, and the Deregulation Act 
was later signed by President Carter on 24 October 1978, 
Emphasis in the 1978 Act was placed on having a liberalised 
situation; allowing a more efficient industry to emerge 
from market forces rather than government regulations, 
so the Act provided the following:
1- Allowing airlines to cut domestic passenger and cargo 
fares up to 50% or raise them by 5% without CAB permission,
2- Giving freedom of entry and exit to carriers of both 
passengers and cargo.
3- Phasing out the CAB's authority by 1982, unless it
can be shown to be worth retaining over fares and mergers,
4- Complete abolishing of the CAB in January 1985 with 
transfer of its activities to the Department of Transport.
5- Anti trust exemptions granted to carriers were limited 
from the CAB authority.
6- Ending federal and state economic regulation on all 
US interstate carriers.
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Before the implementation of the Act, price competition 
was almost non existent in the industry with rivalry 
being mainly in terms of service and the frequency and 
scheduling of flights.
The main idea behind the Deregulation Act was to have a 
long list of fares, with travellers choosing fares from 
among those available that would suit their requirements. 
The Act would also leave airlines free to serve or abandon 
routes, thus producing stiffer competition and leading 
automatically to lower fares.
This could mean the industry shifting from what is 
considered having a public utility form of regulation to 
one that permits competition.
The CAB followed a policy of promoting more price compe­
tition and lower rates on international routes, and in 
encouraging the carriers to develop innovative pricing 
systems and also of having less regulatory interference 
in the carriers' decision making.
The Deregulation Act in its section 102 refers to what 
constitute in the public interest and the public 
convenience and necessity for the CAB to consider 
when performing its duties and powers; Appendix IV quotes 
section 102 in detail.
Finally, the advocates of deregulation believe that free 
entry is the keystone to an efficient system, without 
having the CAB to control and shape the structure of the 
industry, but leaving market forces to play their roles; 
and on the other hand suggest that regulation results in 
inefficient air transportation.
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E. Levitas, Chairman of the investigations and oversight 
Sub Committee of the House Public Works and Transportation 
Committee suggests that " As deregulation is becoming 
institutionalized, there is no need to continue the CAB "(23) 
In conclusion, it is of great essence to mention that in 
formulating the regulatory policies, the regulatory body 
of any country has to consider the national policies 
together with the satisfaction of the legitimate require­
ments of both scheduled and charter air services.
Also providing an efficient network of services is the 
corner stone for considering air transport a public utility 
where without regulation seems difficult to maintain.
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CHAPTER FIVE
5. SCHEDULED vs NON SCHEDULED SERVICES :
The first task of the airline industry, whether it is 
involved in scheduled or non-scheduled operations, is 
to meet the public's demand for air travel.
With the air traveller being no longer an economic elite 
the new phase of mass travel of non-scheduled transport 
has very different characteristics from that of the 
more traditional scheduled market.
In the past ten years the more liberal policies of a 
number of countries have assisted non-scheduled transport 
to become a vital sector, growing at a remarkable rate 
particularly in the North Atlantic, where low-cost mass 
transport with high load factors and lower costs has 
been vigorously promoted at the expense of the rival 
scheduled carriers.
Freddy Laker, in a speech at the Conference of World 
Tourism and Travel in 1973, viewed the situation where 
” scheduled airlines can never meet the low fare require­
ments because of fixed heavy overheads, complicated 
distribution system and enormous capital investment".(1) 
With the non-scheduled carriers having such a significant 
effect on traffic in mid sixties and during the seventies, 
fares were developed which were low enough to attract 
travellers whose demand for travel was price elastic and 
who had a less rigid demand for amenities.
Before studying the characteristics of the two modes of 
service, one must define and understand the two terms.
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5.1. DEFINITION OF SCHEDULED AND NON-SCHEDULED ;
The Chicago Convention of 1944 gave the first elucidation 
and distinction of the two types of service where Article 
5 concerned with the non-scheduled services read;
" Aircraft of a contracting state not engaged in scheduled 
international air services may, subject to certain 
conditions, make flights into or across the territory 
of all other contracting states " (2); while Article 6 
read: " No scheduled international air service may be 
operated over or into the territory of a contracting 
state, except with the special permission or other 
authorisation of the state, and in accordance with the 
terms of such permission or authorisation (3)
The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) in 
1952 sought to redefine the shape and characteristics of 
international scheduled air services, as a misunderstand­
ing had risen over what article 5 meant by " not engaged 
in scheduled So the scheduled service was then to be 
defined as a flight that:
" 1- Passes through the air space over the territory of 
more than one state;
2- Is performed by aircraft for the transport of 
passengers, mail or cargo for remuneration in such a 
manner that each flight is open to use by members of 
the public.
3- Is operated, so as to serve traffic between the same 
two or more points, either:
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i) according to a published timetable or 
ii) with flights so regular or frequent that they 
constitute a recognisably systematic series. " (4)
While those states who were members of the European 
Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC), an organisation 
composed of representatives of civil aviation authorities 
of the European countries, in their Paris Agreement of 
1956 elaborated on the meaning of non-scheduled, and it 
was agreed that no requirements were needed prior to the 
authorisation for;
1- Flights of a humanitarian or emergency nature;
2- Occasional taxi class passenger flights, provided 
seating capacity did not exceed six passengers, the 
destination was chosen by the client, and no part of the 
aircraft’s space was resold;
3- Flights on which the entire space is hired by a single 
person or party for the carriage of his or its staff or 
merchandise, and provided that no part of its space was 
resold ;
4- Single flights, of which no operator or group of 
operators was entitled under this sub-paragraph, to more 
than one flight per month between the same two traffic 
centres for all aircraft available to him, (5)
On the other hand the International Air Transport 
Association (lATA) defines the two types of service with 
the scheduled services as those ’’ flights performed 
according to a published timetable, or so regular or 
frequent as to constitute recognisably systematic services
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which are open to use by the public, extra flights occasioned 
by overflow traffic from the scheduled flights, and preparatory 
flights on planned air services while non-scheduled services 
are " charter flights and special flights performed for 
remuneration on an irregular basis, including empty flights 
related thereto and inclusive tours other than those reported 
under scheduled services ", (6)
In mid 1977 the Special Air Transport Conference meeting in 
Montreal gave to ICAOs Air Transport Regulation Panel (ATRP) 
the task of looking into the difference between the two types 
of service as the I C A O ’s definition mentioned earlier was no 
longer satisfactory and it had become difficult to differen­
tiate between the two services on the basis of this definition. 
The amendments and clarifications proposed by the panel were, 
however, subsequently rejected at the Second Air Transport 
Conference of 1980.
The amendments emphasised that " A service may be regarded 
as open to the public, not withstanding certain restrictions, 
which relate for example, to the time of reservation, the 
minimum length of stay, or the obligation to deal with an 
intermediary. It will be incumbent on each contracting state, 
in respect of these restrictions and decide whether the 
restrictions are so substantial that the service should be 
considered as non-scheduled ", (7)
The Association of European Airlines (AEA), with a membership 
of twenty major European airlines consisting of; Air Lingus,
Air France, Austrian, British Airways, British Caledonian,
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Finnair, Iberia, Icelandair, JAT, KLM, Luxair, Lufthansa, ;
Olympic, Sabena, SAS, Swissair, Turkish, TAP and UTA; in i
defining scheduled services also refers to them of being 
" regular or frequent as to consitute a recognisably 
systematic service ", (8)
Here it is essential to mention that by regularity of flights 
one is to understand that the scheduled carriers face an 
obligation to provide this type of service with no consider­
ation of load factors, as insistance on maintaining high 
load factors would reduce the customer's chances of finding 
a flight when it suits him.
On this obligation, the Edwards Report refers to the 
necessity of retaining " some degree of protection for the 
scheduled operator ", (9)
On regularity of service and load factor, A. Rosenberg makes 
his own distinction between scheduled and charter service 
and sees that charter services make load factor the prime 
consideration while for the scheduled services regularity is 
essential, (10)
C, Taylor has a very distinct concept of the contrast between 
scheduled and non-scheduled carriers that of market loyalty.
He sees charter operators as having little loyality to the 
market, with economic circumstances forcing them to remain 
very volatile, while the scheduled operator feels a commitment 
to the routes he is serving, (11)
However, loyality to the market is not confined merely to 
providing service but in offering that service to the public
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at reasonable and acceptable fares to meet the demand and 
desire of the passenger,
A crucial objective of the airline’s marketing strategy is 
to obtain accurate information on how the passenger sees 
the product offered to him with regard to the type of 
services, level of fares, the restrictions attached to it 
and the satifaction perceived out of the use of a particular 
service.
Philip Kotler sees the customer continue using one brand of 
product ’’ as long as their brand provides the anticipated 
satisfaction ’’ (12).
Achieving his anticipated satisfaction when using one type 
of air service, the passenger would continue his use of that 
service unless to his disappointment that service ceases 
operating or it changed in providing unacceptable set of 
conditions and requirements affecting the passenger preference 
for that particular service or he may find his satisfaction 
and demand preference changing toward another different type 
of air service.
Kotler in his explanation of market loyalty, advocates that 
the continuity in the purchase pattern of a customer for a 
particular brand of product ’’ would seem to reflect the 
intrinsic preference for the product but may really reflect 
habit, indifference, a lower price or the non availability 
of substitutes (13)
Loyalty, however, is a two sided pattern, first by the customer 
towards one or more of the following categories:
^Brand of product e.g. APEX, First class, etc.
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- An organisation e.g. British Airways, Pan Am, etc.
- A destination e.g. New York, London, Paris, Los Angeles, etc. 
Second by the provider of the product towards a particular 
segment or type of customers who form his market.
So availablity and continuity of a service at a reasonable 
rate of return are principle factors on which this loyalty 
may be found and built upon, but can air carriers meet these 
two obligations at the same time.
5.2. THE INTER-RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SCHEDULED AND NON-SCHEDULED;
With an increased need for non-scheduled services, demand in 
North Atlantic became widely distributed between the inelastic 
demand of high fares e.g. First class and Economy class 
passengers, and the more elastic demands of promotional fare 
payers e.g. Advance Purchase Excursions and charter fares 
passengers.
The different needs constituting the traffic mix and the 
rights granted by the international regulatory framework in 
allowing the existence of both scheduled and non-scheduled 
services, require ways to satisfy the demands of both 
categories of passengers.
The idea has to be accepted that both types of service may 
exist in harmony with each other where the needs of both 
being satisfied without any cut throat competition.
However, few distinctions must be made between these two 
types of service;
1- The means of selling seats to the public are different, 
requiring in the case of non-scheduled carriers the services
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of an intermediary channel capable of marketing seats in 
bulk, while scheduled carriers tend to sell directly to 
the public,
2- Scheduled services are subject to bilateral air service 
agreements, and their fares are set within the machinery 
of lATA, while the others have greater freedom of operation, 
needing only the permission of their countries where their 
fare levels being agreed by the governments concerned.
Also the fact that not only fare levels but traffic rights 
of the scheduled services are covered by the operations of 
the bilateral agreements.
In its attempts to control the operations of non-scheduled 
carriers, lATA in its resolution 045, established that minimum 
charter fares should not be less than the lowest scheduled 
fare.
In September 1974, at lATA's 30th Annual General Meeting in 
Montreal, it was allowed that charter carrier might apply for 
the Association’s membership, and that charter agreements 
should be developed within the lATA machinery.
But, in November 1976, the CAB voiced its disapproval of the
participation of charter carriers in lATA’s machinery.
The c a b ’s chairman, Secor Browne, had previously, in speech 
to the Royal Aeronautical Society in 1972, emphasised the 
United States’ objection to both the multilateral approach 
to the operation of charter services, and of bringing charter
rates within the lATA fare machinery. (14)
The United States had been favouring the implementation of 
bilateral agreements on charter issues and a revision of Bermuda
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Agreement II in 1978 mentioned in chapter three dealt with 
this; while the Europeans have tended to favour charter 
issues coming within multinational agreement.
The c a b ’s Chairman also pointed out that, according to the 
Statements of International Air Transportation Policy, the 
US bilateral approach to charter services would depend on 
the propositions that routes would be governed by formula 
similar to those used in its own bilateral agreements on 
scheduled services; that there would be no control on 
capacity; that bilateral machinery should be used to prevent 
substantial impairment of scheduled services, and that there 
needs to be a definitional agreement. (15)
In 1972, when the CAB refused to allow the use of the affinity 
group concept, the United States and European countries made 
non-scheduled services available to the public by offering 
Advanced Booking Charters (ABC) and Travel Group Charters (TGC). 
In the USA, the Civil Aeronautics Board on 7 August 1975 
passed resolution ER-924 which authorised non-scheduled 
transport under a new charter formula called ’’ One Stop 
Inclusive Tour Charter (OTC) ’’ where one intermediate stop 
was allowed on a package travel formula.
One of the measures taken by the scheduled carriers to combat 
the threat of the charter operations was to form its own 
subsidiaries operating outside lATA. Complementing that, and 
as a result of the US Deregulation Act of 1978, dual certif­
ication was permitted whereby charter carriers were allowed 
to operate scheduled services.
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Finally, one has to mention that disagreement between the 
Europeans and the American is with regard how to bring the 
services of the scheduled and the non-scheduled into a 
co-ordinated process where the Europeans are recommending 
a multilateral approach in contrast to the country of 
origin rule advocated by the United States where rules and 
regulations of the country in which traffic first take place 
will govern the non-scheduled services of the bilateral 
agreements.
Therefore, one could say, even with the existence of distinction 
between the twp types of service and due to the importance 
of such services by the passenger, the solution would 
require governments and airlines to be aware that both 
scheduled and charter services have to be regulated to provide 
better service to the public.
* * * * * * * * *
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CHAPTER SIX
6. FARES
6.1. INTRODUCTION
When the first Bermuda air agreement was signed in 1946 
between the United Kingdom and the United States, it was 
accepted that lATA would be the channel or the tool in setting 
the international scheduled fares, subject to the approval 
of both governments before implementation.
As the fares and rates of the scheduled services on intern­
ational routes are in the end controlled by the governments 
of the individual countries which they serve and because 
thousands of routes exist which cover the inter-connecting 
services between areas so that virtually every fare is 
related and dependent on every other one; therefore it seems 
much appropriate to expect and require multilateral acceptance 
and lATA's fares being spread by such use of bilateral 
agreements.
The fare agreements, reached through lATA's three traffic 
conferences representing lATA's geographical areas of the 
world, need unanimous approval of all the members concerned.
In setting fares on the North Atlantic a multilateral 
acceptance seems more needed because more than the usual two 
countries are involved where beside pairs of countries 
existing within this market i.e. USA-UK, USA-FRANCE and etc 
there are those involved in fifth freedom services.
Air fares are usually taken to mean tariffs available in 
the marketplace to members of the public wishing to use 
existing means of transport by air whether it is scheduled, 
charter or inclusive. In the first two cases the tariffs are
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presented by the air carriers as individual fares while in 
the last case the air fares are part of an inclusive package
deal sold through the tour operators or their agents.
Here one has to remember that fares of all types excluding 
First class provide virtually the same product i.e. a seat 
but the difference lies to the conditions attached in 
providing these fares.
The following main types of fare have been made available 
on the North Atlantic:
1- Normal fares; These are the most expensive fares, with 
choice of either First or Economy class. They are available 
to all members of the public with no stay restrictions and
no limitations to the alteration of the tickets.
2- Excursion fares; These are cheaper than the normal fares 
but generally at various restrictions to their validity in 
the time of purchase and length of stay with restricted 
stopovers or none at all.
3- Skytrain; A scheduled, no frills,service first introduced 
and operated by Laker Airways between London (Gatwick) and 
New York in 1977.
Other skytrain services were later offered to Miami, Tampa 
and Los Angeles from Gatwick; to New York and Los Angeles 
from Manchester; and to Los-Angeles from Prestwick.
The skytrain service ceased operation with the collapse of 
Laker Airways in February 1982.
These skytrain services were the first to reduce scheduled 
transatlantic air fares.
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4-Standby: These are the cheapest fares available with 
scheduled airlines on the North Atlantic and were introduced 
as a response to L a k e r ’s skytrain service. The standby fare 
is a one way fare and available to many US cities from 
Gatwick, Heathrow, Glasgow and Manchester.
5- Advance Purchase Excursion (APEX): These must be bought 
and paid 21 days to 3 months before departure with minimum 
and maximum stay requirements. Also available Super APEX 
fares which are the lowest asdvance purchase fares but with 
more restrictive conditions.
6- Advance Bookings Charter (ABC): These are charter fares 
purchased 21 days in advance with a minimum of 7 days but 
with no maximum stay. These fares were introduced on the 
North Atlantic from 1 April 1973 following the meeting of 
representatives of ECAC, US and Canada in Ottawa to replace 
the Travel Group Charter (TGC) for flights from USA.
The ABC rules implemented by the European differed from the 
American TGC rules in that a fixed price were introduced by 
the ABC while a pro rata system of pricing where the cost of 
charter is shared equally by the passengers ocuured with TGC. 
Table 6.1 refers to the regulations governing both types of 
fares .
7- Budget: These fares are similar to the standby where the 
passenger nominates the week in which he wishes to travel 
with payment and ticket bought 21 days before the first day 
of the week in which travel is required.
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Table (6.1)
REGULATIONS GOVERNING ADVANCED BOOKING CHARTERS 
ON UNITED KINGDOM/UNITED STATES SERVICES
SUMMER 1977
ABC OTC TGC
Westbound Eastbound A /ailable eastbound only
Purchase through 
travel agent only Yes Yes Yes Yes
Minimum group 40 seats 40 seats +0 seats 40 seats
Advance Booking 45 days 45 days 30 days 60 days
Passenger list 
to be filed Yes Yes Yes Yes
Minimum stay 10/14 days 7 days 7 days 10 days
Is substitution 
possible ?
10% from 
waiting list 
filed 45 
days advance
10% from 
waiting list 
plus 10% off 
street up to 
7 days before 
flight
? 15% off 
street up 
14 days 
before flij
Source: Doganis, R. (1977), ' Current trends in the international 
regulation of air transportation ’,
ITA Bulletin. No. 40, PP. 937.
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The scheduled airlines were prepared to promote the new 
APEX fares on a wider scale not only because of their 
competitive impact on charter services but also due to the 
need to remain competitive in a North Atlantic market 
deeply affected by Laker's rivalry.
The availability of these special promotional fares at 
lower than the normal Economy fares could mean that the low 
yield generated could only be accepted by high load factors 
with the revenues that would be derived from those passengers 
paying normal fares.
At the time these low scheduled fares were being introduced 
the American CAB was begining to liberalize charter services 
at a time when their competition was already pronounced.
Table 6.1 mentioned earlier shows the regulations and 
restrictions applicable to the non-scheduled fares available 
between the united Kingdom and the United States in the 
summer of 1977 at time when these low fare structures were 
increasingly available in the market place.
Table 6.2 shows the different scheduled and charter fares 
available on the leading route London-New York.
It is essential to mention that the introduction of APEX and 
ABC types of fare on the North Atlantic at about the same 
time was a sign that competition was growing between scheduled 
and charter carriers.
It is due to the availability of all these low promotional 
and competitive fares that discounted bucket shop tickets 
have not been sold by the travel industry on the North Atlantic
.116-
I
0 ?
1o-dH-*CDCL
wD)WH-n
I
I
wdmH*o
T)re
K-
K lod
U‘
gCOH-O
I n
?od
>H iHiH*dH*H‘<J
Hd01H-<re
00Ito
CLd
CO
H-drt
S
s?od"d
H
I S’g.o
I— * to M • r j■P' to ■P- n H-1 1 1 o Hto 4>. to d CO1— * L n I— ' i (H
C L W C L •X I w C L nd re d d re d dd CO d CO 1 dCO ? r H* CO K H- CO COO O h j td CO(D M M re dH % X d COO n n 5 V H-d d d nH HCO COM !-*• H-O Od d
re8
to
g ONON
totoLn
to toVD CjOO  O
5 IVO
to to 1 LO t o LO to LO LO Ln ■P'
►—> VO'vj1—'H-* t o LO LO ■o 00 to Ln Ln CO-o to "0 to to to to to to to -oto
to  (jO to  O  O
to LO to LO LO LO LO LO 4^ LO Ln(-< 1 1 LO VO 00 O h-> VO O LO toO  1 1 O Ln ■P- O O ■P- Ln 00 to I—* 00o
4>- LO Ln 4> Ln LO LO LO Ln ON Lnt—> to O 4>. O VO Ln VO 00 to O LOO Ln O I—* 00 vO ON O 00 O h-*
ON Ln CX> Ln 4>. O
-OON Ln00
LO 1 4> LO Ln •P- 03 I—’vOH ' 1 t—• 00 LO LOLO to 00 ON O to to
to to to to LO to LO to 4>- LO Ln P - 00 t-JVO(_4 VO VO to o t—' t—• t—• •P- vO LO ■P-LO LO to 00 o •p. I—* LO VO to vO O O LO LO
1—> t—'O vOVO '-JO
1—•to VOLnO ON
Wrert
3
COnd*red.dMreCL t-3ffo dO'O Mg" re
r tre ON
to
R V»/reto
rdCLo
?
%re«
0
PT
to to LJ Ln f>vO LO 4^. Ln LO '~J IO  O  O  O  ON LO I
LO Ln Ln P' ON Ln ON 1-*CO 1—> VO00 LO to 00 ON LO P ' to 1—*to Ln 4> 'O ■o I—* h-J p - ON to -o I
Source : ITA Study, No. 7/1978. PP. 23
-117-
6.2. DEMAND AND FARES :
Most organisations,from the marketing point of view, tend 
to have multiple objectives where beside the satisfaction 
of consumer, aim for a market share where to achieve a 
sales volume at a profitable terras to meet its obligations 
and to continue functioning effectively and competitively. 
The satisfaction of consumer in such an industry as the 
air transport could take the shape of providing air service 
for the traveller either on wide market or few or single 
city pair route, or to meet the demands of one segment or 
particular sector or the whole demand of all the different 
types of passenger i.e. Business, leisure, visiting friends 
and relatives.
The marketing strategy needed for each of the above 
situation taking into consideration the economic and 
political factors implemented by the country concerned, 
the air carrier will either aim to provide the type of 
service and the quantaties required by the public or simply 
market the types of service provided by it.
The nature of the industry requires from the airlines to 
fulfill the needs and satisfactions of all segments of 
demand by offering multi number of fares than only one 
single fare but here one has to be careful of the abuses 
that might occur where many undifferent type of fares are 
created by airlines.
The problem facing the air transport industry is finding 
ways of satisfying diverse passengers’ needs by bringing 
quality and cost factors into meaningful and profitable 
relationship.
-118-
To look at such crucial and sensitive issue from the point 
of view of both parties concerned, the airlines and the 
passengers, one has to start by examining the demand of 
air travel.
In the conventional theory, price tend to be a dominant 
variable and the way demand reacts to it is determined by 
the degree of elasticity. So one parameter to determine 
a meaningful measure of the relationship between air fares 
and air travel is the price elasticity of demand.
As all air travellers have freedom of choice from what 
is available in the marketplace, some passengers seek low 
cost fares with less convenient services while others 
prefer to face the high cost of more convenient services. 
Not overlooking the importance of the passenger being the 
consumer, here one has to remember that there are many 
types of passenger each with different needs.
The demand for passenger seats is usually drawn from two 
main sectors of the travelling public that of businessmen 
and holidaymakers and visiting friends and relatives.
Each section is differently sensitive to fares, with the 
latter category being more responsive to price and with 
demand for travel having high degree of price elasticity 
than the former. The nature and purpose of the travel of 
each of these categories plays an important role in the 
degree of its price elasticity with business travellers 
having less in advance flexible plans requiring scheduled 
services with no restrictions attached to its availability; 
while holidaymaking and visiting friends and relatives tend 
not to require such fixed itineraries.
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The elasticity of demand forecasts the overall trend of 
demand under the combined influences of rates and other 
factors such as the passenger’s income. This elasticity 
is the propensity of change in travel due to price 
changes where it measures the percentage change in 
quantity demanded at certain percentage change in price. 
Here prices will be adjusted to the optimum level and a 
set of rates will be introduced whereby to improve the 
operations of airlines and at the same time the passenger 
will be provided with the service to satisfy and meet 
their needs.
Mahlon Straszheim in his study sees the North Atlantic 
market comprising two main segments, a tourist market 
seeking low fares and low quality at a high load factor, 
and being greatly sensitive to price, and a second market 
of businessmen looking for greater scheduled frequency, 
lower load factor, higher quality and therefore facing a 
higher fare.
In using the period 1952-1973, Straszheim has estimated 
the price elasticity for First class fare at -0.649, 
while the Economy service tended to have a high price 
elasticity of -1.92 at peak period of travel and the year 
round price elasticity was estimated at -1.48.
Then Straszheim in analysing the demand for the submarkets 
of the Economy service for the period 1963-1973 has 
estimated the demand function for high Discount market 
having a price elasticity of -2.73. (1)
Then Straszheim went on to stress on the importance of
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developing more varied types of service, with both peak 
load and off peak pricing, and sees that the existence 
of charter and inclusive tour fares, as part of the 
regular fare structure, is necessary to meet this segmented 
demand. The situation is seen by Straszheim as a super­
market, where the consumer is offered different grades
of product at various prices, (2) j
!ii
Mutti and Murai using data for 1964-1974 have looked on j
the price elasticity issue but from the point of view of |
the travellers’ origin, i.e. the Americans vs European, |
where they estimated a year round price elasticity of -0.99 j
I
for the US and -0.07 for Germany, -0.14 for France, -0.28 
for the Netherlands, -0.40 for the United Kingdom and 
-0.75 for Italy, (3)
In 1978, Stephen Wheatcroft has examined in his study the |
various price elastcity studies for the previous years Ii
together with his first work done in 1964 on the elasticity |
of demand on the North Atlantic. The conclusions of these |
!s t u d i e s  a r e  s h o w n  i n  t a b l e  6.3 . (4) I
!it
M.A.Abe, in his paper published by the Department of |
Economics at Marquette University, lists air fare and |
service quality as the determinants of demand volume, where |
one finds those who are willing to pay more for higher |
quality service and those content to pay less for lower I
quality of service. (5)
Abe believes that deregulation could accomplish both the i
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Table (6.3.) 
CONCLUSIONS ON PRICE ELASTICITY
Study Date Market Period 
Summer Winter
Wheatcroft 1964 US
Canada
Hanlon
Kanafani
Mutti & 
Mural
- 1 . 6
- 2.0
1.5
- 1.8
Year Round1970 US
1974 Total North Year Round 
Atlantic
1977 US
Europe
Year Round 
-0.99
-0.07/0.75
Travel Purpose
Business -0.4/1.0 
Vacation -2.0 
VFR -2.1
Business -0.43
Business -0.7/-1.9 
Vacation -0.5/-2.1 
VFR -1.9/2.7
Cross
Elasticity
-0.6/1.2 
-0.1/1.3 
-0.4/2.6
Straszheim 1978 Total North Peak Year 
Atlantic Round
First class -0.65
Economy -1.922 -1.481
High Discount -2.73
High Discount/ -1.817
Promotion
Peak
Economy
Standard
Economy
Boeing 1978 Total North Year Round
Atlantic
Yield -0.8152
DOT 1978 UK
Foreign
Year Round Business -0.9 
Leisure -2.2/-2.4
CAB 1971 Total Market Year Round 
-1.5
Source; Wheatcroft, S. (1978), ' Price elasticity revisted ’. 
Paper of Travel Research Association. New York.
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increase in the number of travellers and consumer 
satisfaction in meeting the desires of the diverse 
submarkets by the provision of services at different 
quality levels and fares. He concludes that price 
elasticity for a skytrain service, of low fares and no 
frills, is higher than for a Concord high quality service, 
and therefore that applying fare reductions on no-frills 
services and increases on services of high quality, 
means in the end higher revenue and benefits for both 
passengers and airlines. (6)
A. Rosenberg, in his North Atlantic study, sees that the 
reason for having a higher price elasticity on the North 
Atlantic than on most international European routes is 
the high ratio of pleasure passengers to business 
travellers in the North Atlantic and that those pleasure 
passengers tend to be more sensitive to price variation 
and therefore that leads to greater seasonal variations.(7) 
According to the 1968 data published by New York port 
Authority, referred by both R, Smithies (8) and A.Rosenberg 
(9), that out of the North Atlantic Eastbond passenger 
traffic 18% were US business passengers travelling to UK 
and the remaining being tourists and those visiting friends 
and relatives; on the other hand, out of the west bond 
traffic to USA business travellers accounted for 27% of 
the total.
Rosenberg reckons business travellers form 24.5% of all 
scheduled North Atlantic traffic to and from New York.
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While Stephen Wheatcroft had suggested that 75% of all 
traffic is leisure travel and foresaw this type of 
traffic reaching 90% of the total traffic by the end of 
the century. (10)
Due to the fact that the market has had continuing growth 
in the more elastic leisure sector compared with that of 
the relatively inelastic business traveller, with more 
passengers using lower yield promotional fares, it might 
be said that no fare increase would substantially change 
the profitability position, as any increase would mean 
losing a certain proportion of passengers.
Fare increases tend to be economically harmful if the 
variable cost factors cannot be reduced at the same time.
lATA’s Director General, Knut Hammarskjold, in his speech 
to the 37th ACM of the Association, saw that the nature
of passenger demand has changed from that of low volume
and therefore that traffic is becoming more sensitive to 
price elasticity and disposable income factors than it 
has been in previous years.
Hammarskjold focused on two factors that affect the 
availability of the different levels of fares that are 
necessary to meet the varying requirements on any particular 
route, where beside demand for seats stressed on;
1- The perishability of the product, as the seat will no
longer bè saleable when the plane takes off; and for that
reason we see airlines offering seats for late arriving 
passengers at specially reduced fares to enable fill up 
the empty seats.
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2- The need to have seats available to the passenger at 
any time is the chief reason why scheduled services are 
flown, where seats are offered at frequent intervals and 
in accordance to an issued timetable, although this may 
mean the carrier have to take the risk of flying with 
empty seats.
It will therefore be seen that when passengers have 
differing needs, which need to be satisfied, the airlines 
tend to provide different fares for each category of 
passengers, while at the same time imposing various 
restrictions and conditions applicable at different periods 
of the year.
Owing to the United States’ domestic deregulation with 
its open sky policy implemented in the new bilateral 
agreements and its increased criticism and use of pressure 
against lATA machinery, the North Atlantic has seen airlines 
under pressure to widen their range of fares and introduce 
more low fares to stimulate demand.
With demand on the North Atlantic often being highly peaked, 
by that allowing airlines an over provision of capacity 
at peak periods, and where unused seats are left wasted 
making carriers seek early and quick revenue then one may 
consider not allowing competition as this will be wasteful. 
Beside the regulatory policy, the future demand for inter­
national travel will be influenced by such factors as the 
exchange rate of currencies, the availability and price 
of fuel, the inflation and the different rates of economic 
growth for the various countries.
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6,3, Pricing and fare setting ;
The economists see that the basis of laying down a policy 
of minimum price require costs to be at their lowest level.
In air transport this would suggest to mean the provision 
of air services by the most efficient airlines operating 
at low costs offering low fares.
One of the possible cost reduction measures at times of 
excessive capacity would be the better utilization and 
reduction in capacity if needed beside the conventional 
minimisation in operating costs such as labour and fuel.
The different types of fare should be based on the demand 
factor relating to it but in no case to be lower than the 
cost especially if the airline is there to achieve profit 
only with no consideration to national or economical 
benefits when setting fares.
The margin of profit incurred over the cost could vary 
and this will be built in consideration of the demand 
elasticity of these different type of fares.
M. Straszheim refers to this subject and stresses on the 
importance of the relationship between capacity, fares 
and load factors. He advocates that a fare structure 
should be based on long run marginal costs and that it 
should retain peak and off-peak pricing, make several 
changes in scheduled fares to relate fares to route 
density, eliminate free stopovers, base discount fares on 
advance purchase or group size and allow an advance 
purchase discount on all tickets. (11)
In comparison, Dr. Rosenberg has seen the following essential 
criteria when setting fares:
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a) class of travel;
b) time of the year;
c) length of stay;
d) individual or group trip and size of group;
e) day of the week;
f) time of commencement of the journey and
g) number of stopovers. (12)
Historically, it is on the North Atlantic market that
most of the major fare innovations have been first introduced,
but as the changes in fares and eligibility restrictions
on different classes of service have often been introduced,
it has not been easy to examine and determine the effect
of each of these factors separately.
In addition it has become difficult to differentiate between 
charter flights and the scheduled services on which one 
may find both types of passengers on the same flight where 
different types of fare are offered which have relatively 
similar conditions, for example APEX scheduled fares and 
ABC a non-scheduled fares are offered daily and on regular 
timetables .
This complex situation on the North Atlantic with the 
availability of so many different and complicated fares 
has led to the fact that a large proportion of passengers 
are not aware of the fares they are paying, or of what 
other fares are available, nor do they understand the 
tariff structure involved.
Edward Spry, Director-Industry Research of lATA in his 
presentation to an lATA symposium held in Dublin in May
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1978 suggested that ” airlines must work efficiently in 
making fare structure more understandable to the public " 
as many travellers do not know what type of fares they 
are paying. (13)
With the volatility of the market and prices, many number 
of fare changes are taking place which makes airlines' 
management difficult to implement a long term pricing 
strategy. This is so because when air carriers introduce 
any new fare then the rival competitiors tend to change 
their prices accordingly to be competitive.
As a general understanding, the pricing strategy taken 
by airlines, especially the scheduled operators, require 
to make available a product that would satisfy passengers 
who are looking for both flexible normal fares and low 
cost promotional fares.
The value of product offered by airlines is affected by 
the conditions and availability of travel.
In satisfying the passenger needs, ways have to be found 
by the airlines in bringing fares, quality and type of 
service and costs under a system or procedure of calculation 
to satisfy the airlines too.
The availability of two basic pricing strategies, in 
which one provides a high level of capacity at a price at 
which to maximize revenue, while the other finances a lower 
capacity with higher load factor together with reduced 
prices, the airlines' choice will depend largely on the 
type of demand's nature ,
By implementing the deregulatory approach a differential
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pricing will be created where airlines will be able to 
charge different fares for relatively same service.
The Civil Aviation Authority in United Kingdom in its 
study " European Air fares " conducted in London in 
November 1977 referred to the following criteria as 
part of its pricing policy;
- fares to be at lowest level to cover costs of efficient 
carriers, together with an adequate return on capital.
- fares to be related to costs, and
- fares to be rational and simple.
By its pricing policy on the North Atlantic, the United 
Kingdom introduced ABC fares in 1972 and in 1977 approved 
the Skytrain fares of Laker,also authorised competitive 
scheduled fares.
While the United States in its air transport pricing 
strategy, the CAB advocated a diversification of fare 
levels to replace the old system and favoured peak and 
off-peak pricing where it offers low fares for flights 
less in demand and higher fares for more convenient flights 
at peak time.
The pricing revolution resulting out of deregulation has 
brought a variation in fare levels with vast number of 
changes in the low promotional fares that benefited only 
the discretionary passenger while the business traveller, 
being unable to meet the conditions and restrictions 
applied on the low fares, is left to pay higher fare.
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6,4. Fares outlook ;
As a general practice and understanding it is no surprise 
to find passengers asking and prefering to pay less for 
the product they buy, but at the same time it is essential 
not to overlook the simple fact that every commercial 
enterprise is in business to make profit to enable to 
survive and continue operation.
So, despite the availability of cheap air fares, the 
travelling public should never expect fares that do not 
cover the costs of the operator to continue at such low 
levels in a competitive situation as there will be no 
economical justification for these airlines to exist and 
continue operating unless such action of offering low 
fares is a short term policy to stand and overcome the 
pressures of this fierce competitive situation where so 
many operators are allowed to enter and leave the market.
The Edwards Report has advocated that fares shall not be 
less than " the economic value of the resources which are 
absorbed in the provision of each service " (14) and to 
be " the minimum economic price which can be contrived" (15) 
The pressure to reduce or offer low fares, in order to 
generate new demand and fill those empty seats, has to be 
balanced by pressure to reduce the unit operating costs 
involved in carrying all those new passengers.
Therefore it cannot be enough to maintain low fares and 
high seating load factors without there being genuine 
cost reductions.
A need just to fill the aircraft for its own sake, and
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therefore putting the emphasis on improving seating load 
factors, would not help the situation at all but, rather 
hamper it as pressure is then felt to adjust schedules 
and if passengers subsequently have difficulty in obtaining 
seats then the very basic meaning of " schedule services " 
will no longer stand.
The present situation is one in which airlines in their 
struggle to keep pace with each other are dumping onto the 
market extra and undemanded seating capacity,so that not 
to lose an imagined competitive edge, that they feel 
necessary to be competitive in getting their slice of the 
traffic.
The consequences that airlines will face, with the need 
to sell more and more seats at low yield promotional fares 
only to fill extra seats and to maintain cash flow, is 
that extra or excessive capacity shall be created who was 
not necessary and would have never been provided in the 
first place.
The relaxation in the regulatory controls on the North 
Atlantic in the previous years have brought much pressure 
on the level of fares and rates with the scheduled carriers 
charging their promotional fares at even lower than 
incremental cost making non-scheduled airlines difficult 
to compete, therefore it is essential that scheduled and 
charter fares of both lATA and non-IATA carriers should 
fall under one acceptable fare machinery, which should 
enforce effective pricing to serve the interests of carriers 
and passengers alike.
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No t only that, but the fares of non-IATA airlines have 
also to be discussed and covered, as no machinery will 
be effective and practical when part of the industry is 
under the machinery of lATA and its regulatory pricing 
system, while leaving the other part on its own.
Here two set of problems could arise, first the non-IATA 
carriers in introducing their own low fares they will 
jeopardies the lATA airlines' position in leaving them 
in continuance difficulty in reaching agreement on an 
acceptable and profitable fare, second the possibility 
that lATA airlines will reach a situation where they will 
match the low fares of the non-IATA even at an uneconomical 
levels just to stay competitive in the market.
Finally, widespread differences between international 
airlines as to what may constitute reasonable passenger 
fare levels are likely to lead to an open rate situation. 
The price w a r ’s dangers could effect consumers in the long 
run where if nothing is reached multilaterally between the 
parties concerned, the market will see carriers collapsing 
and forced out of business and so harming the interests of 
passengers.
Here we have to note that some of the airlines operating 
on the market have very low costs that make the other 
carriers not possible to cut their costs to match these 
airlines, so the present situation calls for airlines to 
start cutting their overhead costs and to look for more 
reasonable pricing for their amenities provided free of 
charge to customers, as it will not be enough to reduce
-132-
fares without reducing costs at the same time. We need 
better way of offering low fares while still producing 
revenue enough to meet the operating costs, and the need 
also remains to find better harmonisation between promotional 
scheduled fares and charter fares.
*******
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CHAPTER SEVEN
7. COMPETITION AND REGULATION ;
7.1. INTRODUCTION
Since early seventies the air transport industry in the 
North Atlantic has been passing through its worst ever 
economic crisis, facing tremendous pressure not only due 
to difficulties of the high cost of operation i.e. fuel 
and labour, but also from the intense competition that 
has surrounded its services.
On international routes, such as those of the North Atlantic, 
and as fares are set by the machinery of lATA, the .area 
most left for competition is airlines’ increase in capacity, 
with higher flight frequencies in an attempt to gain a 
greater share of the market; although this has in turn 
led to further complications.
The other areas left for competition were in offering a 
product of differentiated characteristics such as schedule 
pattern, safety record, passenger services, type of 
aircraft and reputation of the carrier.
The nature of the air transport industry producing a 
product different in kind from most other products or 
services offered to the consumer has played a significant 
role in generating this competition.
The uniqueness of air transport, mainly that of the scheduled 
services, is derived from its striking characteristic of 
offering such a perishable type of product where if the 
aircraft seats are not sold at the day of the flight then 
it would not be possible to store them or keep them for
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next d a y ’s flight, and it seems no commodity is as perishable 
as an empty and unsold airline seat.
This waste or non use of passenger seats is not similar 
to products of other industries where they could be stored 
for next day sale.
The other interesting criterion of the passenger seat is 
the control of supply per flight where the carrier's total 
supply is not controlled in the same manner as the production 
volume for most other products. Airlines tend to provide 
the same number of seats on a particular flight no matter 
how small or large is the demand for them and also the 
fact that the total capacity offered by the carrier can 
not be changed easily to satisfy or to meet the change in 
demand.
Competition in international air transportation may occur 
at various levels and North Atlantic is no exception if 
not the most vulnerable market to such kinds of competition, 
and these being ;
1- Between the scheduled carriers themselves.
2- Between the scheduled and the non-scheduled carriers.
3- Between lATA and Non-IATA carriers.
4- Between the public/state controlled and the private.
5- Between the airlines and other means of transport.
As mentioned in previous chapter, the North Atlantic is 
an air dominant market where competition from surface and 
sea transport is nominal that needs no mentioning and 
which give no worry for the airlines when formulating 
their policies contrary to what most other airlines would
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face on their routes. Therefore our interest will focus 
on the first four levels of competition, beside understanding 
competition and how it works, and shall look first on what 
competition means.
7.2. DEFINITION OF COMPETITION :
Competition in business is generally a situation where two 
or more commercial establishments, involved in one line 
of activity, strive among themselves for certain advantages. 
Competition in the economic sense, foresee to maximise 
profit for the provider of goods or services and benefit 
the buyers of these goods and the users of these services, 
but where prices are controlled by the issue and the 
understanding of supply and demand.
In air transportation, Samuel Richmond refers to competition 
as that situation in which two or more carriers are 
authorised to perform essentially the same service. (1)
Ross Rizley, ex-chairman of CAB, states that competition 
is the situation when two or more airlines contend between 
themselves for access to the available traffic, in 
approximately even terms and to get a better share of it.(2) 
Gill & Bates define air transportation competition as that 
situation existing when two or more airlines each carry 
more than 10% of the traffic between a particular pair 
of cities. (3)
Freedom of capacity, freedom to change prices and the 
ability of new firms to enter the market are necessary 
factors considered by Stephen Wheatcroft in his definition 
of competition. (4)
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In speaking of competition, the Edwards Report refers to 
it a " regulated competition within a system of licensed 
entry and its consequential controls (5)
S, Wheatcroft classifies the restrictions and controls 
over competition in air transportation as capacity and 
tariff regulation. The first includes controls over entry 
and licensing of routes, investment, innovations and 
control of scheduled; while tariff regulation means control 
over fares, rates, and quality of service. (6)
William O ’Connor sees the removal of regulation on the 
international scene an impractical suggestion as no 
government will be willing to leave its air transport 
industry to the mercy of the market place, and he advocates 
the American system of regulated competition as most 
desirable. (7)
The Edwards Report has clearly recommended that regulated 
competition is the system best workable for the benefit 
of the customers in which ’’ they will get comfortable and 
efficient service, that there will be enough capacity, 
that they will gain the advantages of technological 
advances and also enjoy the satisfaction of being able to 
choose between alternative carriers ’’. (8)
The Edwards report sees competition existing only in 
such areas as quality of service and sales promotion, and 
stresses that no price competition exists in international 
airline operations.
But airlines on international routes especially the North 
Atlantic have always been involved in tremendous and 
continious price manoeuvring, where different fares are
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introduced with different conditions under various names 
and classifications to match fares of other carriers.
If Laker’s skytrain fare is not an example of such price 
competition, then why did other airlines spare no time 
and went immediately to introduce their own promotional 
fares to match L a k e r ’s fare; And if Its not price competition, 
then what can we call the price war going on that makes 
the introduction of new fares the only thing for airlines 
to think about.
In a study conducted in Canada by Ritchie, Johnson and 
Jones (9), mentioned that consumers consider the following 
four elements in understanding and viewing competition:
1- There must be a choice between at least two alternatives.
2- The availability of lower fares tends to be indication 
of competition.
3- Quality of service is a function of the competitiveness 
of the product.
4- The convenient of providing scheduled operations and 
flight frequences.
7.3. INTERNATIONAL REGULATION AND COMPETITION ;
Sovereignty of a nation over its air space is a vital 
criterion in international aviation, by which it allows 
governments have the major say and control in formulating 
their air transport policies and regulations. For that 
reason air carriers are greatly dependent on their
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governments for upholding traffic rights, especially on 
international routes.
One reason that makes it difficult for the industry to 
reach a multilateral agreement on the North Atlantic 
regulations concerning both the scheduled and non scheduled 
operations could be attributed to the divergence of 
policies of America and European countries where the 
European suggest various regulation of the non scheduled 
services while the American encourage competition from 
non scheduled, but at the same time the American regulatory 
body of CAB disapproves the participation of charter 
airlines in lATA tariff negotiations.
In regulating international air transport, two alternative 
means exist; either to implement and extend one particular 
country's principles to other countries who are prepared 
to share the same thinking and philosphy, or to agree on 
certain common principles to be applied by the countries 
concerned.
In the latter case, this will depend on reaching multilateral 
agreements through various bilateral negotiations, and this 
would need to be done by taking into consideration the 
Chicago Convention principles where " fair and equal 
opportunity " would be set as the guideline in making 
international regulations.
The Bilateral air service agreements between countries, 
such as that of Bermuda type between the UK and the USA in 
1946, lay down the rules, regulations and conditions of
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how air carriers should operate on routes between the two 
countries.
In these bilateral negotiations, most foreign governments 
including the European usually try to equate their carriers’ 
and aviation policies in general with the national interests, 
while the US government negotiates bilateral agreements 
based on its perception of the marketplace.
US. policy rests on the assumption of having many US. air 
carriers operating internationally, and of having a strong 
consumer movement with its own specific legislation 
promoting consumerism in international scene, in contrast 
to the situation in other countries, where there is usually 
only one carrier operating international routes where in 
many cases tend to be state controlled and have a relatively 
weak consumer movement.
With international routes, the North Atlantic no exception, 
being effected by various governments then the political 
motives behind the current situation should not be 
neglected, on the contrary need to be given special 
attention when criticising or justifying the need for 
regulation or competition on such a sensitive market.
With the market affected by certain political and national 
issues that play a large role in defining and regulating 
competition, then for the airlines to operate in such 
conditions need to maintain the interests of the public, 
being their prime objective, by making available different 
sets of fares with different qualities and conditions to
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satisfy all categories of customers and to achieve their 
economic position by generating higher revenues resulting 
from fare reductions on no frill services and fare 
increases on high quality services; while at the same 
time keeping costs to the minimum, in the end improving 
consumer surplus and increasing the number of passengers.
On international markets, the North Atlantic being a 
prime example, competition has been promoted and enhanced 
by the US government following the passage of Deregulation 
Act of 1978 and the US International Air Transportation 
Competition Act of 1979 signed into law in 1980, which 
improved the competitive role of the American carriers.
The latter Act, in facilitating consumer oriented fares, 
places maximum reliance on competitive market forces 
leading to an efficient service so enabling more people 
to travel to more places at lower prices.
Also this Act prevents foreign governments and their 
respective carriers from placing unreasonable restrictions 
on US, air carriers which might result in their inability 
to compete effectively.
In addition, the Act had given the CAB the power to inves­
tigate, negotiate and if necessary to retaliate if it 
finds US. airlines having problems with discriminatory 
practices of foreign countries.
In referring to US air policy, one may see the air transport 
industry in different and varying modes toward the Civil 
Aeronautics Board, which sometimes favoured competition
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as being the best means of achieving satisfactory results, 
while at other times allowed its policies to drift towards 
a greater degree of regulation.
After the passage of Deregulation Act in 1978 and following 
the success of Laker Airways at the end of the seventies 
in its operation across the North Atlantic, the US has 
shown its complete commitment to free competition both in 
its international as well as its domestic policies.
With its free competitive approach, the US aims to achieve 
the following objectives:
- to meet the needs of all categories of traveller, by
providing a wide variety of service and wide price
options for the consumer to choose from.
- to provide more competitive fares.
- to offer fewer restrictions on capacity, routes and
operating rights on scheduled services.
- to make available more non-stop gateways.
- to eliminate discriminatory and unfair competitive
practices faced by its international airlines.
- to increase the provision of competitive air cargo 
operations. (10)
When the elements and principles of US. deregulation were 
put into practice in the international arena, the American 
carriers were no longer exempted from US. Anti-trust laws, 
and so were prohibited from participating in tariff 
coordination on the US-Europe market.
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7.4. DEREGULATION CRITICS;
Internationally, the deregulation approach has come under 
much criticism both from within the US and the outside 
world to the affect that a comprehensive freely competitive 
international market cannot really exist, no matter how 
much it is sought, and it will be, in contrast to the 
domestic market of a country, a very difficult goal to 
achieve.
Applying deregulation within the USA bringing with it 
intense competition,with head to head competition between 
carriers, does not mean that all airlines and all markets 
else where will experience and accept such severe and 
competitive situation. With the protection given by many 
countries to their airlines it would be unlikely to see 
deregulation working or being implemented efficiently at 
international level as to that in USA.
G.E. Meyer, President and Chief Executive Officer of TWA, 
criticises the implementation of deregulation on interna­
tional scene where he sees it not working " because each 
of the various governments involved pursues its own 
priorities and objectives in setting and implementing 
aviation policy, based on its international social, economic 
and political needs . (11)
Airline deregulation in the international market has 
become a tool of US governmental policy, and therefore 
an increasingly debated subject within management.
The American government's objective has been to provide 
low cost scheduled airline services for its citizens,where 
by the deregulatory approach, US, air transport policy
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makers believe that they will help consumers both inside 
USA and abroad and also help the airlines to have wider 
access to the overseas routes.
But under deregulation airlines have easier access to new
routes and will no longer be serving the public with the 
philosphy of ” public convenience and necessity " because 
they will be competing and concentrating to make a profit.
Also with every route to bear its own costs, the fare
discrimination created out of deregulation is one area 
where, because of the high demand, airlines will be 
concentrating in their operations and services in high 
density routes to make profit.
Generally speaking from the commercial viewpoint it is a 
common understanding that the rate of return is related 
to the risk involved in a particular operation.
So with more freedom to abandon markets and higher costs 
of capital resulting out of deregulation, airlines will 
seek to raise profits to meet the risk involved by reducing 
services to low profit destinations and routes.
So here one has to question whether competition offers the 
best stimulus for airline efficiency and in improving 
financial position.
Stephen Wheatcroft has stressed that unregulated competition 
would lead to over capacity, financial trouble for the 
carriers and bad service for the travellers and suggested 
that some form of economic regulation is needed in the 
operation of international air services. (12)
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Many European countries, together with most of the third 
world, are not only showing no interest in applying this 
US free open-skies policy, but are actively opposing it.
The Europeans have emerged with different reactions with 
Britain and the Netherlands favouring freedom for carriers 
to set fare levels and gain easier access to routes, while 
the French and German governments display much sceptism 
towards any liberalisation of their own policies.
Adam Thomson, Chairman of British Caledonian, who is also 
Chairman of the Association of European Airlines, critises 
the US type of deregulation where " US open-skies policy 
on the North Atlantic routes ignores the economic reality 
that the long term loser may be the passenger ". (13)
The reaction of the European carriers has been to recognise 
that organised competition is the best way to meet their 
governments’ political and social objectives, commensurate 
with the economic position of the airlines and the needs 
of consumer.
Gilbert Perol, President of Air France, points that " we 
should opt for organised competition. This is solely able 
to satisfy the government’s political and social aspirations, 
the airline's profitability, and the consumers’ needs." (14) 
The Italians showed their opposition to the d.eregulatory 
approach and believe in the necessity of retaining capacity 
controls. According to Umberto Nardio, Chairman of Alitalia 
" Forcing other nations to accept deregulation US style is 
vanity. Do you really believe that, in a world with 110 
airlines, most of them owned by their governments, a free 
market exists ?. ’’ (15)
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While Herbert Culmann, Chairman of the West German airline 
Lufthansa, believe that " the American attitude represents 
not only economic illusion, it is political nonsense ", (16)
At the Lloyds of London Conference that took place in New 
York in 1979, it was charged that the US free-competition 
policy is a phenomenon of " American economic imperalism " 
and by it the US is trying to destroy the multilateral 
framework which has hitherto existed on the international 
scene. The international critics are based on the following:
1- As the nations have dissimilar economic policies and 
national goals, it will be difficult for the US to impose 
the deregulatory approach on them and at the same time will 
be neglecting the issue of sovereignty that the Chicago 
Convention agreed upon.
2- With reasonable frequency of services being one of the 
main considerations of passenger convenience, it is likely 
that this be adversely affected by deregulation, causing 
many routes and markets to be abondoned and thus leaving 
many parts of the community unserved,
3- Competition is considered to be very effective during 
boom periods, but the offering of excessive discount fares 
during a boom will lead inevitably to overcapacity of 
supply in seats during a time of recession, and so request 
more regulations in such periods to counter the effects of 
recession,
4- Open competition policies are not in harmony with fuel 
policy where the very high cost of fuel makes airlines 
impose some restrictions on personal and leisure travel in
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order that they may continue to make available a stable 
service for the business traveller, who has no option 
but to travel, and whose demand is therefore supposed 
to be price inelastic.
5- Open entry and free competition are not realy so 
effective in achieving lower fares as are regulation and 
capacity controls.
6- In the operation of a free open-skies system we should 
not neglect the constraints of economy that exist and 
effect the industry. Within the air transport industry we 
find limitations imposed by airports’ capacity, tourism 
restrictions, and air traffic control strikes. (17)
Stephen Wheatcroft, in his report prepared for the Canadian 
Transport Ministry in 1958, inquired into the advantages 
and desirability of competition on transcontinental services, 
where he showed that the following benefits result from 
implementing competitive air policies
- the passenger will be provided with efficient services.
- the airlines will offer a choice of adequate services to 
the traveller.
- the airlines will be in better position generally to 
maintain and satisfy choice for the consumer.
- efficient airlines will be able to carry on providing 
their services,
- traffic will develop more rapidly, and in the end provide 
better results.
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On the subject of choosing between allowing complete 
freedom of competition and applying restrictions and 
regulations, Thomka-Gazdik, Professor W . Guldimann and 
Professor Rigas Doganis have each considered the various 
options that might remedy the situation,
Thomka-Gazdik in 1973 gave the following options (18) ;
1- Leave matters as they were at unilateral regulations;
2- Revitalize the affinity and inclusive tour controls in 
order to preserve what appeared to be the only meaningful 
distinction between the general public and a legitimate 
charter group;
3- Abandon the affinity concept and replace it with bulk 
or group charters with a " no strings " concept, in other 
words the planeload transportation of individual passengers 
who have no affinity other than the desire to travel at the 
lowest fare;
4- Ban the charter concept itself from the public transport. 
While Professor Guldimann, beside continuing in the tradit­
ional way, raised the options of running charter operations 
with either free competition without substantial restrictions 
or free competition within well defined user categories, or 
with restricted competition ; or bridging existing differences 
by establishing a multilateral regulatory framework that 
would mediate between the two extreme positions, (19)
As a compromise Professor Doganis proposed certain 
recommendations to be in the form of international 
regulations which would be politically acceptable and 
economically more justifiable and in " revitalising and 
changing the role of bilateral agreements " by :
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1- Including non-scheduled operations in bilateral agreements.
2- Arranging for bilateral agreements to fix non-scheduled 
capacity as a proportion of scheduled capacity,
3- Redefining non-scheduled traffic,
4- Having bilateral agreements to designate " indirect 
carriers ",
5- Controlling scheduled fares by a revised lATA system.
6- Insisting on no control of non-scheduled tariffs, (20)
On the issue of free competition, C A B 's Chairman Dr, Alfred 
Kahn, who is a great supporter of deregulation, in a speech 
presented in 1978 to the Chartered Institute of Transport’s 
Conference on International Transport, made it clear that 
in order to achieve a reduction in the actual tourist fare 
there must be effective free competition, and suggested 
that " the fact that carriers on the North Atlantic do not 
seem to be earning high or possibly even satisfactory profits 
does not invalidate the inference of ineffective competition, 
when the regular fare-paying traveller is forced to pay 
rates that cover the costs of expensive services he may 
want ", (21)
Spreading free competition to other countries outside USA 
has become a great issue of conflict within lAT A ’s 
machinery and it must be remarked here that governments in 
most European tend to influence or control their airlines.
Adam Thomson, BCAL Chairman, affirms that " just about 
every scheduled airline within Europe is government-owned, 
and to imagine that a free market under these circumstances
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would exist is, at best, naive ", (22)
Table 7.1 demonstrates the proportion of state ownership 
and control in international air carriers.
The lATA Director General, speaking at the International 
Chamber of Commerce Congress in 1978, asserted the 
Association's rejection of the US deregulation proposition 
and stressed that " within the international community 
there is deep concern at the way the USA is seeking to 
change aviation procedures ", He also pointed that airlines 
have national, social and economical objectives and not 
only commercial ones to be considered when formulating 
aviation policies, (23)
The Director General went on so far as to blame the CAB for 
creating a chaotic situation in the North Atlantic market, 
where so many different fares are available to the passenger 
that it has become difficult even for the airlines, their 
travel agents, and the passengers to be aware of them.
It must be noted that even if free competition in air 
transportation, as an economic concept, is acceptable and 
viable where successful economic efficiency and performance 
could be achieved by the different airlines where they will 
attain profit and by which the public will be satisfied in 
getting the required services at a low fare while in practice, 
the political difficulty will still remain in gaining 
acceptance and recognition that a free international air 
transport market serves the needs of all countries.
Taking into consideration the element of nationalistic
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Table (7.1)
State Ownership in international Airlines
Airline State Share Airline State: Share
Aer Lingus 100 Northwest Orient Nil
Air France 98.9 Pan American Nil
Alitalia 99 Transamerica Nil
British Caledonian Nil T.W.A. Nil
British Airways 100 Wardair Nil
CAS 100 World Airways Nil
Iberia 99.23 Air India 100
Iceland Air 20 Air New Zealand 100
LAT 100 China Airlines Nil
KLM 71.3 JAL 37.7
LOT 100 Korea Nil
LTU Nil Pakistan 97
Lufthansa 74.31 PAL (Phillippine) 98.79
Olympic 100 Qantas 100
Sabena 99 Singapore 92
SAS 50 Thai Airways 100
Swissair 22
TAP 100
UTA Nil
Alia 100
El A1 Over 90
Kuwaiti Airways 100
Royal Air Maroc 89.84
Saudia Approx. 15
Air Canada 100
American Airlines Nil
Capitol Nil
CP Air Nil
Source: Intervia, October 1982. PP, 1078-1092.
-154-
prejudice of each country, there are also so many differ­
ences in law, language, habits, currency, and political 
rules and practices between nations. All these make the 
difficulty in accepting a deregulation approach, applicable 
in USA which has not yet even been proved to work there, 
and it appears not to contain enough exportable philosphy 
to be acceptable and workable in other countries.
The philosphy reflected in the Deregulation Act of 1978 
and in the new liberal US bilateral air agreements should 
not be the same in all agreements negotiated by other 
countries as consideration should be given to each country 
where the political and economical conditions are different 
and so it would not be appropriate to expect the American 
stream of thinking be accepted by the international 
community as for the international air transport system 
to be workable and effective it has to be built on the 
international interest and understanding.
William Seawell, Chief Executive Officer of Pan American, 
in his lecture to the Swiss American Chamber of Commerce 
in Geneva in 1978, took an alternative view of deregulation 
on the international scene as the " regulatory determinations 
are made by many governments rather than just one and because 
various governments have various-and often differing- views 
as the purposes to be served by their air transport 
system ". (24)
US. Senator Edward Kennedy, in a letter to Jesse Friedman 
in 1975, stressed that " international air transportation 
creates economic facts and circumstances which are basically
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different from those of the domestic industry, and it is 
not appropriate to automatically apply to the international 
field concepts of deregulation of rates and entry that are 
appropriate for the domestic industry (25)
Finally, the nations represented at the Second Special Air 
Transport Conference of ICAO appear to believe that the 
American policy of freedom and competition is just not 
right for most international markets.
So in conclusion, one would say that the American belief 
and commitment to a fully free market could not be easily 
accepted by most other governments.
Governments need not to be blindly committed to deregulation 
because it's a fad or just for the sake of saying they're 
deregulated the industry.
With the airline industry existing as a quasi-public utility 
for so many years since its creation, it would be surprising 
seeing it thrown into an approach and discipline of free 
market without experiencing a reluctancy from airlines in 
accepting such a change and at the same time expect a 
positive financial rewards for the parties concerned.
Also due to the international constraints mentioned earlier 
there will be a risk that some of the benefits expected out 
of deregulation will not be achieved if competition is not 
contained .
* * * * * * *
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CHAPTER EIGHT
8. THE CAPACITY ISSUE :
8.1. INTRODUCTION
Accepting the importance of schedule convenience and 
frequency when providing air services for the passenger 
and also of being, together with fares, essential 
factors and ingredients of competition have made airlines 
to strive in providing an excessive amount of seat supply 
to meet the above demand criteria.
This level of supply or capacity provided by carriers 
can not be changed easily even if the demand slowed down 
except by decreasing the number of frequencies or size of 
aircraft.
Therefore providing a higher probability of obtaining seat 
and the supply of greater number of frequencies with more 
convenient services means creating a greater capacity. 
Capacity in air transport is referred as the maximum 
amount of payload that can be carried by the aircraft 
which is determined by the number of seats and the 
frequency of flights.
Some thirty years after signing the Bermuda I agreement 
between the United States and the United Kingdom, the 
implementation of the capacity issue was being questioned 
on the basis that it did not relate to demand.
Jesse Friedman refers to the subject of inefficiency of 
capacity use in the North Atlantic where he mentions that 
" the amount of capacity operated is far greater than the 
public demands or requires, and the capacity operated is 
inadequately utilised ". (1)
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Arguing that the US has an unfair advantage over the UK 
carriers where the American carriers were offering excessive 
capacity to the market, the UK government expressed its 
dissatisfaction. This led to the signing of Bermuda II 
agreement in 1977 which, as mentioned in earlier chapter, 
introduced some form of capacity control on the North 
Atlantic. The agreement allowed the " inaugrating " 
competitor airline to match the frequency of an already 
serving airline, without putting any controls over 
frequency or capacity.
The swamping of routes with extra capacity was to be 
prevented in this new agreement, while permitting increases 
in the frequency if growth was genuinely sought in the 
marketplace .
The International Civil Aviation Organisation, at its 
first Special Air Transport Conference in April 1977, 
examined this problem, together with the issues of tariff 
enforcement, international non-scheduled air transport, 
and the machinery for the establishment of international 
fares and rates. The Conference suggested that the 
existing capacity regulations do not match the objective 
of *’ fair and e.qual opportunity ", and recommended that 
all countries concerned should take into consideration the 
following points:
" - to coordinate their policies and regualtions with 
regard to capacity control.
- to include both scheduled and non-scheduled traffic in 
their considerations.
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- to ensure that the carriers of both countries concerned 
have fair and effective opportunity to provide capacity 
for the carriage of scheduled and non-scheduled traffic.
- to encourage their airlines to make the most efficient 
use of resources consistent with the provision of 
adequate air transport facilities.
- to monitor closely both load factors and the quality of 
service to the public. " (2)
Following the Bermuda II agreement, many changes took place 
where free capacity was advocated by the Americans and the 
lATA rate making machinery was in jeopardy since the US 
issued its Show-Cause Order.
The Second Air Transport Conference of ICAO met in February 
1980 to look at the new changes. The feeling was that 
regulation of capacity had not maintained the objectives 
sought at its first conference namely: fair and equal 
opportunity, efficient use of resources (fuel, airport and 
airway facilities), co-existence of scheduled and non- 
scheduled services, and the maximizing of the public's 
interest (consumers, airlines and governments).
Therefore the Conference proposed three choices to 
facilitate the regulation of capacity based on following:
1- Predetermination where governments set capacity targets 
with some degree of flexibility depending on market needs, or
2- Free determination in which to give complete freedom to 
the airlines to establish their own capacity, or
3- Bermuda I approach where governments set only principles, 
leaving airlines free to establish capacity but subject to 
government review.
-162-
The first choice of predetermination by governments is 
accompanied by certain criteria to be considered by the 
parties concerned;
" A- The need to relate capacity closely to demand in a 
flexible manner.
B- The need that the capacity to be provided should 
primarily be governed by the demand for the traffic 
between the territories of the two contracting parties.
C- The need to provide effectively for equality and mutual 
benefit for the carriers of both countries concerned.
D- The need to encourage the development and expansion 
of air transport on a sound economic basis and in the public 
interest.
E- The need to match traffic with airport and airway 
capacity, to make efficient use of human and material 
resources particularly fuel, and to protect the environment 
from air and noise pollution.
F- The need to harmonize the provision of non-scheduled 
and scheduled capacity in relation to total demand. " (3)
For the second choice that of free determination, the 
following guidelines were recommended by the conference 
for consideration;
1- Each party shall allow a fair and equal opportunity 
for airlines to compete.
2- All steps necessary should be taken to eliminate 
discrimination or unfair competitive practices affecting 
the airlines of other party.
3- Neither party shall unilaterally limit the volume of 
traffic, frequency or regularity of service, or the air-
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craft types operated by the airlines.
4- No party shall impose on other party's airlines any 
requirement with respect to the capacity, frequency or 
traffic which would be inconsistent with the purposes 
of the agreement.
5- No party shall require the filing of schedules, 
programs for charter flights or operational plans by air­
lines of other party for approval except as may be required. 
While the third choice, that of Bermuda I type, the 
following guidelines were recommended for consideration:
1- Air transport facilities shall bear close relationship 
to the requirements of the public.
2- Airlines shall have a fair and equal opportunity to
compete.
3- Each party shall take into consideration the interests 
of the airlines of the other party.
4- The provision of capacity shall be adequate to meet the
traffic demand between the airline's own country and the 
country of the ultimate destination of the traffic.
8.2. Over capacity :
The increase in the number of airlines and the difficulties 
in the economy together with the fact that each country has 
a different national interest have brought the interrelated 
issues of competition and capacity under criticism.
Most of the parties concerned feel unhappy about it, and 
are looking for a solution to the present situation whereby 
stricter controls would be imposed on capacity.
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The industry is now facing a situation of excessive 
capacity and this has led to low load factors and financial 
losses for the airlines.
As over capacity not only means the availability of too 
many unused seats but also achieving low load factors at ‘ 
low fares level, this excessive capacity has been calculated 
on estimates of the availability of both greater frequency 
of flights and extra seating capacity.
However, in international air transport it is likely to be 
very difficult in practice to implement either of the 
extremes of control and regulation on the one hand, or 
unrestricted competition on the other.
H.A. Wassenbergh refers to excess capacity as the " unused 
capacity of the aircraft below a certain standard percentage 
of the aircraft which must be sold to ensure an economical 
operation of the route concerned over a certain period of 
time ". (4)
J. Friedman describes excess capacity " in terms of the 
surplus offered beyond that which is needed to meet public 
demand satisfactorily and sustain a profitable level of 
operation ", (5)
Excess capacity is generated by the fact that there is no 
traffic growth sufficient enough to accompany the available 
number of seats, leaving empty seats (capacity) unutilised. 
It is owing to the superiority of the established airlines 
on the North Atlantic, especially the American carriers 
e.g. Pan American and TWA, with the advantage of operating
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at low costs compared to those new entrants which make 
them provide capacity amounts extra than needed.
It can also be said that the demand by US of extra capacity 
in its negotiations with other countries concerning rights 
on the North Atlantic can be attributed to the belief 
that such a market is important to its counterpart countries 
involved in the negotiations and that these countries would 
lose in not serving in this market or when even not reaching 
agreement with the US.
The over capacity situation is caused, as the Edwards report 
puts it, by the existence of unregulated competition which 
has led in the end to high costs, with traffic not being 
sufficient to allow the carriers to operate the services 
that are necessary in order to compete with their existing 
rivals. The Edwards Report has also shown that having a 
high traffic volume means that an airline will operate on: 
"1- Higher average load factor as more frequency of flights 
being operated .
2- Lower cost per seat mile as larger aircraft will be 
used .
3- Lower cost per passenger.
4- Lower unit cost in sales and advertising. " (6)
Stephen Wheatcroft (7) suggests that high traffic will 
enable the airline to gain the economies of high utilisation 
of these terminal facilities, to schedule a higher frequency 
of service and lower seat mile costs will be achieved with 
the use of larger aircraft than smaller ones.
Nevertheless, one should not always advocate new airlines
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to be introduced immediately when there is a traffic 
increase because the new capacity provided by the new 
entrants together with the extra capacity offered by the 
existing carriers due to extra frequencies and the use 
of large and usually more expensive aircrafts to meet 
this increase in demand, will be far greater than this 
increase in traffic and this will eventually mean either 
looking for new traffic increase to breakeven or the market 
is left with an excessive or extra unused capacity.
In other words, excessive capacity is a situation that 
has resulted from the miscalculation of management in 
their desire to meet the demand that was created initially 
through their policies of offering lower fares to fill 
some of the empty seats and that in turn needed extra 
new capacity to meet the newly created passenger demand, 
but that has culminated in the carriers’ being left with 
excessive new capacity on their hands that they never 
initially bargained for.
So the control of capacity is required by the industry in 
order to improve load factors and lower unit operating costs; 
and this may be achieved by the better utilisation of 
available capacity before introducing any new amount of 
capacity .
It is no surprise that with more carriers, more frequencies 
of flights, more seats to fill and more destinations to 
serve, the marketing job facing airlines’ management is 
becoming harder and difficult.
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8.3. Capacity control vs share of market;
In measuring or determining capacity of an airline on a 
route or the total capacity of all carriers on all routes, 
the load factor is not enough if not accompanied by a 
reasonable level of profitability as the growth measured 
will not be sufficient if seats are not filled with an 
economical and financial rewards.
Also, the seat load factor is not sufficient because the 
complicated fare structure existing in the market is not 
giving a better overall operating revenues.
Therefore, maximizing traffic by itself is not enough by 
airlines’ policy to achieve better financial performance 
as the essential factor is the need to maintain or boost 
yields.
It would be important to consider when calculating or 
deciding the load factor, that the availability and usage 
of different sizes of aircraft could require a different 
load factor as the probability of obtaining a seat will 
differ where an aircraft with less number of seats have 
higher probability of a passenger not securing a seat and 
therefore require a lower load factor than an aircraft 
with more number of seats.
In defining a low load factor, William O ’Connor refers to 
the c a b ’s Statement Draft Regulation 43, of 19 August 1975 
as being that situation where it is easy to obtain a seat 
on a flight, while a higher load factor means increasing 
difficulty in obtaining a seat especially at peak periods. 
O ’Connor also implies that low load factors mean higher
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fares as passenger unit costs will be high and the obvious i
corollary being that high load factors allow lower fares |
j
as unit costs will be lower, (8) j
As mentioned earlier, high flight frequencies and high 
probability of finding seats on a flight are two main and 
essential characteristics given for a scheduled service.
The number of participating airlines, the flight frequen­
cies together with the size of aircraft i.e. number of 
seats make the total capacity offered on the route.
So the increase or decrease in the number of flight 
frequencies, with the number of seats tending to be 
relatively constant, is the major factor that effect 
capacity.
With no initiative by one carrier to cut capacity i.e. the 
number of flight frequencies originally offered if other 
airlines do not persue the same action is a natural 
expectation in the industry where share of market will 
be determined by the capacity offered.
This relucatncy arises because the scheduled airline 
will be fearing that first, other scheduled carriers will 
benefit out of this unilateral action by getting better 
share of the market and second, traffic will be lost to 
their charter rivals especially when the charter capacity 
is not brought under the same regulatory machinery of the 
bilateral air agreements.
Owing to the fact that more pressure is exerted on the 
scheduled airlines to continue in providing such high
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amount of capacity to meet the characteristics features
of scheduled service, airlines are forced into a more
imbalance situation of supply and demand therefore 
playing an effective role in harming the efficiency and 
the financial results of the carriers.
On the North Atlantic, the rival carriers tend to
emphasize in their advertising campaign on the number of
frequencies they provide on their different routes as 
being different and convenient than those offered by the 
others.
Jesse Friedman has referred to the often-drawn conclusion 
that operating at greater frequencies will result in a 
greater share of the market. (9)
This can be true and would apply in the case of a free 
for all situation, as in the North Atlantic, where no 
effective control exists on capacity offered, and where 
competing carriers will quickly jump to obtain any loose 
capacity for their own use should any other carrier reduce 
its frequencies or even withdraw from the market.
So in the existing situation carriers will maintain their 
market share no matter how much costly that would be.
Any solution must require the determination of all the 
parties concerned to modify the existing bilateral 
agreements, and they will have to abandon any rigid 
adherence to the philosphy of free open market and impose 
restrictions on capacity offered.
The present surplus of capacity provided by the airlines 
is so great that no initial reduction of supply is likely
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to have any real negative effect on convenience to the 
public or in maintaining adequate scheduled flights, 
and to allow the carriers to continue their operations 
with such excessive capacity cannot lead to any increase 
in the quality of the service they provide, in the sense 
of offering better scheduled flights to the passenger; 
on the contrary, a level has been reached where the total 
number of extra seats, offered by all the carriers, is a 
complete waste, of no benefit neither to the public nor 
to the carriers themselves.
Improving services by offering direct scheduled services 
to new US destinations beside the main gateways can only 
be justified if airlines can perform at positive financial 
results. Cutting part of the scheduled capacity to enable 
achieve better financial performance should not be 
considered as a degrading procedure to the quality of 
service .
The inclusion of the non-scheduled operations in the 
bilateral agreements and the provision of rules to control 
their capacity would be one reasonable way to control the 
supply of seats to ensure better results.
The control of capacity is required to avoid the situation 
of extra costs being incurred which will then be built in 
the price levels.
The market has experienced a high rate of increase in 
capacity mainly due to the increase in the number of flights 
offered after the appearance of new carriers in late 
seventies, while the passenger traffic increase did not
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match this capacity increase and unfortunately since this 
increase was sustained by more than one new entrant had 
surely meant more difficulties for the already existing 
and committed carriers as this meant they had to provide 
more capacity to meet this new competition to keep its 
share of the market, and this result in higher unit costs, 
while the new entrants are incurring relatively lower 
unit costs for these new routes involved in.
In embarking into a price war situation to achieve a 
better cash flow, it would be economically justifiable 
to apply such price war action where excess capacity is 
available in the market, by that attempting to reduce 
their extra capacity by filling empty seats at such marginal 
costs.
The current situation on the North Atlantic would appear 
to demand not lower fares, sought by the free-market 
advocates " to induce a contraction of capacity " (10), 
but also the immediate agreement to a capacity reduction.
To remain competitive and to offer quality of scheduled 
flights, the airlines are ignoring the financial or 
economic factors and consequences arising out of such 
action,
Bad financial conditions and results should really make 
the airlines consider the option of reducing capacity, 
and to see this as a very genuine, and perhaps the only 
practicable, way of leading them out of the crisis.
Facing severe competition, airlines especially the more 
efficient ones, in cutting their prices to keep their
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market share or gain new share, have not proved to 
achieve positive results.
Also the fact, that due to the protection given by many 
governments to their airlines to prevent them from 
collapsing, and the fact, that efficient carriers will 
do their best to push the less efficient airlines out 
of business by accepting to cut their fares so that to 
attract more passengers, by that requiring and creating 
extra capacity to meet this new wave of passengers, 
this made the situation worse resulting in harming the 
carriers to suffer and engage in bad financial results.
M. Straszheim trenchantly observes that " it is the 
commitment of governments to subsidise their flag carriers 
that underlies the continual 'excess' capacity problem 
in international air markets ". (11)
But the fact of the matter is, that to maintain high 
capacity or low fare scheduled services by governments' 
subsidies will not solve the problem as it would be an 
unfair economic justification when these countries can 
continue injecting cash and provide the support required 
to keep them operating while at the same time jeopardising 
the financial position of others.
So the major task for airlines presently is to have 
control over capacity in seating, in fact, cutting the 
number of carriers themselves or flights may be the only 
reasonable way out from the present crisis which also 
avoids an air fares' war between the airlines, but this 
will need a joint or multilateral acceptance by the
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countries and the airlines concerned.
Mutti & Murai stress that " there is a basic reluctance 
for any airline to act unilaterally in reducing its 
scheduled capacity, because there is a close relationship 
between the share of total seats offered and the share 
of total passengers attracted ". (12)
Therefore an acceptance by the whole industry is needed 
and not just by few airlines.
The question we face today is why the scheduled airlines 
are not then cutting down their flight frequencies to 
decrease the capacity offered ?.
If the question seems simple, the answer appears not as 
we are usually told that airlines must maintain their 
competitiveness in the market by providing a share of 
supply which matches that of its competitors to enable 
maintain or increase their share of the traffic.
Cooper & Maynard refer to this by saying that " the more 
flights any one airline has, the larger the share of any 
given market it stands to get ". (13)
But as we have seen, providing extra frequencies and 
seats to stay competitive may harm the airlines more than 
benefit them, since it is not enough to have a larger 
share of the market if that share does not pay for itself, 
in the sense that extra revenue earned by this activity 
may not cover the extra costs involved if those extra 
seats are marketed at low fares and returning a very low 
yield.
In such a situation, the airlines appear powerless to
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help themselves, choosing to remain operating in an 
unhealthy financial position.
Airlines should not expect that offering the public too 
many low type fares will help them get over their problems 
while their capacity is not effectively controlled.
The remedy must be more radical and require the under­
standing by all parties concerned that the solution lies 
not in attracting new passengers at whatever price to 
meet the capacity provided. The operators must be made 
to realize that too many seats are being provided, and 
realization of this fact will prove to be a stepping 
stone to the solution.
The truth is that some governments and regulatory 
authorities, indulging in laying down the sort of air 
regulations that we now have, have brought such a situation 
that no one carrier can by itself afford to take action 
to reduce capacity.
There is also that feeling among some private independent 
airlines that they have been forced and pushed into 
competing with airlines that have protective civil aviation 
policies applied by their governments.
Adam Thomson, Chairman of British Caledonian, is one of 
those in industry who suggests that ” governments and 
airlines will endeavour to protect their market shares 
whatever the cost may be. Over half the world airlines 
are owned by governments .... As the price war escalates 
I would suggest that those without government support 
will inevitably disappear ". (14)
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It seems likely that carriers will soon reach a point 
when providing additional frequency to that already 
existing would provide little attraction for passengers 
and produce little effect on the market share; but it 
would on the contrary drive carriers towards the increased 
difficulties of not being able to meet the financial 
obligations arising out of those extra costs of increased 
frequencies of flight.
With little effect on the full fare payers and with such 
severe competition existing, the airlines are trying to 
persuade as many extra passengers as possible to fly by 
offering them such low promotional fares which simply do 
not cover costs.
Merely obtaining a well-filled aircraft is not the solution 
to the problem where it would still be commercially not 
viable if the return or yield received is unsatisfactory 
or insufficient to meet the operating costs and to 
generate reasonable profit for further investment.
It is true that load factors may have been low when there 
was a large surplus of capacity, but when it came to remedy 
the situation and improve load factors, it was at the 
expense of uneconomic returns as people were encouraged 
to fly at very low fares.
The present situation of financial ill-health in the 
airline industry and where costs are constantly escalating, 
would force the airlines to discipline their approach 
to scheduled operations and to minimise cost factors in 
the search for alternative means of operating in more 
efficient ways.
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To limit capacity and depending on the market and the 
season, one can suggest number of flights to be decreased 
and this would result in increase or improvement in load 
factors. To engage in such an action and to avoid any 
possible disadvantages resulting out of it, it is necessary 
to have fares under control where any decrease in fares 
would not be justified during when the services are cut 
as passengers might consider this as unfair to accept higher 
fares for a relatively lower quality of services especially 
for those passengers who tend to consider cutting flight 
frequencies as sign of lowering quality of service.
Here an acceptance by the whole industry is needed not 
just by certain airlines where one cannot be left with 
one segment of the industry advocating fare reduction 
while others ask for a fare increase.
For airlines to decide or implement a strategy of choosing 
between a profit oriented policy seeking high yields 
from passengers or achieving a high share of the market 
is an important issue for airlines when considering capacity 
while it is true that share achieving policy fulfills the 
demands of higher number of passengers by catering for a 
bigger share of the market.
The disadvantage would be that too much capacity will be 
offered by airlines, to be in a favourable position to 
seek or achieve a higher share of the passengers, beside 
the fact that part of their share would be earning a low 
yield as this part of demand is motivated and created by 
the sheer fact of low fares.
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In general one could conclude that it would be necessary 
to impose a ceiling on the capacity granted based on the 
level of demand required to attract sufficient services, 
thereby placing maximum reliance on market forces and on 
actual potential competition and at the same time provide 
or maintain a convenient system of scheduled services so 
that to meet the market needs.
Finally, for airlines to return to healthy and profitable 
situation, one may revert to the prescription made by the 
Strategic Planning Sub-Committee of lATA's Annual General 
Meeting on 8 November 1982, where it recommended " established 
economically sensible fare levels, having a genuine 
relationship with costs of their operations; reduce the 
erosion of yields caused by illegal practices; and obtain 
government approval for inter-company co-ordination and 
refrain from individual extreme measures, in the direction 
of either liberalization or protectionism ". (15)
In Appendix I the writer suggests a set of recommendations 
as remedial action to the present situation facing the 
North Atlantic air transport industry.
********
'-•c-
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CHAPTER NINE
9. ANALYSIS OF OPERATING RESULTS :
In this final chapter, it is appropriate and essential 
to analyse the operating results of the North Atlantic 
market for the period 1970-1980 by looking at such 
crucial areas as financial results, yields and revenues, 
costs, profitability, type of fares, fuel prices, seating 
capacity, passenger traffic and routes and airlines.
In introduction it should be noted that the years 1978,
1979 and 1980 saw a pattern of proliferation of very low 
fares, entry of new US carriers and other international 
airlines, availability of new gateways and the shift in 
the balance of US originating cities to European originating 
routes.
All this led to the remarkable growth in scheduled traffic 
and a decrease in charter traffic, also the scheduled 
carriers fearing the effect of competition caused by the 
law fare charters introduced its own low promotional fares 
instead of liberalizing their own charter operations.
Having said all that, one has to refer to the reasons 
causing this drop in charter traffic and the transfer 
of passengers in using more scheduled services :
1- The signing of Bermuda II agreement between the United 
Kingdom and the United States and the liberal interpretation 
of the reciprocal traffic rights brought by other new 
bilateral agreements between the USA and European countries 
made the scheduled operations less regulated where new 
gateways were introduced and additional airlines were 
authorised to offer scheduled services.
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2- As a result of deregulation, the charter US carriers 
were permitted to operate both charter and scheduled, 
dual cerification, services.
3- Following the introduction of L a ker’s skytrain service 
on the North Atlantic in late 1977 offering scheduled low 
fares and with the increase in the availability of low 
fare charter services, the scheduled carriers started 
offering their own low fares budget, standby and Super 
APEX which provided 14% share of all lATA scheduled traffic 
in 1978 and together with the APEX type of fare already 
available brought the share of all these low fare scheduled 
services to 27%, This type of fare increased in 1980 to 
represent 45.9% of all lATA scheduled services operating
on the North Atlantic,
Table 9,1 refers to passengers breakdown by fare type using 
lATA scheduled services on the North Atlantic for the period 
1970-1980,
These low fares offered by the scheduled were so attractive, 
table 9.2 shows a comparison between charter and scheduled 
fares offered on London-New York in winter 1977/1978, the 
passenger saw no difference to the low fares of charter 
services, and also the scheduled carriers saw no need to 
offer charter services if they can provide such low fares 
on scheduled basis especially at off season when demand 
for travel is low. This also led the scheduled airlines to 
cease operating their charter services.
Also the wave of the new promotional fares introduced by 
the scheduled carriers, even with restrictive conditions, 
have attracted traffic from the existing normal fare
Sr .'
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Table 9.2.
LONDON-NEW YORK WINTER 1977/78 FARES
CHARTER FARES (£ )
ABC from 95 Return 
to 153 "
SCHEDULED FARES ( £  )
CONCORDE 862 RETURN
FIRST CLASS 713 V
ECONOMY 340 »T
14/21 DAYS EXCURSION 293. 50 "
22/45 DAYS EXCURSION 254 fî
YOUTH 256. 50 ”
INCENTIVE GROUP FARES 254 Tl
NORMAL G.I.T. 230. 50 ”
7/8 DAY G.I.T. WINTER 207
APEX 153 tf
STANDBY 64 ONE WAY
BUDGET 64 M tf
l a k e r ’s s k y t r a i n 59 ft ff
Source ; Lauriac, J. + Mezin, J, ’ Trends in the price-sensitive market 
Part II, ITA Study, No. 7/1978. PP. 17.
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paying passengers and diverted traffic away from the charter 
where the charter traffic dropped to 2 miilion passengers 
in 1980 compared to a record of 4.4 millions in 1977.
As a result of the spread of promotional fares offered by 
lATA’s airlines and the low fares charged by charter and 
scheduled carriers outside lATA’s machinery, the average 
revenue per passenger has been decreasing. The fact, too, 
that operating costs have been increasing faster than 
revenues has led to a loss-making situation.
With North Atlantic scheduled fares falling 20% in real 
terms over the period 70-80 and with capacity ever shooting 
up, the airlines are loosing an aggregate of at least 
4 to 5 million Dollars in 1980.
The ICAO Annual Reports show that the Average unit cost 
of scheduled carriers reporting to ICAO rose from 25.2 
US 0 per available tonne-Kilometre in 1976 to 41.0 US 0 
in 1980 giving a 62.7% rate of increase.
Fig. 9.1 demonstrates the dramatic shifts in operating 
costs and revenues occuring on the North Atlantic during 
the period 1970-1980, in which airlines have been, sustaining 
losses where the costs have been higher than the yields 
received which resulted in low operating ratio. This trend 
has been more serious since 1978 when the gap or the 
difference between the increase in cost and yield per 
passenger has been higher bringing the operating ratio to 
approximately 90 in 1980 being much lower than the figure 
suggested by lATA’s cost committee of 110.
Table 9.3 and 9.4 show the lATA scheduled carriers 
operating on the North Atlantic incurring an increasing
-186-
Fig . 9.2.
North Atlantic operating results
60
50
400 Cost /possengor 
Y ield/passenger
300
200
100
105
100B9
95 Operating
r a t i o90
1970 1972 1974 1976 1970 1980
Source : Wheatcroft, S. (1982), ’ The changing economics of 
international air transport '.
Tourism Management, Vol. 3, No.2, PP. 77.
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amount of passenger operating expenses and total costs 
in 1978 at a rate of 24% and 22.8% respectively to that 
of 1977; while the passenger’s total revenue growth was 
20.5%.
Although the increase in operating costs may be attributed 
to landing fees, navigation fees, labour costs and amount 
of commission paid by airlines to their agents; the most 
important factor that plays a big share in the operating 
costs of aircraft and so in the formation of air fares is 
the price of aviation fuel.
The industry had to face spectacular increases in the 
cost of aviation fuel where beside the oil price increases 
in 1973 and 1974 the price of a gallon rose from 12 US 0 
in 1970 to 123 cents in 1980 ( table 9.5).
The increase in fuel prices in 1973 and 1974 forced airlines 
to raise their air fares to cover the increased operating 
costs causing total traffic to drop to 12.8 and 12.4 
million passengers in 1974 and 1975 respectively compared 
to 14 million passengers in 1973.
The aviation fuel representing 12% of total operating costs 
in 1970 for the North Atlantic operations rose in 1980 
to represent 28%.
Fig. 9.2 refers to fuel, landing and navigation charges 
occuring on international scheduled passenger services 
where fuel costs rose at much higher rate than other 
costs especially since 1978.
Table 9.6 shows the impact of rising fuel cost on total 
world international scheduled operations where the fuel
-190- 
Table 9.5
Aviation Fuel Price 
US 0 per Gallon
YEAR US 0 % CHANGE
1970 12.00 — — —
1973 15.00 25.0
1975 43.00 186.7
1978 47.50 10.5
1979 71.90 51.4
1980 122.98 71.0
1981 140.00 13.8
Source ; A E A , (1981), ’ Facts and Figures April. Brussels.
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Table 9.6
The impact of rising fuel cost 
on total world international scheduled operations
1972/73 73/74 79/80 +
Cost per US gallon (US0) 
(index) *
20.59
(152.5)
83.5
(618.5)
Total operating Expense/ATK (US0) 
(index)
17.7
(100.0)
19.2
(108.5)
36.4
(205.6)
Fuel cost as % of total operating 
Expense
11.0 12.2 25.0
Fuel expense per ATK (US0) 1.95 2.34 9.1
''■ Index based on April-June 1973= 13,5 0/US gallon= 100; 
earliest prices available on Route / Area basis.
+ Forecast
Source ; lATA publication, (1980), ' Aviation fuel-costs conservation’, 
Geneva, Switzerland. PP. 21.
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expense per available tonne-Km reached 9.1 US t in 1979/80 
compared to 1.95 US 0 in 1972/1973.
The increases in fuel cost and the fuel inefficiencies 
make long routes less expensive to operate and so causes 
carriers to move away from the short routes and this will 
automatically bring severe price competition on these 
long haul markets.
As the North Atlantic market was experiencing fierce 
competition and rapid growth in traffic, airlines in 
general were introducing new fare categories and new types 
of service in order to attract new segments of the public. 
Several new low fares such as the APEX, Super APEX and 
Standby were introduced to compete with non-IATA L a k e r ’s 
single class skytrain scheduled low fare service.
These Advance Purchase Excursion fares spread later to 
other transatlantic markets.
Table 9.1, mentioned earlier, shows the big percentage of 
competition occuring on the North Atlantic lATA scheduled 
services to be between the various promotional fares which 
in 1980 represented 74% of all types of fares available. 
Analysing the types of fares used by passengers, the 
share of First class and Concorde services did not show any 
drastic change, except during 1972 and 1973 when they 
accounted for 4.8% each year, while in 1980 they represented 
6.1% of total lATA North Atlantic scheduled traffic.
This drop in First class, together with the drop in Normal 
Economy share in 1972 and 1973 have benefitted the old type
-194-
excursion fares that of 14-17/21 days and 22-29/45 days 
Excursions to get 37,5% and 41.1% share of the lATA-scheduled 
market for 1972 and 1973 respectively.
These old promotional excursion fares started declining 
to 25.2%, 17.9%, 14.1% and 13.5% for 1977, 1978, 1979 and 
1980 respectively. This decrease in Excursions was mainly 
due to the introduction of new promotional low fares e.g.
APEX in 1975 and then in late 1977 Super APEX, Budget and 
Standby fares which were very competitive and more attractive 
to the traveller. In addition, Laker’s skytrain scheduled 
service introduced in late 1977 on New York-London route 
and later to Los Angeles and Miami has also effected this 
drop in the use of the old Excursions, where Laker’s one 
way fare on London-New York in winter 1977/78 mentioned 
in table 9.1 wasj[ 59 compared to £ 293.59 and £ 254 return 
fare for 14/21 and 22/45 days excursions respectively.
It is no surprise that lowering fares is applauded by the 
passenger where the public is seen the main beneficiary 
out of the continuous availability of low fare services 
by both scheduled and charter carriers but the perceived 
benefit to the traveller should not be on the expense of 
diminishing returns to the carriers. So the change in fare 
preference by the passenger with such a large share of 
the traffic coming from these low promotional fares is 
effecting and bringing profits down.
Table 9.7 refers to the US airlines’ financial results for 
their operation on the North Atlantic and it is quiet 
clear from it that following deregulation in 1978 the 
financial position of these carriers is deteriorating
-19 5- 
Table 9.7 
Revenues, Expenses and Income
for US carriers operating on 
North Atlantic market 
C in thousands $ )
Braniff 1978 1979 1980
Total operating Revenues 35,972 93,540 128,539
Total operating Expenses 31,791 110,012 166,010
Operating profit/Loss 4,181 -16,472 -37,471
Net Income 2,650 - 8,521 -47,147
Delta
Total operating Revenues 21,771 50,788 80,723
Total operating Expenses 19,429 45,406 81,133
Operating Profit/Loss 2,342 5,382 - 410
Net Income 1,268 3,372 765
Pan American
Total operating Revenues 1,031,502 1,152,798 1,389,396
Total operating Expenses 1,016,792 1,133,563 1,441,751
Operating Profit/Loss 14,710 19,235 - 52,355
Net Income - 6,908 12,432 - 94,682
TWA
Total operating Revenues 846,248 925,052 1,060,137
Total operating Expenses 799,625 920,610 1,054,633
Operating Profit/Loss 46,623 4,442 5,505
Net Income 83,964 9,151 5,829
Northwest
Total operating Revenues 
Total operating Expenses 
Operating Profit/Loss 
Net Income
41,904 
62,955 
-21,051 
- 8,398
105,221
134,493
-29,271
-12,447
Source ; CAB, ' Air Carrier Financial Statistics
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where the operating profits and net incomes are lowered 
drastically despite the improvement in passenger load 
factors shown in table 9.8.
Therefore, it is important to realize that even if there
were improvement in traffic and load factors, airlines 
require to improve their operating results by reducing 
their operating unit cost especially with the decrease 
in average revenues resulting from the availability of 
more lower fares, and to improve the industry’s cost 
efficiency it is necessary to maintain both low costs
by the new entrants and the continuing cost reduction by
the major established airlines.
In referring back to the subject of fares one could say 
that due to the greater freedom of choice, the availability 
of wide range of different promotional fares beside the 
First and Economy class fares and the involvement and 
influence of governements in approving fares, the passenger 
fare structure seems to operate in an extremely complicated 
and complex situation in contrast to the prederegulator y 
period when pricing was simple and fares tended to relate 
to the cost levels of the high cost carriers.
The complicated fare structure in the North Atlantic market 
resembled the range of products available, even that 
products have a basic similar character, which have various 
forms of restriction to cater for a wide spectrum of demand 
This complexity of fare structure brings with it management 
difficulties and higher airline costs.
-197-
Table 9.8
Revenue Passenger Load Factors
for US carriers operating on 
North Atlantic market
Airline 1977 1978 1979 1980
Braniff -- 59.2 57.3 63.5
Delta -- 67.0 78.3 78.2
Pan American 56.6 61.4 64.3 65.1
TWA 59.5 68,8 66.9 63.3
Northwest 40.0 57.0
Notes : Braniff inaugrated its Atlantic services on 18.3.78.
Delta " " ” " ”  30.4.78.
Northwest " " " " " Feb. 79.
Source ; CAB, ’ Air Carrier Traffic Statistics ’.
— 198 —
The amount of fare flexibility being available in the 
market and the degree to which airlines have utilized 
make the projection and extends of its effects difficult 
to realize and measure.
So with pricing being the root of the marketing strategy 
then the need arise for a more simplified fare structure. 
One remark has to be made concerning the dangers of having 
low fares is that a point may come when extra capacity is 
required to meet the severe competition and the extra demand 
for seats and this could mean operating at higher costs 
and at the same time being so high where the extra revenues 
derived out of selling so many extra cheap seats were not 
enough to meet these new operating costs, therefore a loss 
making situation will be created.
The industry also faces the problems of international 
inflation and currency fluctuations where the depreciated 
value of the US Dollar against most European currencies 
made the United States more attractive destination for 
foreign travellers and the increased availability of low 
fares brought a boom in non-USA originating traffic where 
scheduled carriers operating between Europe and Uqited 
States recorded an increase of 14.8% in non-US citizens 
with only 1% in US citizens in 1980. The total scheduled 
and charter US citizens share of traffic between Europe 
and USA declined by 2.5% and 5.9% in 1979 and 1980 compared 
to a growth of 23.2% and 12.5% for non-US citizens for 
the same years as shown in table 9.9.
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One final criterion to be mentioned that has shown an 
important and crucial significance in studying and 
analysing the North Atlantic operations concerns the 
capacity of supply offered by airlines.
A surplus in seating capacity is being developed and 
brought into the market due to the increase in flight 
frequencies especially at a time when frequencies are 
considered crucial in achieving market domination when 
no multilateral understanding and agreement can be 
reached to cut frequencies, the expansion in the number 
of points served by the carriers when in many new bilateral 
air agreements the U.S. and foreign airlines were authorised 
to serve many US cities beside New York, the use of large 
wide body size aircrafts, and the arrival of new carriers, 
all this resulted in an uneconomical breakeven load factors 
as the traffic dispersed into extra number of routes.
Table 9.10 shows the traffic carried by the individual 
airlines operating on the North Atlantic with most of these 
new comers appearing in late seventies as a result of the 
liberalized situation created in the market where entry 
has been freely open to new airlines following signing 
new air service agreements by the United States with the 
United Kingdom and some other European countries mentioned 
in earlier chapter.
In concluding this chapter one can say that the pressure 
and the threat on the established carriers from new entrants 
will always be there where the potential for new airlines 
to enter the market will exist with the initial capital
Table 9.10
( 000)
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Total North Atlantic traffic 
by individual carriers 
1972 - 1980
Airlines 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
1- British Airways 1,165 1, 350 1,153 1,217 1,416 1 ,358 1,797 2,100 2,106
2- British Caledonian - 86 66 - “ 7 71 95 149
3- Pan American 2,069 2, 391 1,791 1,643 2,070 2 ,030 2 ,146 2,521 2,230
4- TWA 2,084 1, 920 1,797 1,736 1 ,855 2,050 2,417 2 ,491 2,352
5- Air Canada 692 763 762 741 733 814 793 856 844
6- CP Air 219 238 261 290 316 369 392 400 453
7- Aer Lingus 281 277 247 198 215 227 290 327 268
8- Air France 638 624 632 613 647 677 717 723 736
9- SAS 417 474 402 401 460 480 531 556 524
10“ Alitalia 550 535 513 427 441 491 522 504 534
11“ Sabena 209 269 265 243 253 232 213 266 291
12“ Iberia 245 298 304 252 235 250 279 297 335
13” Swissair 340 408 381 346 414 428 476 478 536
14“ Olympic 127 184 144 135 188 174 188 205 196
15“ Finnair 45 56 50 67 ' 68 65 79 106 107
16“ TAP 122 117 111 121 145 189 190 196 140
17“ LOT — 24 41 44 58 73 . 101 108
18“ El A1 267 248 246 191 263 270 283 339 306
19“ Air India 116 111 74 120 152 152 171 173 185
20- Lufthansa 598 663 641 673 748 752 875 929 1,051
21“ KLM 610 660 607 593 642 655 703 789 818
22“ Braniff “ “ - “ 118 333 397
23“ PIA 9 ~ “ 23 33 39 39 - 57
24“ CSA 16 NA NA 35 NA NA 27 NA 18
25“ Royal Air Maroc - “ “ 6 NA NA 28 NA 45
26“ TAROM — - NA 5 NA NA 10 NA 16
27“ Alia - “ ” - — NA 25 NA 101
28“ JAT “ “ “ “ NA ■ NA 33 NA 64
29“ Laker ” “ - ” ma NA 253 NA 720
30” Delta “ “ - ... «• “ 79 NA 252
31“ Northwest “ “ “ “ M - - 306
32” Capital - “ “ “ - - - - 204
33“ Trans America - “ “ ” — “ - 83
34“ Air Florida “ “ - “ - _ 23
35“ World — •M - - - - .. 66
36“ Western “ “ - - •U _ „ 2
37“ Air Berlin “ “ - - MÉ- - 2
38- Kuwait Airways “ - “ “ - “ “ - 1
Total 10,819 11 ,696 10,489 10,120 11,352 11,782 13,826 14,785 16,625
Others 2,194 2 ,331 2,370 2,298 2,482 3,340 3,002 3,804 2,150
Total 13,013 14 ,027 12,859 12,418 13,834 15,122 16,828 18,589 18,775
Source; lATA^ Statistics unit-Industry Research Division,
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investment needed to start and operate is not enormous 
like that in other industries and especially with lower 
operating costs. But a point will come where the operating 
costs of these newly entered carriers will rise to meet 
the extra or new costing obligation to satisfy a higher 
number and possibly divergent type of passengers.
Also when the established carriers lower their cheapest 
restricted excursion fares in the off-season to match 
the unrestricted low fare offered by the charter or the 
new comers, a situation of much confusion could arise 
where such established carriers as British Airways 
might face criminal and civil anti trust suits in United 
States courts if say a lower fare British carrier such 
as Laker Airways or any new carrier that might appear 
in the future to operate on the UK-USA market were unable 
to survive the heightened fare competition due to the 
introduction of these low fares by the established.
With the new pressures of increased deregulation, the 
airlines to survive need to be more efficient in their 
operation and to be innovative they require to be 
effectively competitive and profitable.
* * * * * * *
CONCLUSIONS
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CONCLUSIONS :
Having investigated and examined the North Atlantic market 
by looking at its crucial issues of capacity and competition, 
the researcher now focuses on the final conclusions reached 
out of the study on which his remedial actions to the 
crisis lay upon ;
1- The American experience of deregulation :
With United States looking toward competition as the only 
possible way for air transport industry to operate at 
healthy environment does not mean that other countries 
have to change and accept accordingly.
As no evidence available to suggest that deregulation in 
the USA had achieved satisfactory results in the early 
years of its implementation, it is surprising that the 
American Administration should embark so quickly in applying 
it into an international market, such as the North Atlantic, 
involved with many different nations by exerting pressure 
on others especially the European countries to follow 
suit in accepting deregulation.
It would have been more reasonable if deregulation of the 
US airline industry had been given more time to reshape 
business domestically and for its practical effects to 
be valued, only then the international community would 
have been in a position to accept the economic advantages 
and the practicality of such a change, instead of being 
so quick in thrusting it upon other unwilling countries 
when its first experiment had not yet been proved workable.
So it could indeed be said that this unilateral practice
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by the United States, in imposing its own views of what 
it thinks best in the public interest, can prove very 
difficult for other countries to swallow.
The political and socio-economic barriers existing 
between various countries brings operating restrictions 
on many international airlines.
With the need by the international community for an 
extensive network of regular and reliable air services 
together with the necessity for a body such as lATA to 
control negotiation of fares to reach compromise formula 
that take into account the diverse economic and monetary 
circumstances as well as the various categories of demand, 
therefore the competition process needs a regulatory 
framework within which to operate effectively. 
Internationally, the moves towards deregulation seem 
complicated by the sheer fact that no common political 
framework or system exist that suits and satisfies all 
the countries.
But, on the other hand, one has not to be reluctant in 
admitting to consider competition in air transport as a 
process that would enable or make use of new and better 
ideas. There still be space to accept the idea that 
compeition is the force that will keep the market volatile 
and providing different levels of service to the public 
at an economical and feasible level for the airlines, 
but the fact is that this will only be realised efficiently 
if there remain some guiding restrictions as a framework 
within which to exercise the competition process.
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2- The satisfaction out of air policies ;
The availability of more than one airline operating 
international services in one country with one being 
privately owned and the other being partially or wholly 
controlled by government would need an air policy that 
ensures the satisfaction for both carriers where having 
a profitable airline would require not the same under­
standing and approach to that of serving as a public utility 
Owing to the fact that the North Atlantic market involves 
many European countries together with United States and 
Canada, then it is very important to realize that these 
countries have wide range of policies that are not always 
similar,
The varying economic and political systems that exist 
even in Europe where most countries are members of the 
European Economic Community (EEC), have caused vastly 
different economic approaches to civil aviation to emerge, 
this is, of course, specially relevant in the democracies 
where the election of new government is often marked by 
great shifts in political and economical idealogy.
This diversity of economic systems means each country 
has its own and different approach in achieving its 
economic objectives with the objective of maintaining 
its airline industry being part of this economic reality. 
Therefore it would be no surprise that the air policy 
objectives of one country e.g. the United States might 
not be compatible with other countries requirements, and 
so the reconciliation between them looks difficult to 
accomplish.
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3- The multilateral harmony ;
It has been widely accepted that bilateral agreements 
tend to be the only really effective international 
regulatory means available to the air transport industry 
when multilateral agreements cannot be reached.
But if these agreements are formulated for the benefit 
of international interests, then individual countries 
should not be permitted to introduce and peddle on 
unfavourable policy leaving the other members of the 
international community being forced into conforming with 
alien policies to their own detriment.
In these circumstances bilateral agreements may even be 
a step away from the introduction of acceptable policies 
to the international scene when one country e.g. the 
United States apply its open sky policy in bilateral 
agreement as tactical step to force the results of this 
bilateral agreement to be accepted by other countries 
no matter how unfortunate results had that bilateral 
agreement produced.
With the bilateral agreements approach being machined 
and implemented, where the capacity issue has been dealt 
with, and as the market involves so many airlines, routes 
and countries, then the effectiveness would be more if a 
multilateral approach is seeked to bring together the 
capacity limitation issue on a broader scale than leaving 
it to the dual understanding and agreement of only the 
two countries concerned in each particular bilateral 
agreement.
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Also the capacity reduction measure should only be taken 
as part of wider scale of action including the costs 
reduction so that this capacity reduction does not take 
the shape of harming the scheduled convenience of having 
very high load factors, therefore a balance of interests 
must be maintained in achieving these two objectives.
In achieving the objectives of having lower costs by 
cutting flight frequencies and being effective in not 
harming the scheduled quality, would require the redis­
tribution of the availability of types of fares where 
the business sector would not be effected in obtaining 
the seats required at relatively no change and by making 
the allocation acceptable to all the different type of 
passengers.
4- The governmental and political role :
It is very important to notice the fact that the influence 
and role of many governments in their airlines* affairs 
will not change dramatically in the near future due to 
the great determination of most governments in protecting 
their national airlines. It is essential to remember that 
when negotiating and approving fares for their airlines, 
governments tend to consider and protect the commercial 
features within the pricing policies where they do not 
jeoprady the survival and continuity of their carriers.
The determination of governments is maintained as long 
as the airline industry continue attracting tourists and 
business passengers and providing foreign currency beside 
the political and economical importance.
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For that reason, the continuing existence of international 
airlines is a reality that need no questioning in which 
they will remain being subsidised by their governments 
where these airlines have been trying to stay in the 
market, meeting fierce competition and striving to keep 
their market share only by disregarding the costs of 
competitiveness.
The international scheduled airlines, especially those 
of western Europe operating on the North Atlantic, who 
are either partially or wholly government controlled and 
whom tend to be the main international airlines (flag 
carriers) of their countries would remain and continue 
providing services at uneconomical fares whom it wont be 
realistic for these countries to leave their carriers with 
financial difficulties but to rush in helping them to 
avoid their collapse, this is so as long as : 
a- these governments are accepting and adhering to the 
undisputable importance of the International Air Transport 
Association (lATA) where no other workable and replaceable 
machinery has been introduced to meet the general consent 
of the interested parties.
Here it is essential not to forget that lATA is the body 
approved by most of world airlines to set air fares and 
it is the creation of governments and not a private cartel 
with the special and peculiar power of these governments 
in it ;
b- fhe International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), 
whom most if not all of the countries concerned are part
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of, continue providing its support to lATA machinery; ;
c- the machinery and influence of air regulatory bodies |
of most countries in most cases remains under the advise j
and control of governments; and |
d- there is no compromise on the issues of meeting the |i
demands and the interests of passengers, airlines and ;
nations and in ensuring the long term economic stability
I
of the industry. So here, one has to raise one simple I
question, can the air carriers meet these two fundemental 
obligations that of providing services and of receiving 
a reasonable rate of return ? .
Finally, the researcher concludes not to leave the 
international air transport industry to the mercy of one 
particular system, advocated by only one sector of this 
important and sensitive market, to be forced upon and 
implemented by other unwilling countries.
One has to keep in mind in answering what would be best 
for the whole industry one simple fact:
Should the industry allow the present competitive and 
deregulatory trends in the airlines’ operations to continue 
and expand in such a free open skies style expecting bad 
financial results with the possibility of more airlines 
going out of business, or should it seek a wider measure 
of understanding allowing a system of controlled 
competition which protects the interests not only of 
carriers but of passengers too as well as the industry 
itself with all its international multiplicity.
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SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH : !
During the course of the work, the researcher faced many j
questions that could be a starting material for further i
research within the subject of competition and capacity i
jin the air transport industry as a whole or specifically \
on North Atlantic, ;
These questions fall entirely within the boundaries of !
marketing management approach, \
If the researcher was to pursue a new work, then he would !
surely not miss one of the following issues: I
a- The functions performed by the different non-price |
Icompetitive factors, if considered to be more effective in j
building sales than the equivalent of a price reduction, !
can appeal to air traveller and they may help to secure :I
more consumer loyalty where a lower fare may not be !
I
significant enough to be noticed by some passengers. i
b- To test whether each passenger has a pattern of preference i 
toward a particular type of air service reflected in the i
frequencies with which he or she uses that service, and that i
ithese preferences change relatively slowly over the time, i
c- Does advertising, as a product differentiation criterion, \
curtail competition in the open sky-freedom air policy i
approach by putting up the cost of entry and limiting ,
price competition and so making demand for travel more
inelastic, ;
*************
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APPENDIX I
RECOMMENDATIONS
To enable the air transport industry on the North Atlantic 
achieve the objectives of all interested parties in 
providing an adequate level of services to the travelling 
public and at the same time maintain a strong, efficient 
and commercially effective industry, the following remedial 
actions can be recommended:
1- The achievement of profitability by the airlines and
the fulfilment of public service depend on the co-ordination 
of both governments and airlines.
Governments have to resolve the basic regulatory policy 
differences which have contributed to the air carriers' 
economic decline in recent years and should at the same 
time discourage their carriers from increasing their supply 
of capacity.
2- A joint investigation by the airlines is urgently 
required to examine tariffs and ways of adjusting supply 
to meet the differing types of demand.
From the general marketing point of view, market research 
is needed, the passengers' views must be more accurately 
determined concerning low fares, the effect they have on 
quality of service,and on how they might wish their money 
be better used while at the same time understanding the 
airlines' legitimate need to sell more seats and keep costs 
down. This may be done by testing the market and finding 
out how the air traveller is accepting high fares by 
measuring the elasticity of demand principally at a time 
when costs are not coming down.
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Any successful policy aimed at the growth of passenger 
traffic has to remember that air fares must remain 
affordable by the passengers.
3- A greater sense of recognition is required by all 
parties concerned of the importance of costs factor 
when pricing and setting fares,also that improvements 
in load factors and more revenue from each flight are 
two essential prereuisites of future profitability.
In addition, as the fuel prices effect and play a big 
role in the high trend in costs, the recent changes 
occuring in world oil prices may ease the pressure on 
airlines,
4- Achieving a better load factor will not by itself 
solve all the problem, there should be better utilisation 
of the capacity provided and at the same time passengers 
have to be paying fares that are built and related to 
costs thus resulting in higher yields.
5- With a view to the new noise regulations which will 
come in force in 1986 where many airlines are seeking to 
change and mdernise their fleets to meet these new 
requirements, there is thus a remarkable opportunity for 
those concerned to agree now on how to reconstruct their 
capacity and plan to meet realistically the actual demand 
for scheduled services, at the same time there must be 
understanding with the non-scheduled carriers in order
to reach new bilateral agreements which settle the capacity 
issues.
A free for all open-sky policy cannot help the industry
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to get out of its present crisis and complex situation, 
and in the absence of greater international understanding 
resort must be made to the traditional machinery of 
such bilateral air agreements.
Here one must note that neither a return to the old 
policy of total regulation would help the situation, and 
on the other hand it would only force the industry to 
suffer more and damage the economy of many countries 
in continuing advocating liberalisation in that seeking 
immediate profit while neglecting the long range importance 
of the industry to all of us and the generations to come 
and its value for the world's economy.
It is not up to a few to impose their will on the industry 
with threats to implement the rules of competition, rather 
than that the industry should seek survival at healthy 
environment and by giving fair and equal opportunity for 
all to participate and within agreed rules which everyone 
subscribes to and accept.
6- The notion of equal opportunity should be given more 
consideration when setting international air policies.
It is unrealistic to regard equal opportunity to compete 
as currently existing while no conditions are laid down 
of who is allowed to make use of these opportunities and 
without there being clearly accepted distinctions and 
definitions of the diverse markets in which particular 
airlines have a stake.
To allow a large established scheduled international 
carrier e.g. British Airways or Pan American and a
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supplemental carrier e.g. World Airways or Laker to 
operate in the same market and with identical rules 
cannot be considered competition on an equal basis.
It would be too easy for Laker to skim the benefit of 
competition by achieving higher load factors and higher 
yields out of their revenue while having substanially 
lower operating costs. While the scheduled airline is 
left to uphold the public interest by operating all 
the various unrewarding routes with necessarily much 
higher operating expenses.
On the other hand, it would not be considered a fair 
and equal opportunity when these established carriers 
can use their great resources together with the direct 
or indirect subsidies made available to them by their 
governments, in such a shrewd and tactical way to match 
the low fares applied by those low cost carrriers no 
matter how uneconomical they are and go even further to 
offer lower fares, in that dragging airlines to follow 
suit. Such action may cause the low cost carriers not 
being able to continue as they have to go into providing 
new capacities to be competitive and attractive to passenger. 
The inability of continuing in such difficult financial 
circumstances will surely mean unfair and unequal 
opportunity for airlines to operate,
* * * * * * * * *
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APPENDIX II: ROUTES SCHEDULE OF BERMUDA AGREEMENT II
Sectim 1; Scheduled Combination Air Sendee Routes for the Uidtcd States 
US Route 1: Atlantic Combination Air Service
(B)
Intermediate PointsW)u s  Gateway Points 
Anchorage 
Atlanta 
Boston 
Chicago 
Dallas/Ft. Worth 
Detroit 
Houston^)
Los Angeles 
Miami 
New York 
Philadelphia 
San Francisco 
Seattle 
Washington/Baltimore
An additional point to be agreed between the Contracting Partics(‘)
(C)
Points in UK Territory 
London 
Prestwick/Glasgow
(D)
Points Beyond (0  
Frankfurt 
Hamburg 
Munich 
Berlin
(:) May not be served nonstop until three years after this Agreement enters into force. .
()) Only one United States airline may bo designated to serve each point in Column (D) on this route, including those in footnote 2, except for Frankfurt 
for which two airlines may be designated on US Routes 1 and 2 taken together.
US Route 2; Round the World Comblumtion Air Seiricc(*}
W)
u s  Gateway Points
Segment (o): New York 
Washington/Baltimore
(5)
Intermediate Points
(Q
Points in UK Territory 
London
Segment (b): Honolulu 
Los Angeles 
San Francisco
Japan Hong Kong
(D)
Points Beyond
FrankfurtO 
Turkey 
Lebanon 
Syria 
Iran 
Pakistan 
New Delhi 
Calcutta 
Points on Segment (b)Q)
Thailand 
Points on Segment («X^)
C) Not more than seven flights per week may operate in each direction on each segmoit.
0  Not more than two United States airlines may be designated to serve Frankfurt on US Routes 1 and 2. taken together. 
0  Segments (d) and (jb) shall be combined, except as may be agreed pursuant to Article 2. paragraph (S).
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Section 3: Scheduled Combination Air Service Routes for the United Kingdom 
UK Route 1: Atlantic Combinatitm Air Sorice
(A)
UK Gateway Points
London
Manchester
Prestwick/Glasgow
Intermediate Points
(C)
Points in US Territory
Atlanta(') 
Boston 
Chicago 
Dallas/Ft. Worth(') 
Detroit 
Hoiiston 
Los Angeles 
Miami 
New York 
Philadelphia 
San Francisco 
Seattle 
Washington/Baltimore
W)
Points Beyond
(*) May not be served nonstop until three years after this Agreement enters into force.
(A)
UK Gateway Points 
London 
Manchester 
Prestwick/Glasgow
UK Route 2: Atlantic Ctwabination Air Service via Canada
(B)
Intermediate Points 
Canada
(C)
Points in US Territory 
Boston 
Chicago 
Dallas/Ft Worth(*) 
Detroit 
New York 
Philadelphia 
Washington/Baltimore
W)
Points Beyond
(A)
UK Gateway Points 
London 
Manchester 
Prestwick/Glasgow
UK Route 3: Atlantic Combination Air Service Beyond to Mexico City
(B)
Intermediate Points
iC)
Points in US Territory 
Boston 
Detroit 
New York 
Philadelphia 
Washington/Baltimore
W)
Points Beyond 
Mexico City
(*) May not be served nonstop until three years after this Agreement enters into force.
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(A)
UK Gateway Poi/ils 
London 
Manchester 
Prestwick/Glasgow
UK Rovto 4: AUlMie ComUnation Air Sdnrtrt B^ond to Sonih Àxàeiica
<*) to
fatemediate Points Points in US Territory 
Atlanta(^) 
Houston
(D)
Points Beyond 
Venezuela 
Colombia 
Manaus 
Peru(*)
M)
UK Gateway Points 
London
UK Route 5: Atlantic Combination Air Service Beyond to Japan
intermediate Points
(C)
Points in US Territory 
Anchorage
(D)
Points Beyond 
Japan
(*) May not be eervcd nonstop until three years after this Agreement enters into force. 
0  Without rights to carry local traffic between Houston and Peru.
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APPENDIX III
ARTICLE 11 OF BERMUDA TWO AGREEMENT ( FAIR COMPETITION )
(1) The designated airline or airlines of one contracting 
party shall have a fair and equal opportunity to compete 
with the designated airline or airline of the other 
contracting party.
(2) These designated airline or airlines of one contracting 
party shall take into consideration the interests of the 
designated airline or airlines of the other contracting 
party so as not to affect unduly that airline’s or those 
airlines' services on all or part of the same routes.
In particular, when a designated airline of one contracting 
party proposes to inaugurate services on a gateway route 
segment already served by a designated airline or airlines 
of the other contracting party, the incumbent airline or 
airlines shall each refrain from increasing the frequency 
of their serivces to the extent and for the time necessary 
to ensure that the airline inaugurating service may fairly 
excercise its rights under paragraph (1) of this article. 
Such obligation to refrain from increasing frequency shall 
not last longer than two years or beyond the point when 
the inaugurating airline matches of the frequencies of any 
incumbent airline, whichever occurs first, and shall not 
apply if the services to be inaugurated are limited as 
to their capacity by the licence or certificate granted 
by the designating contracting party.
(3) Services provided by a designated airline under this 
Agreement shall retain as their primary objective the
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provision of capacity adequate to the traffic demands 
between the country of which such airline is a national 
and the country of ultimate destination of the traffic.
The right to embark or disembark on such services 
international traffic destined for and coming from third 
countries at a point or points on the routes specified 
in this agreement shall be exercised in accordance with 
the general principles of orderly development of intern­
ational air transport to which both contracting parties 
subscribe and shall be subject to the general principle 
that capacity should be related to:
(a) the traffic requirements between the country of 
origin and the countries of ultimate destination of 
the traffic;
(b) the requirements of the area through which the airline 
passes, after taking account of local and regional 
services ; and
(c) the requirements of through airline operations.
(4) The frequency and capacity of services to be provided 
by the designated airlines of the contracting parties 
shall be closely related to the requirements of all 
categories of public demand for the carriage of passengers 
and cargo including mail in such a way as to provide 
adequate service to the public and to permit the reasonable 
development of routes and viable airline operations.
Due regard shall be paid to efficiency of operation so 
that frequency and capacity are provided at levels 
appropriate to accomodate the traffic at load factors
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consistent with tariffs based on the criteria set forth 
in paragraph (2) of Article 12 (Tariffs).
(5) The contracting parties recognize that airline actions 
leading to excess capacity or to the underprovision of 
capacity can both run counter to the interests of the 
travelling public. Accordingly, in the particular case 
of combination air services on the North Atlantic routes 
specified in paragraph (1) of Annex 2, they have agreed 
to establish the procedures set forth in Annex 2,
With respect to other routes and services, if one 
contracting party believes that the operations of a 
designated airline or airlines of other Contracting Party 
have been inconsistent with the principles set forth in 
this Article, it may request consultations pursuant to 
Article 16 (Consultations) for the purpose of reviewing 
the operations in question to determine whether they are 
in conformity with these principles. In such consultations 
there shall be taken into consideration the operations 
of all airlines serving the market in question and 
designated by the contracting party whose airline or 
airlines are under review.
If the Contracting Parties conclude that the operations 
under review are not in conformity with the principles 
set forth in this Article, they may decide upon appropriate 
corrective or remedial measures, except that, where 
frequency or capacity limitations are already provided 
for a route specified in Annex 1, the Contracting Parties 
may not vary those limitations or impose additional 
limitations except by amendment of this Agreement.
-223-
(6) Neither Contracting Party shall unilaterally 
restrict the operations of the designated airlines 
of the other except according to the terms of this 
Agreement or by such uniform conditions as may be 
contemplated by the Convention.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
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APPENDIX IV
SECTION 102 OF THE AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT OF 1978 
In the exercise and performance of its powers and duties 
under this Act with respect to interstate and overseas 
air transportation, the Board shall consider the following, 
among other things, as being in the public interest, and 
in accordance with the public convenience and necessity:
(1) The assignment and maintenance of safety as the highest 
priority in air commerce, and prior to the authorisation
of new air transportation services, full evaluation of the 
recommendations of the Secretary of Transportation on the 
safety implicarions of such new services and full evaluation 
of any report or recommendation sumitted under section 107 
of this Act,
(2) The prevention of any deterioration in established 
safety procedures, recognising the clear intent, encourag­
ement, and dedication of the Congress to the furtherance 
of the highest degree of safety in air transportation and 
air commerce, and the maintenance of the safety vigilance 
that has evolved within air transportation and air commerce 
and has come to expected by the travelling and shipping 
public.
(3) The availability of a variety of adequate, economic, 
efficient, and low-price services by air carriers without 
unjust discriminations, undue preferences or advantages,or 
unfair or deceptive practices, the need to improve relations 
among, and co-ordinate transportation by, air carriers, and 
the need to encourage fair wages and equitable working 
conditions.
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(4) The placement of maximum reliance on competitive 
market forces and on actual and potential competition
(A) to provide the needed air transportation system, and
(B) to encourage efficient and well managed carriers to 
earn adequate profits and to attract capital.
(5) The development and maintenance of a sound regulatory 
environment which is responsive to the needs of the public 
and in which decisions reached promptly in order to 
facilitate adaption of the air transportation system to 
the present and future needs of the domestic and foreign 
commerce of the United States, the Postal Service, and the 
national defence.
(6) The encouragement of air service at major urban areas 
through secondary or satellite airports, where consistent 
with regional airport plans of regional and local authorities, 
and when such encouragement is endorsed by appropriate State 
entities encouraging such service by air carriers whose
sole responsibility in any specific market is to provide 
service exclusively at the secondary or satellite airport, 
and fostering an environment which reasonably enables such 
carriers to establish themselves and to develop their 
secondary or satellite airport services.
(7) The prevention of unfair, deceptive, predatory, or 
anticompetitive practices in air transportation, and the 
avoidance of-
(A ) unreasonable industry concentration, excessive market 
domination, and monompoly power; and
(B) other conditions;
that would tend to allow one or more air carriers unreason-
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ably to increase prices, reduce services, or exclude 
competition in air transportation.
(8) The maintenance of a comprehensive and convenient 
system of continuous scheduled airline service for small 
communities and for isolated areas, with direct Federal 
assistance where appropriate.
(9) The encouragement, development and maintenance of an 
air transportation system relying on actual and potential 
competition to provide efficiency, innovation, and low 
prices, and to determine the variety, quality, and price 
of air transportation services.
(10) The encouragement of entry into air transportation 
markets by new air carriers, the encouragement of entry 
into additional air transportation markets by existing air 
carriers, and the continued strengthening of small air 
carriers so as to assure a more effective, competitive 
airline industry.
* * * * * * * * * *
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